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FROM THE EDITORS
The story of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s is a well-known one, at
least in khaki circles, but for many it has receded into an iconic past that seems to
hold few obvious lessons for the present. In “Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today,” John Hanley asks us to revisit the context and
development of the original, Soviet-inspired Maritime Strategy in the light of the
challenge currently posed to the United States and its allies by the People’s Republic of China. The primary focus of his discussion is the role of the Chief of Naval
Operations’ Strategic Studies Group (SSG) as catalyst of the strategy. Writing as
one intimately familiar with this organization and those then associated with it,
many of whom would occupy very senior positions in the Navy in later years,
Hanley emphasizes the critical importance of the SSG not only in effective exploitation of sensitive intelligence on the Soviet navy (by now a relatively well-known
part of the story) but also in conceptual breakthroughs in combined-arms antisubmarine operations and in what later came to be called “net-centric warfare.”
He suggests that a group with the attributes of the SSG (collocated with the Naval
War College but working more or less directly for the Chief of Naval Operations)
might profitably refocus its efforts to concentrate on developing imaginative
strategic counters to the near-term Chinese threat to American global maritime
operations. John Hanley, a former Navy nuclear submarine officer, served on the
Strategic Studies Group for eighteen years, eventually as deputy director.
Central to Chinese maritime preoccupations in the twenty-first century is
certain to be the South China Sea. For some years, China has advanced a vague
claim to “sovereignty” over a large swath of that strategic body of water (the
“nine-dotted line”). More recently, it has tried in various ways to strengthen its
hold on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, ownership of which remains contested
with several Southeast Asia nations (as well as Taiwan), and has attempted to exert greater control over fisheries there and the transit of foreign shipping. James
R. Holmes, in “Strategic Features of the South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood
for Hegemons,” offers an analysis of the region that takes its point of departure
from the geopolitical writings of the great American naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan. Specifically, Holmes argues that Mahan’s analysis of the significance of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean for the maritime security of the
United States at the beginning of the twentieth century provides a useful template
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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for understanding China’s relationship to the South China Sea today and in the
future. His conclusion is that China’s geostrategic position there is weaker than
many may be inclined to think.
One of the most important mechanisms for keeping the peace in East Asia
is the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Its importance for the United States is all
the greater given the steady buildup of Chinese naval and maritime capabilities
in the region that we have witnessed in recent years. In “The Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force in the Age of Multilateral Cooperation: Nontraditional Security,” Captain Takuya Shimodaira, JMSDF, argues that Japan needs to ramp
up maritime cooperation with friendly navies, above all with that of the United
States, by a new emphasis on the conduct of what he terms “Noncombat Military
Operations,” particularly humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Captain
Shimodaira is currently the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Liaison Officer
to the Naval War College.
In “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain,” Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak provide a synoptic overview of an increasingly
important topic on the global security agenda. They adopt a middle position
between those of alarmists and skeptics concerning the potential of “cybered
conflict” (a term they seek to introduce) to be a “game changer”—that is, to have
a truly strategic impact—in the future security environment. Paying particular
attention to the evolution of cyber capabilities in the Navy, they hold out hope
that properly developed cyber forces can serve to maintain or enhance traditional
American military advantages. Peter Dombrowski and Chris Demchak are professors in the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies.
Also high on the current global security agenda is the issue of piracy. Christopher Spearin, in “Promising Privateers? Understanding the Constraints of Contemporary Private Security at Sea,” provides a careful discussion of the nature and
role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) today in addressing the
threat of piracy, particularly in the waters off Somalia. He argues that it is misleading to understand these entities, as many have suggested, as analogous to the
privateers of earlier centuries. Many questions remain to be answered, however,
concerning their relationship to national navies and authorities. Christopher
Spearin is a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada.
Finally, Marcus O. Jones, in “Innovation for Its Own Sake: The Type XXI
U-boat,” offers a fascinating case study in naval technological innovation in
wartime. He argues that the introduction of an entirely new submarine design
by Nazi Germany in 1943, often understood as reflecting the German obsession
later in the war with technological “wonder weapons” that would compensate
for strategic and tactical weaknesses, was instead a reasonable gamble that
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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acknowledged the growing ineffectiveness of the Nazi U-boat effort in the teeth
of superior American and British countermeasures. However, he also notes that
it represented a poor allocation of resources by the German high command and
that it made no difference in the outcome of the war.
OUR LATEST NEWPORT PAPER
Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009, Newport Paper 40, edited
by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, of the Naval War College, is now available in print for online sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office, at bookstore
.gpo.gov. This, our latest monograph (also available on our own website) collects
expert analyses of commerce raiding during the past two centuries in terms of the
factors of time, space, and force, as well as with respect to positive and negative
objectives. A consideration of the range of historical case studies in this volume
provides an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which old and long-forgotten
problems might reemerge to challenge future naval planners and strategists.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335,
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1

10

Naval War College: Spring 2014 Full Issue

Rear Admiral Walter E. “Ted” Carter, Jr., became the
fifty-fourth President of the U.S. Naval War College
on 2 July 2013. A native of Burrillville, Rhode Island,
he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981,
was designated a Naval Flight Officer in 1982, and
graduated from Top Gun in 1985.
His career as an aviator includes sea assignments in
Fighter Squadron (VF) 161, on board USS Midway
(CV 41); in VF-21, the “Freelancers,” on board USS
Independence (CV 62); in Carrier Air Wing Five
(CVW 5); in command of the VF-14 “Tophatters”;
and as executive officer of USS Harry S. Truman
(CVN 75), culminating in command of USS Camden
(AOE 2) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Subsequent
fleet command assignment includes service as Commander, Enterprise Carrier Strike Group (CSG 12).
Carter has served in numerous shore assignments,
including VF-124, the “Gunslingers”; in Fighter Wing
Pacific; as executive assistant to the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command; as chief of staff
of the Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Joint Forces
Command; as Commander, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command; and as Director, 21st Century Sailor
Office (N17).
He has led strategic projects, including the dis
establishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and
most recently, was charged with leading Task Force
R ESILIENT.
He is the recipient of various personal awards, including the Defense Superior Service Medal (two
awards), Legion of Merit (three awards), Distinguished Flying Cross with Combat V, Bronze Star,
Air Medal (two with Combat V and five strike/
flight), and Navy and Marine Corps Commendation
Medal (two with Combat V). He was also awarded
the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Leadership
Award and the U.S. Navy League’s John Paul Jones
Award for Inspirational Leadership and was appointed an Honorary Master Chief by the Master
Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.
He has accumulated 6,150 flight hours in F-4, F-14,
and F-18 aircraft and has made 2,016 carrier-arrested
landings, the record among all active and retired U.S.
naval aviation designators. He has also flown 125
combat missions in support of joint operations.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Education That Matters

THE YEAR 2014 MARKS the 130th anniversary of the General Order

that established the Naval War College to conduct “an advanced
course of professional study for naval officers.” Over the ensuing decades the College has expanded to include students from all military services, from nationalsecurity-related agencies, and from over sixty-five allied nations. Today, the College is organizationally adaptable, educationally flexible, and more Fleet relevant
than ever. The decisions officers make to seek out a service college education
are complex, and we are working to make the Naval War College an irresistible
choice for our brightest and best young officers.
An officer’s career of twenty to twenty-five years can have as few as a half-dozen
decision points when key assignment choices must be made. Many of these choices
are essentially “hardwired” as mandatory “career gates” necessary to achieve duecourse progression within a chosen community. At the same time, promotion
within the officer community is a highly competitive process, and thoughtful officers carefully weigh the advantages that each potential job will bring in terms of
increased operational experience, development of executive and decision-making
skills, and expansion of their knowledge of “big picture” issues necessary to provide leadership at the most senior levels. Even with the need to stay on a careerrelevant “glide slope,” every career has time for professional development, and I
would argue that there is no better or faster way for officers to transition from
platform-centric expertise to executive leadership competence than completion
of the Naval War College program. The investment of one year of study will pay
significant dividends for the remainder of their careers. We recognize, however,
that there have been administrative hurdles that may have discouraged some “hotrunning” officers from seeking the benefits that a service-college education can
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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provide. We are committed to addressing these important issues and removing
these impediments to the maximum extent possible.
In the past, officers attending the resident Naval War College course were
provided with “not observed” fitness reports that simply documented their time
at the College. Many officers chose not to attend the course out of fear that a
year-long “hole” in their career would be detrimental to their chances for promotion. I am happy to announce that a change was recently implemented to provide
officers who excel in our academic program (finishing in the top 20 percent of
each class) with “observed” reports signed by a Navy two-star. Selection boards
will now be able to see that these officers competed with joint service officers in
a highly demanding educational program—and came out on top!
While the College’s well-known core courses are extremely rigorous and rewarding, a number of other programs have been developed to enrich further the
Newport experience.

• Through a new program, Advanced Studies in Naval Strategy (ASNS),
a select group of students will complete a focused concentration on the
strategic use of maritime power in the modern age, in addition to completing the College’s three highly relevant core courses, which provide a broad,
graduate-level education in joint military operations, the national security
environment, and the interaction of strategy and policy. Simultaneously with
their core curriculum studies, these select students will also complete a series
of three advanced elective courses focusing on international security, strategy and economics, and the strategic role of sea power, both historically and
in the future. The final component of the ASNS program will be a focused
thirteen-week capstone project that enables students to develop strategic
products tailored to specific issues identified by the Fleet and Combatant
Commanders. Successful graduates will be assigned a Navy subspecialty
code 2300-P to identify them as “Naval Strategists.” The pilot offering of the
ASNS program is being conducted during academic year 2013–14, with a
ramp-up to a fully staffed program expected by 2015.

• Students with an interest in taking a “deep dive” into research on a range of
topics can augment their core courses with selection as Halsey, Mahan, or
Gravely Scholars. These scholars engage in collaborative student/faculty efforts that use operational analysis supported by free-play war gaming to examine in detail such issues as the medium-intensity access/denial challenge;
high-intensity conventional warfare centered on a technologically sophisticated access-denial challenge posed by a “near peer” military competitor;
and strategic-level challenges, such as nuclear weapons, deterrence, and
escalation-control issues. The analysis is conducted at the classified, tactical
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level and relies on military and civilian student expertise to maintain its
relevance to the Fleet and appropriate staffs.

• Students participating in the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S)
intermediate-level Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) course may
apply for a competitive appointment to the Maritime Advanced Warfighting
School (MAWS), which educates officers to be operational-level leaders—to
understand and apply maritime power effectively; to stand up and lead Operational Planning Teams (OPTs); and to think creatively and critically, evaluating complex, chaotic security problems, identifying key causes and effects,
developing exhaustive alternatives, and effectively implementing the best
courses of action. MAWS also educates officers to conduct effective operational planning as members of planning teams in multinational, interagency,
joint, and maritime environments. In addition to the core courses offered by
the CNC&S, MAWS students complete a series of planning-oriented electives
and a thirteen-week capstone project.
We are also currently reviewing our highly regarded Electives Program to ensure that the student effort expended here, which constitutes 20 percent of their
entire academic program, provides the critical education and essential credentials needed to best serve the Joint War Fighter.
The years between the first and second world wars are often referred to as the
Naval War College’s golden era, when officers who would ultimately win World War
II in the Pacific spent time in Newport studying the many potential futures they
were likely to face. Today, we find ourselves in a similar period, having drawn down
from a dozen years of conflict, and officers should now seek out the opportunity
to invest in themselves and further improve their ability to think strategically and
contribute to the needs of the Joint Force of the future. Just as no two students are
alike and no two careers mirror one another, the “Newport experience” varies by
an individual’s aspirations, interests, and goals. At the College students are allowed
to create educational experiences tailored to their personal needs. The three core
courses function as the firm foundation on which each individualized program is
built. By choosing one of the specialized programs outlined above or by selecting a
series of elective courses in a given Area of Study, students can craft the educational
program that best prepares them for the rest of their careers—and beyond!
The Naval War College truly provides education that matters.

WALTER E. “TED” CARTER, JR.

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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CREATING THE 1980S MARITIME STR ATEGY
AND IMPLIC ATIONS FOR TODAY
John T. Hanley, Jr.

W

hile important differences exist, the first decade of the twenty-first
century paralleled the 1970s for the Department of Defense and the
U.S. Navy. U.S. armed forces were embroiled in extended and expensive counterinsurgency wars. American military equipment was growing old, budgets were
tight, and extended projections called for significant decreases in the nation’s
armed forces, just as the main prospective military adversary was both rapidly
modernizing and expanding its forces, particularly its navy. “From 1962 to 1972,
the navy had programmed the construction of 42 ships per year, but between
1968 and 1975 only 12 ships, or less than a third as many per year, were programmed. In 1975, given the age of ships already at sea, and the navy-expected
service life for a warship of 25–30 years, the service anticipated retiring about 4
percent of the active fleet each year.”1 The Soviets were extending their defensive
perimeter from two to three thousand kilometers.2 Today, the Chinese suggest
extending their defensive perimeter from the “first island chain,” enclosing
the East and South China Seas, to the second, bounded by the Marianas, three
thousand kilometers from the Chinese coast.3 In the 1970s, the United States
questioned its own ability to fight forward, defend allies, and achieve objectives
—as many defense analysts and many in the Navy do now.
The maritime strategy of the 1980s rapidly changed the 1970s Navy’s narrative
and perspective. In the early 1980s the Navy came to believe that it could play a
decisive role in a global war with the Soviet Union. Using sensitive intelligence on
Soviet operations, plans, and military science, a newly created group of upwardly
mobile officers working directly for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and
interacting with the Navy leadership and fleet commands employed operations
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analysis and war gaming to create novel operational concepts and campaigns
to defeat the Soviet strategy. The operational concepts that became William A.
Owens’s “system of systems” and that Arthur K. Cebrowski branded “networkcentric warfare” provided underpinnings for this turnaround.4 These concepts
involving close cooperation among Navy, Marines, Air Force, and allies, akin to
today’s “Air-Sea Battle,” were key to victory in the maritime theaters.5 Revisiting
the creation of the 1980s strategy suggests opportunities for dealing with the
antiaccess/area-denial challenges presented by China and others today.
THE SPIRIT OF THE U.S. NAVY IN THE ’70S:
WRINGING OF THE HANDS
“The accelerating obsolescence of the U.S. Navy since the end of World War II as
opposed to the impressive growth of and modernization of the Soviet Navy during the same period” was in the forefront of Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt’s mind
when he became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970.6 American and Soviet maritime development were “asymmetrical” in a number of fundamental respects:
• The United States was a “world island” long experienced in the use of the
seas, but the Soviet Union was a self-sustaining land power.
• The Soviets were able to “protect their most important client states or attack all but one of its most likely enemies without going to sea,” while “the
political interests and commitments of the United States require[d] that it be
capable of having a large military influence overseas.”
• The U.S. Navy had been at its largest at the end of World War II and was now
retiring large numbers of aging ships, while the Soviet navy, having been
destroyed, was rebuilding.
• The Soviets had an advantage in naval cruise missiles.
• The Soviets had only limited access to the seas but were increasing their
operations in the Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf, in the Caribbean, and
around Africa.
• The Soviet navy controlled land-based, long-range aircraft armed with cruise
missiles, as well as merchant ships and fishing fleets.
• The U.S. Navy was emphasizing power projection rather than sea control, in
response to the demands of the Vietnam War.
• The U.S. services’ budgets were limited, as was their control over roles and
missions.
All these factors led, in Zumwalt’s view, to an unbalanced fleet with a rapidly
diminishing capability to deal with the Soviet navy.7 Zumwalt estimated “that
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as of 1 July 1970 the United States had a 55 percent chance of winning a major
conventional war at sea, and was heading toward a 45 percent chance as of 1 July
1971, and [a] considerably smaller one than that by 1 July 1972 if budget levels
under discussion were maintained.”8
Nuclear arms control agreements were driven by “Henry Kissinger’s world
view: that the dynamics of history are on the side of the Soviet Union; that before
long the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] will be the only superpower
on earth and that the United States will be an also-ran; that a principal reason this
will happen is that Americans have neither the stamina or the will to do the hard
things they would have to do to prevent it from happening.”9
On coming to office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter directed in Presidential
Review Memorandum 10 “that a comprehensive examination be made of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities.”10 The review generated “alternative
integrated military strategies,” all of which emphasized Central Europe. The
strategies planned on losing territory but holding for thirty days. Strategies to
take territory back were deemed unaffordable. The strategies counted on Soviet
hostility with China to pin Soviet forces in Asia. They contained no viable approaches for conflict termination. While they acknowledged options for conflicts
outside Europe, they did not analyze these. The Joint Chiefs of Staff footnoted
in several places that “adoption of any of these [alternative integrated military
strategies] contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation
of a nuclear response, should deterrence fail.”11 The plans called for swinging U.S.
forces, particularly naval forces, from the Pacific to Europe, though there was a
question whether they would arrive within the thirty days needed to stop a Soviet
advance.12
Secretary of Defense Brown seemed to be trying to bring the huge defense budget
under control by strengthening NATO’s land and air forces through reduction of the
navy’s role and budget. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation, Russell Murray, was quoted as saying that [the Defense Department’s]
short-term objective was to ensure that NATO would not be overwhelmed in the first
few weeks of a blitzkrieg war, and he advised that the navy should be concerned with
local contingencies outside the NATO area.13

Further,
In February 1978, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, testified to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that in the event of
war with the Soviet Union the U.S. Navy could not maintain complete superiority in
the western Pacific or protect vital commercial shipping to allies in Japan and Korea.
As Holloway later recalled in his memoir, “Supporting NATO was our first priority.
With the continuing decline in our naval force levels, we had become a one-ocean
navy.”14
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The assessment of the 1978–79 Military Balance, produced by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, was that NATO no longer had the capacity to exert
sea control in all areas vital to the alliance at the start of a NATO–Warsaw Pact
war.15
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP
In July 1981 the CNO, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, established a Center for
Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, with Robert J. Murray, who was
just leaving his position as Under Secretary of the Navy, at its helm and a Strategic
Studies Group (SSG) as its centerpiece. As commander of the Seventh Fleet in
1976–77, “Hayward became aware that it was not until the three-star level that a
senior officer was faced with having to make strategic decisions.”16 He “had two
parallel interests: to create a core of future naval leaders who were well versed in
the role of naval forces in national policy and strategy and to reestablish the Naval
War College, in everyone’s view, as the pinnacle for education in naval strategic
thinking.”17 As CNO, Hayward “wanted to break away from the program planning process that seemed to dominate so much of the navy’s thinking and to focus
on a realistic and effective strategy for fighting at sea.”18 As commander of the
Pacific Fleet he had initiated a “Sea Strike” concept for employing naval forces in
the Pacific in the event of war with the Soviets.19
Hayward wanted to form a group made up of extremely capable and successful
naval officers with recent fleet experience, and who themselves would be the future
leaders of the navy, to work toward this new strategy. . . . In selecting the first group
of officers for the Strategic Studies Group, Hayward received nominations from a
wide variety of sources within the navy, and then he personally reviewed the service
jackets of candidates, spending hours on them in an attempt to find the men he felt
would certainly be the best future choices for flag rank.20

The first SSG consisted of six naval officers (commanders and captains) and
two Marines (a lieutenant colonel and a colonel), assigned to the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies for a year as “CNO Fellows.”21 This group had no template for how to conduct its studies. Its members spent a considerable amount
of time talking to the commanders of fleets and unified commands (i.e., in this
connection, theater commands, today realigned and known as “unified combatant commands”), well-known academics, and former senior defense officials to
familiarize themselves with the strategic context and issues facing the Navy. Each
of the officers chose a topic of interest relating to practical war fighting. They
tested their collective ideas as they developed them in a series of war games. Of
the individual efforts, a P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft pilot, Captain Dan
Wolkensdorfer (who was selected for rear admiral while with the SSG), worked
with a submariner, Commander Bill Owens, on a “combined arms” approach to
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antisubmarine warfare. Commander Art Cebrowski focused on the air campaign
in NATO’s northern region. These efforts, informed by high-quality intelligence,
coalesced into a campaign and strategy aimed at defeating the Soviet naval strategy in a way that was to affect the fundamental Soviet approach to war.22
THE SSG’S MARITIME STRATEGY
One of the important findings of our Strategic Studies (Review) Group at
[the Naval War College] and the [CNO Executive Panel] folks here, during their fleet visits and discussions with navy leadership, is that there is
a great deal of confusion about strategies and analysis relating to force
acquisition and strategy for winning wars. Much of the analysis done is
more related to the first than the latter.
ADMIRAL WILLIAM SMALL, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1982

In the Pentagon, the focus of the Navy Staff was on programming and budgeting.23 The SSG focused its efforts instead on war fighting with existing forces. The
SSG’s approach was to identify strengths that U.S. and allied forces could apply
against Soviet weaknesses in the maritime theaters to attack the Soviet Union’s
strategic sensitivities in a global war. The first SSG concentrated its analysis on
the Soviet Northern Fleet and NATO’s northern region as presenting the greatest
leverage for NATO. Soviet sensitivities to the “correlation of forces,” particularly
nuclear, and “combat stability” became targets for the SSG’s strategy.
Though a forthcoming new national intelligence estimate on the Soviet’s naval
strategy had not yet been published, the SSG had access to the intelligence on
which it was based as it was analyzed. Key findings were these:
Within the Soviets’ overall wartime strategy, however, the primary initial tasks of the
navy remain:
• To deploy and provide protection for ballistic missile submarines in preparation
for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes.
• To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers.
Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or portions of the
Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland seas, the seas of Japan and
Okhotsk, and the Northwest Pacific Basin, and to conduct sea-denial operations beyond those areas to about 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. We believe that virtually all of the Northern and Pacific Fleets’ available major surface combatants and
combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would
be committed initially to operations in these waters. Other initial naval wartime tasks
are: support of ground force operations in the land theaters of military operations
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(including countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such as
Norway), and some interdiction of Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
. . . We expect these requirements—particularly the need to counter Western units
armed with the new Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile—will drive the Soviets to
expand the area in which their navy would initially deploy the bulk of its Northern
and Pacific Fleet forces for sea-control/sea-denial operations—possibly out to 3,000
kilometers from Soviet territory.24

Analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, who had been
studying Soviet naval writings for decades had come to the conclusion that the
Soviets would use most of their naval forces to provide “combat stability” for their
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and to defend against
strikes on their homeland. The dominant Navy vision, in contrast, had been of
Soviet submarines flooding the Atlantic to sink U.S. shipping bound for Europe,
as the Germans had done in World War II.25 Sensitive intelligence was now confirming the center’s findings. The new Delta class of Soviet SSBNs, armed with
SS-N-8 missiles, had the range to reach American targets from bastions in Arctic
waters rather than having to transit into the Atlantic, as SSBNs of the previous
classes had to do. The bulk of the Soviet Northern Fleet would be north of the
Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap.
The SSG also was aware of the Soviet emphasis on calculating “correlation of
forces” to assess whether the Soviet Union had sufficient forces to succeed in an
operation, including nuclear war fighting.26 Changing the Soviet perception of
the correlation of forces in NATO’s favor—in the maritime theaters, so as to require the USSR to devote forces to defense early in a conflict, and also in nuclear
forces, and rapidly, so as to deter escalation to the use of nuclear weapons by
either side—set the strategic intent for the SSG.
From discussions with the unified commands early in its year of study, the
first SSG quickly learned that the United States had no coherent global strategy
for fighting the Soviets. Each theater commander was operating on a different
timeline.27 From discussions at the headquarters of Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, the SSG knew that its commander, then General Bernard Rogers, believed that he would have to resort to nuclear weapons within days of a Soviet
invasion of Western Europe.28 U.S. Navy war plans of the 1970s called for breaking contact with the Soviets as they extended their defensive perimeter with (in
the antiaccess/area-denial approach of the day) naval aviation and surface forces
armed with cruise missiles, falling back and later, over time, fighting back toward
the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, the United States had a huge advantage in antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) over the Soviets. In 1949, facing demobilization, the U.S. submarine force
had adopted ASW as a new mission, establishing Submarine Development Group
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2 to develop required capabilities. Over two decades of close cooperation with
Navy laboratories and intelligence, the group had developed tactics for emerging technologies through rigorous scientific analysis of submarine exercises. The
submarine force had gone from having essentially no ASW capability to being the
Navy’s premier ASW capability.29
The SSG’s campaign approach called for using combined-arms antisubmarine
operations to exploit that advantage further. Plans at the time called for maritime patrol aircraft, carrier battle groups, surface action groups, and submarines
to operate independently in
A renewed focus on war-fighting strategy and separate areas. Taking a page
from U.S. Army concepts of
operations might dust off some old SSG concombined arms and using
cepts while focusing on the development of
lessons from the Navy’s Conew ones.
ordination in Direct Support
program, the SSG developed concepts for ASW forces working as integrated
teams.30 Analysis indicated that the primary U.S. submarine losses would be from
counterfire (i.e., weapons fired in immediate response to torpedo launches—the
United States had the quietest submarines and noisiest torpedoes in the world)
and mines. Having maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters from surface ships
conduct the attacks would not only reduce submarine losses but accelerate attack
rates, by preserving the most effective sensors and preventing submarines from
having to withdraw to reload their tubes. Combined arms offered the prospect
of higher Soviet SSBN-loss rates at the onset of conflict than did independent
ASW operations, a differential that would affect the nuclear correlation of forces
within days.
To allow the maritime patrol aircraft to operate forward, the submarines
needed to sink the Soviet navy ships that carried antiaircraft missiles. The Soviets had about fifteen such ships available in their Northern Fleet. They operated
them in surface action groups arrayed to provide defense for their SSBNs and
against air strikes against their homeland. To target these surface action groups,
the SSG’s concept called for U.S./NATO Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft operating in a maritime mode to provide location data to the
submarines, using digital data links (Link 11). To achieve the intended strategic
effect, the intent was to sink the key Soviet air-defense ships in the first days of
the war, rapidly expanding the area in which combined-arms ASW could be conducted. The AWACS could then return to their role in the air battle over Norway.
Sinking the Soviet air-defense ships would have another effect on the nuclear
correlation of forces. The Soviet surface action groups operated where U.S.
bombers planned to refuel on their paths from the United States to Moscow.
Sinking these ships rolled back the Soviet defenses against both aircraft carrier
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and intercontinental bomber strikes toward the heart of the Soviet Union, placing
greater pressure on national air-defense forces (Voyska PVO Strany).
To be in position at the outset, U.S. submarines and maritime patrol aircraft
would have to move quickly. The SSG used intelligence on Soviet fleet readiness
to lay out U.S. and Soviet timelines for deploying forces to station. Detailed analysis of the Northern Fleet battle and war gaming of all the maritime theaters indicated rates at which to expect Soviet and American losses. Intelligence officers
with access to the latest assessments played the “Red” teams in the war games,
employing their best understanding of Soviet plans and operations.
As with the war at sea, the SSG carefully analyzed the air war over northern
Norway and gamed the air war in the maritime theaters. The Soviets organized
their forces within “theaters of military operations,” each with its own command
and assigned forces.31 The primary mission of Soviet Naval Air Force (SNA) Bear
and Backfire bombers in the Northwestern, Southwestern, and Far East Theaters
was to prevent strikes by U.S./NATO naval forces on Soviet forces and territory.
The SSG’s appreciation was that the SNA had two possible routes for attacking
U.S. carrier battle groups coming from the Atlantic. They either could go around
the North Cape of Norway, as they did during routine training and surveillance
flights, or test Swedish neutrality by flying over Sweden. The latter risked adding
the very capable Swedish air defenses to those NATO had deployed. Gaining air
control over northern Norway would increase Northwestern Theater SNA losses
should they fly over or close to land, significantly reduce the range at which they
could attack U.S./NATO naval forces, and similarly limit attacks on Iceland.
Campaign analysis and gaming indicated that U.S. naval air, working with
the NATO forces assigned to the northern region, could be decisive in gaining
and maintaining air control over northern Norway. Furthermore, maintaining
control over northern Norway provided airfields for strikes against Northwestern
Theater SNA and Voyska PVO Strany bases, further rolling back defenses against
U.S. strategic bombers. The PVO Strany was, and is, a separate branch of air
forces dedicated to defense against air strikes on Soviet and now Russian territory, a structure reflecting the priority placed on defense of the homeland. At that
time, only U.S. naval air had all-weather, nighttime attack capabilities. Marine
expeditionary airfield equipment could be used to expand rapidly the ability of
Norway’s airfields to handle military jets. The SSG envisioned using these fields
in a manner similar to that in which Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was occasionally used in World War II—that is, to extend the range of carrier-based air
strikes by recovering, refueling, and rearming aircraft.
The key to effective, coordinated air operations over northern Norway was
creating the means to share information between the NATO Air Defense Ground
Environment command-and-control system and U.S./NATO naval data links
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(Link 4 and Link 11). Since only the Marines worked regularly with sea/air/
ground forces, only a Marine “tactical operations center” had all the networks
needed for the desired coordination. The Marine Corps prepositioning plan in
Norway included a tactical operations center.
Combined-arms ASW and networking the U.S./NATO sea-, air-, and groundsurveillance and command systems were at the core of the SSG’s operational
concepts, designed to allow the Navy to fight forward, negate Soviet combat stability, and change both the conventional and nuclear correlations of forces. This
was the SSG’s alternative to losing in the center and falling back on the flanks.
Bill Owens would later frequently recall that his year on the SSG had been an
epiphany—beginning with the perspective of a submariner, he had quickly come
to appreciate the power that could come from integrating the advantages of each
Navy branch and military service into a war-fighting whole. As Owens and Art
Cebrowski advanced in their careers, they would continue to refine and expand
on their notions of system of systems and network-centric warfare.
The first SSG departed early in the summer of 1982, and the second SSG convened in August. SSG II picked up where SSG I had left off, focusing on NATO’s
southern flank (the USSR’s Southwestern Theater of Military Operations) and
Northeast Asia (the Soviet Far East Theater) in the way that the first SSG had
focused on the NATO northern and Soviet Northwestern theaters. Its members
followed the SSG template of visiting senior commanders and strategists and
analyzing and gaming their concepts. The team working on the Pacific included
officers who had participated in Admiral Hayward’s Sea Strike concepts when
he commanded the Pacific Fleet. The Mediterranean team came from command
of ships recently deployed there. Recalling how Soviet T-34 tanks arriving from
the Far East Theater had saved Moscow in World War II, Sea Strike planners
intended to use naval forces to prevent Soviet far-eastern forces from moving
west.32 The team working the Mediterranean also focused on pressing the Soviet
correlation of forces in the Southwestern Theater and targeting the few available Soviet / Warsaw Pact lines of communication that would support an attack
on NATO’s south.
SSG II added two significant refinements to the work of the previous year.
One was the concept of “havens.” SNA bombers had to lock their cruise missiles
onto their targets before they launched. The SSG, using data on the flight profiles
of the bombers and technical intelligence on Soviet cruise missiles, adopted a
concept from a paper by a former amphibious-squadron commander at the Naval
War College to use the islands of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean to prevent the SNA from targeting carriers or their escorts with cruise missiles. Though
islands are sparse in the western Pacific, the concept offered opportunities there
also. The fjords of Norway were well suited to this tactic.
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The second refinement was teaming with the U.S. Air Force, which had the
best low-altitude models for penetrating Soviet air defenses. Using these models,
the SSG focused its efforts on “targets that count,” in terms of limiting the effectiveness of Soviet air forces and the ability of the Warsaw Pact to move large
ground formations along the limited land lines of communications supporting
the maritime theaters. The “targets that count” approach evolved into a Joint
Warfare Analysis Center, focusing on “effects-based operations.”33
The strategy called for close Air Force / Navy cooperation in the Pacific theater.
The distances involved in the conduct of strikes demanded extensive in-flight
refueling for carrier-based aircraft. Also, B-52s played a large role in a planned
mining campaign. In addition to being the origin of network-centric warfare, the
SSG’s maritime strategy was in effect “Air-Sea Battle 1.0.”
IMPLEMENTING THE SSG MARITIME STRATEGY
To meet Admiral Hayward’s aims as CNO to stimulate strategic discourse within
the Navy leadership, he encouraged the SSG to meet with as many flag officers
as it could. “In many ways, the Strategic Studies Group acted like a small swarm
of honeybees, migrating from one flag officer to another, discussing issues, exchanging views, and carrying the pollen of stimulating thought from one widely
separated command to another.”34 By the end of their year at the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies, Owens and Cebrowski had briefed 162 flag officers.35 A key briefing came in October 1982, when they were invited back to present their ideas to
Admiral James D. Watkins, the new CNO, at his first Navy “four-star” conference
—that is, with the Navy’s four-star admirals and the Navy Staff ’s three-stars attending. The briefing, scheduled for forty-five minutes at the end of the day, went
on for almost six hours; Admiral William J. Crowe (Commander in Chief, U.S.
Forces Pacific, later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) continued the conversation afterward with Art Cebrowski, using a chart on the hood of his car. By
1983 the first SSG concepts were being reflected in revised Navy war plans and
the CNO had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force to work jointly on the concepts contained in the maritime strategy.36
War gaming involving admirals in operational and staff commands and senior
representatives from other services became a very effective mechanism for familiarizing those outside the SSG with its concepts even as it was refining them. The
SSG conducted games every few months to explore its concepts, and its members
served as theater commanders in the Naval War College’s annual Global War
Game. As the Global War Game series matured, flag and general officers from
the theater commands came to play their forces, and other services brought their
campaign models to adjudicate game outcomes.
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Following their respective years in the SSG, its fellows were assigned by the
CNO either to positions where they could influence implementation of the strategy or to command. Dan Wolkensdorfer was assigned to develop ASW programs
on the Navy Staff, and Bill Owens became executive assistant to the Director for
Naval Warfare on the Navy Staff, responsible for balancing naval warfare capabilities in Navy programs. Art Cebrowski went immediately to command a carrier air wing. The Center for Naval Warfare Studies staff worked with the Navy
Staff on writing a new formal document, The Maritime Strategy. CNO Fellows
from the SSG also held important positions in Navy policy and served as direct
links to or supervisors of the drafters of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy briefing
and classified booklet and of
The SSG’s approach was to identify strengths
the U.S. Naval Institute Prothat U.S. and allied forces could apply against ceedings supplement about it
Soviet weaknesses in the maritime theaters to (published in January 1986)
attack the Soviet Union’s strategic sensitivities by Admiral Watkins and the
in a global war.
Commandant of the Marine
Corps, P. X. Kelley.
The SSG’s concepts led also to exercises and technology development. When
in command of a submarine squadron, Owens had exchanged an officer with a
nearby maritime patrol aircraft squadron to coordinate exercises by which, at every opportunity for a submarine and P-3 aircraft to operate within range of each
other, clandestine communications for use in forward areas could be developed.
As chief of staff for Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet, Owens had
established an exercise called AGILE PLAYER to get all available submarines out of
port and headed toward their wartime patrol areas within seventy-two hours. By
1985 the Second Fleet had begun exercising the carrier-haven concept in Vestfjord as part of Exercises NORTHERN WEDDING and OCEAN SAFARI. As Commander, Submarine Group 2, Rear Admiral J. D. Williams (who had played in
SSG war games) initiated submarine exercises with AWACS aircraft to work out
tactics and resolve technical glitches in Link 11 communications. Commander,
Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet and the commander of Development Squadron
12 worked with their counterparts in the fleets and other Navy branches to exercise and develop combined-arms ASW.
In March 1986, a large NATO exercise covering the Norwegian Sea and commanded from the Northwood headquarters in the United Kingdom demonstrated the effectiveness of combined-arms ASW. Using Bayesian approaches to
estimate where the adversary submarines were, the NATO force achieved detection rates that exceeded the ability of attack aircraft to sortie in response, reversing the normal constraint in ASW. Against the expectation that the Soviets would

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1

26

22

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College: Spring 2014 Full Issue

target fixed command headquarters, in 1988 a combined-arms ASW exercise
demonstrated the ability of a mobile command center deployed to an air base in
Norway to command ASW forces near the North Cape.37 Other fleets conducted
similar exercises, both in national exercises and with allies. In November 1987
during Exercise NORPAC87, the commander of the Third Fleet, Vice Admiral
Diego “Duke” Hernandez, used a series of havens along the Aleutians, to cover
his approach to the Kamchatka Peninsula.38
THE EFFECTS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The work of the SSG added to The Maritime Strategy operational depth and detail
that has not otherwise been achieved in strategy documents coming from the
Pentagon. These efforts rapidly changed the Navy’s narrative from one of handwringing over the growing advantages of the Soviet navy to a belief that it could
make a decisive difference in the maritime theaters and create conditions that
could lead to war termination on conditions acceptable to NATO and without the
use of nuclear weapons.39 The exercises with allies—particularly Japan, Norway,
and Turkey—not only developed confidence within the U.S. Navy that it could
fight forward but demonstrated its intent and increased allied confidence in
American support in the event of war, thereby contributing to alliance cohesion
and to deterrence.40 The emphasis on forward operations played to the Soviets’
concern for protecting their naval bastions and the homeland against strikes
from aircraft carriers and cruise missiles, reinforcing their instincts to keep the
bulk of their naval forces near home waters rather than interdicting reinforcements to NATO and Pacific allies. Following the demise of the Soviet Union,
Russian naval leaders were mistakenly to infer that the next U.S. Navy capstone
document—Forward . . . From the Sea—meant that the United States felt that it
no longer had to worry about the Russian navy but could sail up to the coast and
attack from there.41
Even at the time, the maritime strategy sparked a vigorous debate in the West
among academics and former government officials.42 “By the end of 1986, the
public and professional discussion of the issues surrounding The Maritime Strategy had taken a sophisticated form. The issues of naval strategy could be, and were,
understood and being debated widely. This contrasted starkly with the absence of
such discussion a decade earlier, and at the same time, seemed to demonstrate a
widespread appreciation of strategy within the officer corps.”43
Following the end of the Cold War, Owens’s appreciation for the power of
combined arms, as opposed to forces operating independently, as well as his
conviction that networking all service and allied intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities into a system of systems could lead to a decisive information advantage over adversaries, was to govern his actions.44 As
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commander of the Sixth Fleet, he exchanged officers with Army and Air Force
counterparts in an effort to bring joint capabilities into the exercises he oversaw.
As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he made every effort to ensure
that service ISR capabilities were interoperable. Similarly, Art Cebrowski was to
develop the “brand” of “network-centric warfare” and to refine its concepts in his
positions as Director for Command, Control and Communications on the Joint
Staff and as President of the Naval War College, contributing to a rapid growth
in military network capabilities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has replaced the Soviet military as the
most challenging for U.S. forces in the vicinity of its homeland. The strategic
relationship of the United States with China differs in important ways from that
with the Soviets. On the national level, rather than containing the Chinese, the
United States encourages them to promote security and peaceful development
that benefits China’s rise, while deterring its use of armed coercion or aggression
to settle territorial claims and other disputes.45 The competition with the Soviets
was perceived largely as a zero-sum game, wherein any advance for the Soviets
was a loss for the free world—though all would lose massively in a large-scale
war. The game with the Chinese, in contrast, is one in which both sides win big
or lose big.
The overall military concept for deterring the Chinese is similar to that embodied in The Overall Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Area, or MC 14/3.46 The overall concept is defensive. The United
States has no intention or reason to initiate armed conflict. Its intent is to provide for security and peaceful development by credible deterrence, effected by
working with the nations of the region and leading the Chinese to conclude that
if they launched an armed attack on the United States or its allies the chances of
a favorable decision to them are too small to be acceptable, and that fatal risks
could be involved. The overall military concept, rather, is a balance of deterrence
and encouragement, inviting the PLA to play a responsible and constructive role
in promoting security and peaceful development and join in coalition operations,
as it has in countering piracy in the Indian Ocean. Underpinning this concept
is the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), analysis for which began in
2008.47 “High-end asymmetric threats,” presented mainly by the PLA, were the
focus of much of that analysis.48
Within the Pentagon today, the last decade of double-digit growth in Chinese
military expenditures and increasing Iranian military sophistication, largely
focused on U.S. forces moving to and within the nearby theaters, has led to another period of hand-wringing. Iran’s capabilities are much more limited in scale,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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geographic scope, and forces than are China’s, but they are potent in the restricted
waters near shore and against bases in nearby countries. The Pentagon’s approach
to programming future forces centers principally on capability shortfalls created
by adversary militaries, rather than creating concerns among adversaries regarding their own military capabilities against U.S. forces. The Pentagon, stimulated
by Congress and the defense industry, turns to superior technology (the means)
rather than to strategy (the
ways) to accomplish its deIn the early 1980s the Navy came to believe
sired ends. Reacting to what
that it could play a decisive role in a global
the PLA and other military
war with the Soviet Union.
forces are doing cedes the
initiative to them at a time when technology is rapidly shared and copied around
the globe and the U.S. military budget is declining.
In July 2009, in a constructive effort to redirect somewhat this unproductive
approach, the Secretary of Defense, with strong support from Navy and Air Force
leadership, initiated an Air-Sea Battle effort to address concerns raised in the
QDR. The initiative recalls the Air Force / Navy cooperation engendered by the
1983 memorandum of understanding.49 The Air-Sea Battle is not a strategy but a
concept “to better integrate the Services in new and creative ways.”50 War-fighting
strategies as such are the responsibility of the combatant commanders, not the
services. The Air-Sea Battle concept concentrates on identifying cost-effective
methods for disrupting “effects chains” in an adversary’s processes of command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, ideally precluding attacks on friendly forces; on destroying or neutralizing
adversary weapon platforms to enhance friendly survivability and provide freedom of action; and on defeating weapons that have been launched so as to defend
friendly forces and allow sustained operations.51
However, a declared design to “attack in depth” has triggered a vigorous debate
over the escalatory potential of Air-Sea Battle and how it fits into a strategy for
war with China.52 T. X. Hammes has offered an “offshore control strategy” that
eschews any strikes on the mainland, calling instead for a long-duration blockade
to cripple the Chinese economy.53 Similarly, Wayne Hughes and Jeffrey Kline
have argued for a war-at-sea strategy involving blockade and destruction of PLA
forces at sea without strikes on the mainland, thus reducing possibilities of escalation.54 David Gompert and Terrence Kelly too have argued for greater emphasis
on defensive measures, to include giving antiaccess/area-denial capabilities to
allies in Asia to deny the Chinese the use of the seas.55
These concepts and strategies differ in their judgments on the feasibility and
wisdom of strikes on the Chinese mainland, but all aim to align program planning and budgeting for future force development rather than to provide strategy
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and concepts for winning a war using forces and capabilities that could be available in months. To the extent that these proposed concepts and strategies require
future investment for success, their credibility is suspect in today’s budget environment. Also, given current international dynamics, the security situation may
change significantly in the decade or two that would be required to procure the
force structures envisioned by these concepts and strategies. Both factors suggest putting more effort into developing strategic and operational concepts for
prevailing with today’s forces to effect credible deterrence and reassure allies. The
public debate is useful. However, more important would be a declaratory strategy
that is effective in a long-term competition with the PLA, supported by a military
strategy in which American leadership and military officers have confidence.
The military operational challenge posed by the PLA is similar to that which
the Soviet military presented in the early 1980s. The SSG addressed the latter
by focusing on Soviet military strategy, Soviet concepts of war fighting, Soviet
sensitivities and vulnerabilities, and command and bureaucratic structures that
affected Soviet decisions and operations, in addition to details of Soviet military
technology. A similar effort would carefully investigate the perspectives of Beijing and PLA regional and local commands; it would emphasize PLA military
science, strategic concepts, campaign theories, and command and operational
practices, so as to take advantage of Chinese and PLA sensitivities and theories of
victory. Such Chinese concepts as “victory of form” (winning without fighting),
“shi” (psychological momentum using both strength and deception), force groupings, command arrangements, and the importance of the Second Artillery as a
special branch analogous to the Voyska PVO Strany should play into new strategic concepts. While the Second Artillery has responsibilities for intercontinental
nuclear strike, the effectiveness of missiles generally is central to PLA theories of
victory and warrants particular attention.
SSG operational concepts in the early 1980s trumped the typical Washington
analysis of technical weapon-system capabilities that suggested the Navy would
be “taking a knife to a gunfight” in a battle with Soviet naval aviation.56 The first
SSG devised approaches for controlling key geography at sea and over land to
limit the SNA’s lines of approach to the U.S. fleet and for extending the range of
U.S. strikes by using expeditionary air bases ashore. SSG II added the concept
of aircraft carrier havens and “targets that count” to compensate for the limited
range and sortie rates of naval strike aircraft.
A renewed focus on war-fighting strategy and operations might dust off some
old SSG concepts while focusing on the development of new ones. All U.S. concepts and strategies exploit the limitations of the PLA’s ASW capabilities. Shortly
following the end of the Cold War the U.S. Navy lost its competence in combinedarms ASW; these capabilities are now receiving renewed attention. Over the last
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decade the value, limitations, and vulnerabilities of network-centric warfare have
been further explored. Electronic warfare has received renewed emphasis, after
being bureaucratically submerged in “information operations” and generally
neglected. Perhaps the most fertile field for concept development is cyber war
fighting, which receives scant attention in most public discourse. New concepts
in these fields should consider investment primarily in payloads that could be
procured in a few years, or months in an emergency, vice platforms, etc., taking
decades to develop and deploy.
In 1985 the CNO, with the urging of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, assigned a director to the SSG separate from the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, thereby disconnecting the SSG from the center. In 1995, Admiral
Mike Boorda, as CNO, changed the direction of the SSG to focus on warfare innovation and the “Navy after next.” The current CNO, Jon Greenert, reportedly is
pleased with the work that the SSG is doing for him under its current charter and
approach, and the rate of promotion to flag rank of CNO Fellows has returned
to that of the 1980s. That said, the ingredients that led to the success of the maritime strategy would likely contribute as well to the success of new strategic and
operational concepts. A core of future naval leaders working directly for the CNO
and with the Navy leadership, counterparts from other services, and the relevant
combatant commands; provided with access to special intelligence and programs;
located away from the Pentagon but in an environment where they can think,
experiment with games, and learn; supported by first-rate operational analysis;
focused on war fighting rather than programs and budgets; and assigned thereafter to positions where they can implement the concepts they helped develop
—such a group could again rapidly generate an effective declaratory strategy
underpinned by strategic and operational concepts in which the military and
civilian leadership could have confidence.

NOTES

The author was directly involved in the
events discussed and made direct personal
contributions to the development of the maritime strategy of the 1980s. This article draws
extensively on his own experience in those
years, without citation except at points of
particular interest or contention. The author
would like to thank John Hattendorf, Wayne
Hughes, Michael McDevitt, David Rosenberg,
Peter Swartz, the Naval War College Review,
and anonymous referees for their improvements to this article.
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STR ATEGIC FEATURES OF THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA
A Tough Neighborhood for Hegemons
James R. Holmes

T

he South China Sea is a semienclosed sea at the intersection between East
Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It exhibits characteristics similar to the
Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean Sea, as well as some revealing differences.
Both the similarities and the differences commend sea-power theorist Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s analysis of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea to presentday students and practitioners of maritime strategy. Mahan classified strategic
features—especially prospective sites for naval stations—by their positions,
strengths, and resources. This article adds a metric to his analytical template,
namely, the state of relations with countries that host naval bases. He applied
much the same framework to narrow seas, such as international straits, while
also sizing up these passages’ widths, lengths, and difficulty of transit. Here too
an element warrants adding, namely, the underwater terrain—its topography and
hydrography.
This modified template allows for exhaustive analysis of geostrategic features.
Mahanian methods retain their potency not just for evaluating enclosed seas and
adjacent littorals but also for assessing the value of maritime strategic features
wherever they may be found. This article investiJames Holmes is professor of strategy at the U.S. gates Mahan’s methodology; applies it to maritime
Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over
Southeast Asia, examining the sea and its islands,
the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S.
Maritime Strategy. He has been a senior research as- the South China Sea rim, ingress and egress points,
sociate at the University of Georgia Center for Inter- the capacity of local sea powers, the underwater
national Trade and Security, Athens, Georgia.
dimension, and crucial differences separating
Naval War College Review, Spring 2014, Vol. 67, No. 2
the South China Sea from other marginal seas;
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and urges those who do business in great waters to embrace this instrument for
general use.
WHY THE SOUTH CHINA SEA?
What would Mahan think about the strategic geography of the South China Sea?
One thing is certain—that he would think about it were he alive today. How could
he not? Journalist Robert Kaplan calls the South China Sea “the 21st century’s defining battleground,” the “throat of global sea routes.”1 China seemingly covets a
hegemonic position there, having repeatedly asserted “indisputable sovereignty”
over virtually the entire expanse while conducting itself as though it intends to
create a closed sea.2 And it is moving to match purpose with power, constructing
a great navy, deploying its first unified coast guard, and providing fire support
for the sea services through such shore-based sea-denial weaponry as antiship
cruise and ballistic missiles and missile-armed tactical aircraft, submarines, and
patrol craft.
Beijing’s claims to sovereignty over this vast realm are far from indisputable.
But—backed up by this panoply of military hardware and the advantages that
accrue to those defending their home turf—they might prove irresistible. China’s
naval rise is a crucial factor prompting the United States to “pivot” or “rebalance”
to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. As early as 2007, U.S. sea-service chiefs
pledged to stage “credible combat power” in the two oceans for the foreseeable
future.3
Geopolitical thinkers explain why. The South China Sea belongs to what Yale
professor Nicholas Spykman terms the “girdle of marginal seas” swaddling the
Eurasian mainland. For Spykman, dominating such marginal seas is crucial to
projecting power into the Eurasian rimlands and thence into the vast interior. As
Kaplan notes, this potentially contested body of water is also an interface joining
the two oceans constituting the “Indo-Pacific” region.4 Seagoing forces routinely
traverse it, alighting around the Asian perimeter as strategic circumstances warrant. Strategic mobility would be slower and clumsier absent free transit through
Southeast Asian waters. Freedom of the seas constitutes a mainstay of U.S. foreign
policy in any event, but it is increasingly a matter of operational expediency as well.
Maritime strategy is not all about great powers, however. Lesser Southeast
Asian states seek to advance their interests, consonant with the meager physical strength they can muster. They can also reach out for support, aggregating
their strength to counterbalance China. The United States is a balancer of first
resort. Asian powers like Japan, India, and Australia, furthermore, have voiced
interest in free passage through regional seaways, while consulting among themselves about maritime matters. The increasingly obvious intersection between
Southeast Asian geography and politics would fix Mahan’s strategic eye on the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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region—much as he peered southward toward the Caribbean and Gulf during
his own lifetime.
THROUGH A MAHANIAN LOOKING GLASS
By consulting Mahan’s works on American geopolitics, observers can glean
some idea of what he would say about strategic competition in Southeast Asia
were he alive today. That naval historian compared the Caribbean Sea and Gulf
of Mexico to the Mediterranean Sea in hopes of deriving insights into strategic
effectiveness in semienclosed expanses. He saw “a very marked analogy in many
respects” between the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas—“an analogy which
will be still closer if a Panama canal-route ever be completed,” allowing east–west
transit and shortening communications between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
by thousands of miles.5
The logic Mahan articulated for America’s Mediterranean holds for any aspiring sea power that possesses the economic vitality, military strength, and political
resolve—the lineaments of great power—to make use of important strategic features in or adjoining the South China Sea.6 Even small marine states can deploy
artful strategy to deny geographic assets to stronger rivals or to exploit these
assets themselves. Indeed, strategic guile is all the more important for the weak.
An expansive view of such matters came naturally to Mahan, a philosopher
of sea power as well as a naval strategist.7 Nowadays it is distressingly commonplace for strategists to reduce him to a propagandist, a Gilbert-and-Sullivanesque
figure touting Trafalgar-like battles between swarms of armored dreadnoughts.8
Decisive sea battle was a part of his writings, to be sure, but not the whole—and
arguably not even the most important part. For him, vouchsafes historian William Livezey, “sea power was the sum total of forces and factors, tools and geographical circumstances, which operated to gain command of the sea, to secure
its use for oneself and to deny that use to the enemy.”9 Quite so. There is more to
sea power than tactics or specific implements of sea combat.
Rather, Mahan conceived of sea power as a symbiosis among domestic industry and foreign trade and commerce, commercial and naval shipping, and forward
bases to support the journeys of fuel-thirsty steamships.10 “Commercial value,” he
wrote, “cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest
of the sea is commerce.”11 In today’s parlance, gaining and enforcing commercial,
political, and military “access” to regions like East Asia constituted his paramount
goal. The “starting point and foundation” for comprehending sea power are “the
necessity to secure commerce, by political measures conducive to military, or
naval strength. This order is that of actual relative importance to the nation of the
three elements—commercial, political, military.”12 Commercial access, then, held
pride of place in his thinking. This is a vision of grand-strategic sweep.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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Mahan was acutely conscious of geography. He examined specific theaters
more attentively than did the other greats of strategic theory, except perhaps his
“best military friend,” land-power scribe Antoine-Henri Jomini.13 Indeed, some
pundits pronounce Mahan a seafaring Baron Jomini.14 Both Clausewitz and Sun
Tzu, for instance, pay considerable attention to terrain only in a generic way.
Neither goes into detail about the geographic characteristics of any particular
battleground or theater.
For Mahan, studying the particular geographic surroundings is a prerequisite
for competitive enterprises. He proclaims that “geography underlies strategy.”15
Many principles of continental warfare map to the sea, moreover, applying there
much as they do ashore. This renders the feats of land-power giants like Frederick
the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte worthy objects of study, even for mariners.
Mahan delights in quoting or paraphrasing Napoleon’s maxim that “war is a business of positions.” He does so four times in Naval Strategy (1911), his last major
work—a work specifically meant to tease out the likenesses between land and sea
warfare.
So geographic analysis comes first, at sea as on land. When pondering the
opening of an oceanic theater, affirms Mahan, makers of strategy must begin by
surveying its physical characteristics. To design and prosecute strategy, they must
evaluate geographic features, determine which are critical and which secondary,
and integrate important features into their plans along with maritime forces able
to shape events. “In considering any theater of actual or possible war, or of a prospective battlefield,” he insists, “the first and most essential thing is to determine
what position, or chain of positions, by their natural and inherent advantages
affect control of the greatest part of it.”16 Where to station forces to assert—or
deny—control of key positions constitutes “a matter of prime importance” for any
power that covets access to faraway expanses.17
Geography constitutes the fixed setting within which maritime strategy—a dynamic, intensely interactive human enterprise—unfolds. Yet Mahan went beyond
general entreaties to afford geography its due. During his long publishing career,
he constructed a framework for analyzing the worth of such strategic features as
seaports, islands, and narrow waterways. His first book explored The Gulf and
Inland Waters (1883).18 He returned to this subject in “The Strategic Features
of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea,” a Harper’s essay reprinted in The
Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897).19 Naval Strategy, as
suggested above, concentrates single-mindedly on unearthing points of similarity
and difference between continental and maritime warfare.
Interestingly, his most influential work, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History, 1660–1783, contains the least geographic content, beyond the general
axiom that the extent and conformation of territory are two of the six inescapable
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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determinants of maritime might. That few readers venture beyond The Influence
of Sea Power upon History may help explain strategists’ habit of overlooking the
geopolitical dimension of his writings.
Where do likely theaters of competition and conflict lie? Mahan casts this
question in terms of purpose and power. He observes that certain regions, “rich
by nature and important both commercially and politically, but politically insecure, compel the attention and excite the jealousies of more powerful nations.”20
Regions combining abundant natural resources and vibrant trade and commerce
with frail governments unable to resist great-power encroachment beguile
acquisitive foreign powers. Ambitious outsiders see great reward in obtaining
military and economic beachheads in such regions, and they see the barriers to
entry as low. Mahan was thinking of the great-power struggle over Manchuria
and the Korean Peninsula. Northeast Asia was a crucible of conflict during the
Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), and Japan’s
annexation of Korea (1910), great events that transpired during his lifetime.
How did Mahan estimate the strategic value of geographic positions? As noted
before, he considered overseas naval stations to be collectively one of three pillars
of sea power. External powers, he held, must be choosy about the sites they select,
lest they disperse forces too thinly and expose their navies to piecemeal defeat
in wartime. Mahan proposed that “the strategic value of any position, be it body
of land large or small, or a seaport, or a strait, depends, 1, upon situation (with
reference chiefly to communications), 2, upon its strength (inherent or acquired),
and, 3, upon its resources (natural or stored).”21 As noted at the outset of this
article, relations with prospective host governments constitute a de facto fourth
determinant, or enabler, of a site’s value. Absent decent working relations, a port
will remain off-limits, along with its geostrategic leverage.
Suitably amended, Mahan’s simple construct retains its analytical power today.
Consider its elements in turn. First, in maritime strategy as in real estate, location ranks atop the priorities list. To be worth occupying, prospective bases must
lie along “strategic lines.” Otherwise, innate strength and resources matter little.
Harbors near heavily trafficked sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are ideal,
placing the fleet close to its sphere of action. Proximity to friendly seaports is another advantage. It allows fleet detachments to combine for defensive or offensive
action in wartime, rendering mutual support. Proximity to hostile naval stations
allows squadrons to watch or interdict enemy movements.
Isolation, on the other hand, detracts from a position’s value. Even Gibraltar
would be worthless as a naval station, despite its unsurpassed natural defenses,
if situated alongside waters devoid of merchant and naval traffic.22 A fleet based
there would find little to do. Nor would anyone see any point in attacking the
harbor. Stout defenses would be moot. Nor can a sea power do much about
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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ill-positioned features. “Strength and resources,” observes Mahan, “may be artificially supplied or increased, but it passes the power of man to move a port which
lies outside the limits of strategic effect.”23 Natural defenses can be augmented to
a degree, or resources can be shipped in overland or overseas. Position is eternal.
Second, a seaport needs military strength, or defensibility, to fend off maritime
or landward assault while projecting naval force outward. A squadron stationed at
a base capable of protecting itself can prowl the seas independently, executing its
missions confident that its landward refuge will be there when it returns. Rugged
natural defenses are desirable. Cliffs overlooking seaward approaches, for instance, render amphibious assault unpalatable while letting defenders rain gunfire
on an enemy fleet. Defenders can emplace guns on both sides of a narrow harbor
mouth, creating overlapping fields of fire. Hence Lord Nelson’s quip that a ship’s
a fool to fight a fort. If a base lacks inherent protection against attack, naval engineers must fortify it—or look elsewhere for a more defensible site. Defensibility is
especially complex in this age of missile warfare. Hardening infrastructure against
missile strikes from the sea demands expensive, labor-intensive measures. The
proliferation of inexpensive antiship weaponry, on the other hand, can augment
the striking power of bases. Truck-launched antiship missiles, furthermore, can
be positioned along the coast or well inland, converting the littoral zone into a de
facto fortress.24 How the offense-defense balance is likely to play out is a question
worth asking when appraising a seaport’s defensibility.
Third, “resources” refers to shipyards to refit merchantmen and ships of war,
provisions for visiting ships, and goods to supply the residents of the port. Foodstuffs, fuel, spare parts, and ammunition are only some of the items a base needs.
Self-supporting ports are ideal. Large islands and coastal harbors boasting ample
backcountry can provide for many of their needs. Sites without such endowments
must ship in cargoes of critical goods. Dependence on external supplies exposes
the port and fleet to a naval quarantine. Observes Mahan, resource-poor Gibraltar would wilt without seaborne supplies—its peerless strategic position and
defenses notwithstanding.25 Its relationship with the Royal Navy was symbiotic:
warships based there could control access to the Mediterranean Sea, but ship
crews and the inhabitants of the fortress would starve unless the fleet ruled the
waves, assuring regular shipments.
Transpose this analysis to the Caribbean and Gulf. (Use map 1 as a reference
during the following discussion.) Mahan warns against gauging a site’s potential
in isolation from its surroundings. This is especially true within the cramped
confines of “America’s Mediterranean.” Islands, he notes, constitute a nearly solid
barrier between the Gulf and Caribbean. Cuba, Santo Domingo (i.e., Hispaniola),
and Puerto Rico are the primary obstacles. Narrow seas separating the islands
corral shipping bound to or from the Isthmus of Panama into three principal
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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MAP 1
GULF OF MEXICO AND CARIBBEAN SEA

Source: Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, p. 270.

shipping lanes. One, through the Yucatán Channel, passes to Cuba’s west. The
second route, the Windward Passage, lies between the eastern tip of Cuba and
Haiti. Because Cuba faces these two waterways (the third passes well to the south,
skirting past Puerto Rico), concludes Mahan, it is “as surely the key to the Gulf of
Mexico as Gibraltar is to the Mediterranean.”26
But as he notes, Cuba commands manifold advantages over Gibraltar in terms
of strength and resources. Its attributes include a long, distended shape, multiple
harbors, and abundant indigenous resources. Defenders operating in the interior could resupply harbors like Havana and Santiago overland, defying even an
overpowering blockade fleet. Best of all from a Mahanian standpoint, the United
States had won basing rights at Guantánamo Bay, near Cuba’s eastern tip, through
its victory in the Spanish-American War (1898). U.S. Navy forces stationed there
stood athwart sea communications with the British-held island of Jamaica to the
south. This positional advantage over the Royal Navy was no small thing, since
the Royal Navy had ruled American waters until around the turn of the century
and Anglo-American war remained a hypothetical possibility.
Puerto Rico, another prize wrung from Spain, likewise occupied a strategic
position. As noted before, the third of Mahan’s major SLOCs, the Anegada Passage, lay to its east.27 U.S. Navy warships operating from the island had the option
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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of interdicting adversary shipping along this route or safeguarding the island and
adjacent waters for friendly use. In short, its post-1898 island holdings empowered the United States to mount a forward defense of its Gulf coast, entrenched
U.S. naval forces in a central position astride important shipping lanes, and granted Washington the option of radiating power southward toward the isthmus.
Amassing the wherewithal to mold events on and around the isthmus obsessed
navalists like Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge. After all, an
entirely new sea passage would connect Atlantic with Pacific once engineers finished digging the canal across Panama. Transoceanic passage would spare ships
the long cruise around Cape Horn. In geospatial terms, observes Spykman, the
“cut through Central America had the effect of turning the whole of the United
States around on its axis and giving it direct access to the Pacific Ocean.” In effect,
the artificial waterway teleported New York nearer to the Asia-Pacific, closer than
Liverpool is to Shanghai, an invaluable edge for American merchantmen. New
York was also thousands of sea miles closer to the west coast of North America.28
Controlling Central American waters, consequently, became a goal of surpassing importance for Washington during the age of Mahan. Where should the U.S.
Navy position forces to command these waters? The interdependence among
such sites as Pensacola, Key West, and Guantánamo Bay complicated geostrategic
calculations. Some sites, writes Mahan, were “overshadowed by others so near
and so strong as practically to embrace them.”29
When weighing the comparative merits of Jamaica and Cuba, for instance, he
pointed out that Jamaica “flanks all lines of communications.” Judged purely by
its geographic position, the British-held island commanded the greatest potential
of any geostrategic asset in the Caribbean Sea. Yet it was deficient in resources
and thus dependent on shipments brought in by sea from Canada or the British
Isles. Cuba overshadowed Jamaica, controlling all sea communications between
the Atlantic Ocean and the lesser island. Only a fleet stronger than any hostile
fleet based in Cuba could prevent a distant blockade from isolating and slowly
starving out Jamaica. Only a dominant navy could imbue Jamaica with the full
value it commanded in abstract calculations, whereas Cuba was virtually selfsufficient.30 By the turn of the century, the Royal Navy could outmatch the U.S.
Navy in American waters only by pulling squadrons from other important theaters. Advantage: Washington.
Mahan expands in Naval Strategy on his position/strength/resources template, applying it to straits and other confined waterways as well as to islands and
coastal sites. He also adds three metrics peculiar to narrow seas. “The military
importance of such passages or defiles,” he says, “depends not only upon the
geographical position, but also upon their width, length, and difficulty.” More
specifically, a strait is a “strategic point” whose value depends on its “situation”
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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on the nautical chart; on its “strength, which may be defined to consist in the
obstacles it puts in the way of an assailant and the consequent advantages to the
holder”; and on “resources or advantages, such as the facility it gives the possessor
for reaching a certain point.” A well-placed passage shortens the distance from
place to place for the belligerent who holds it.31 Denying an enemy fleet passage
forces it to follow longer, more circuitous, and probably more debilitating and
costly routes to its destination.
As in his analysis of bases, Mahan cautions against evaluating narrow seas
without accounting for their larger geographic contexts. When “fixing the value
of any passage,” it is crucial to calculate the number and availability of nearby
alternatives. “If so situated that a long circuit is imposed upon the belligerent who
is deprived of its use, its value is enhanced.” Scarcity magnifies a waterway’s importance. Its value rises if it constitutes “the only close link between two bodies of
water, or two naval stations.” Finally, he urges strategists to consider the underwater topography of narrow seas. There is a vertical dimension to Mahan’s analysis,
then, even though he was concerned mainly with surface shipping. The presence
of convoluted channels, shallow water, or shoal water helps determine a passage’s
offensive and defensive potentials.32 A hard-to-navigate passage represents an asset to the defender, a bane to opponents unfamiliar with its intricacies and quirks.
Finally, Mahan notes in passing that “a certain regard must be had to political
conditions, which may be said to a great extent to neutralize some positions.”
Social or political upheaval in the surrounding country, for example, can work
against or even negate a site’s value, undercutting its defensibility or impoverishing even a wealth of resources. Mahan dismissed Haiti as a base for just that
reason. The country’s constant revolutionary upheaval, or sociopolitical “nothingness,” rendered it “an inert obstacle” to U.S. maritime strategy.33
Such comments about social, cultural, and political context have the feel of
an afterthought for Mahan. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that there are
diplomatic indexes of geostrategic merit. Position, strength, and resources are
not everything for a base. Learning the cultural terrain can be just as crucial. Alliance relations, then, belong in the Mahanian framework as an additional metric.
Today, strong nations no longer wrest choice pieces of territory from their owners
to use as bases. It is imperative, consequently, to take account of prospective host
nations’ interests and views—lest their governments restrict or refuse access in
stressful times.
The best-situated, most defensible, most lavishly supplied seaport in the world
means little if it remains off-limits when needed most. Alliance management represents an enabler for any forward-leaning maritime strategy, letting a seagoing
state tap bases’ physical potential.
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DAITŌSHOTŌ
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Now apply this framework—position, strength, resources, and alliance relations
for land sites, while adding length, width, difficulty, and underwater topography
for narrow seas—to the South China Sea. (Refer to map 2.) This is a body of water
similar in crucial respects to the Caribbean and Gulf, just as those semienclosed
seas bore enough resemblance to the Mediterranean Sea to make Mahan’s comparative study worthwhile.
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The South China Sea presents operational surroundings that appear more
hospitable for navies than do other semienclosed expanses of comparable size, yet
are less hospitable in other respects. It is wider and more vacant than the Mediterranean or the combined Gulf and Caribbean, facilitating free passage for commercial and naval shipping while allowing naval task forces ample maneuvering
space. No obstacles comparable to the Italian Peninsula jut into it to constrict
navigation. No island barrier comparable to the Cuba–Hispaniola–Puerto Rico
line funnels shipping bound for the Malacca Strait—the main outlet to the Indian
Ocean beyond—through a few focal points that can be guarded by watchful maritime forces (or bedeviled by pirates or other nonstate scourges).
For ships that are simply passing through the region in peacetime, then, the
South China Sea is a readily navigable expanse. Only a handful of mostly tiny
islands, atolls, and reefs—the Spratly Islands to the south, the Paracel Islands to
the north—break up the largely featureless maritime plain that separates Vietnam
from the Philippines along the east–west axis and Hong Kong from Borneo from
north to south. The Spratlys and Paracels command enviable geographic positions, but they feature next to nothing in terms of the benchmarks of strength and
resources. Many are uninhabited, habitable only if outside supplies are brought
in. At most these small, resource-impoverished, hard-to-defend islets could play
host to small units armed with antiship cruise missiles, providing the force that
occupies them a sea-denial option vis-à-vis passing merchant or naval traffic.
These are tenuous positions for military forces in search of forward bases.
In short, it will prove hard for any Southeast Asian naval power to ensconce
itself in a central position comparable to the one the United States occupied after
wresting away Spain’s island empire. There is no Puerto Rico, let alone a Cuba.
Two islands figure prominently in news dispatches from Southeast Asia. The first
is Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratlys. This asset is held by Taiwan. The second is Woody Island, or Yongxing Island, a Chinese-held outpost in the Paracels.
Beijing recently instituted the administrative center of Sansha, on Yongxing, to
buttress its claim to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Both islands
resemble Jamaica, as Mahan described it, but they lack Jamaica’s resource base.
Both hold good positions, then, but are short on strength and resources. Neither
is a self-sufficient, readily defensible Cuba.
Consider. Taiping is the largest of the Spratly Islands, at 1.4 kilometers long and
0.4 wide. These are flyspeck proportions. It is the only one of the Spratlys with its
own freshwater. It is big enough for an airfield. Accordingly, Taipei has equipped
the island with an airstrip capable of handling military aircraft and is mulling extending the runway to permit larger aircraft to land.34 In terms of position, Taiping
is well situated along SLOCs connecting the Strait of Malacca with Northeast Asia.
Beyond that, it makes a precarious base. Plentiful freshwater is a significant asset,
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but ships or aircraft would have to ferry in foodstuffs, ammunition, and other
supplies from Taiwan, through potentially contested sea or air routes, to support
any serious expeditionary presence in the South China Sea.
Without sea control or air supremacy—operational conditions increasingly
out of reach for Taiwan’s outmatched air force and navy—Taiping Island will fall
in any serious conflict.35 As in the case of Jamaica, only a dominant naval and
air force can impart value to the island. Taiping would be an asset to Chinese sea
power in Southeast Asia, since People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces can hope
to rule the seas and skies, but it does little for Taiwan in military terms. The same
is even truer for the other, even weaker claimants to the Spratlys.36 At most the
island holds negative value for Taipei—that is, withholding it from China works
in favor of China’s competitors, simply because it keeps the PLA from emplacing
forces there in peacetime.
Woody Island, which anchors China’s presence in the Paracels, holds still less
intrinsic military value. As noted before, Beijing founded the city of Sansha there
in July 2012 while announcing plans to garrison the island.37 Like Taiping, Woody
Island occupies an excellent geographic position. Also like Taiping, it is woefully
deficient in strength and resources. It is minuscule. It boasts no freshwater, meaning the very basics of life must be shipped in from the mainland. Sansha is little
more than a village, populated by a thousand or so residents. The garrison will be
a token force, with more symbolic power than combat potential.
Even so, Chinese military predominance in the northern reaches of the South
China Sea bestows more potential on Woody Island than Taiping will ever enjoy
under Taiwanese control. Its capacity to sustain air and sea communications lets
the PLA unlock whatever potential the island holds. In Mahanian parlance, it
equates to a Jamaica that is home to a preponderant fleet and depends on that
fleet for defense and sustenance. Clearly, from a military standpoint, the South
China Sea islands are an unpromising lot. Yet China is best positioned to take
advantage of what little they offer.
The South China Sea Rim: Part Solid, Part Porous
If not island strongholds, what about ports and airfields around the South China
Sea rim? As detailed before, no sea power can easily mount a forward presence
in the islands. There is no Cuba, Puerto Rico, or Saint Thomas from which to
stage forward operations. Nor are there counterparts to Gibraltar, Malta, or other
Mediterranean outposts where Royal Navy ships tarried during Britain’s imperial
heyday. Hainan Island extends China’s seaward reach, but only by some 233 kilometers from the mainland coast. Converting Woody Island into a serious asset
might be worth China’s while but promises to consume significant resources and
policy energy.
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Because of these shortcomings, sites around the periphery take on more importance than in Mahan’s Gulf and Caribbean. Southeast Asian states are increasingly willing to open their facilities to outsiders. Manila, for instance, has welcomed U.S. ship visits in increasing numbers since China occupied Scarborough
Shoal, an atoll deep within the Philippine exclusive economic zone, in 2012. Cam
Ranh Bay, a U.S.-built seaport in southern Vietnam, offers an excellent harbor
astride the eastern approaches to the Strait of Malacca. Hanoi has opened the
port to shipping from all nations.38 Changi, a port facility in Singapore, can berth
U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, not to mention smaller craft. Singapore
recently agreed to host a rotating four-ship squadron of U.S. Navy littoral combat
ships, while making it known that all navies are welcome to call there.39 The first
littoral combat ship commenced its maiden deployment in early 2013.
Neither Vietnam nor Singapore is likely to permit full-fledged foreign bases
on its territory, but both appear amenable to less formal arrangements. How governments size up the strategic setting represents the crucial determinant of their
policies toward foreign navies. The more aggressively China pushes its maritime
territorial claims in Southeast Asia, in other words, the more receptive regional
governments are likely to be to hosting outside forces. Position, strength, and
resources are meaningless without access. Access is a function of international
politics and, in turn, of whether governments perceive menace in the geostrategic
environment and seek outside support.
There being few permanent basing options in the southern reaches of the
South China Sea, ships capable of at-sea replenishment—indispensable to sustained operations on the high seas—will be central to any maritime competition.
This helps account for Beijing’s determined pursuit of aircraft carriers, the best
mobile substitute for forward airfields. One suspects the People’s Liberation
Army will also step up efforts to field tanker aircraft and combat-logistics vessels.
Doing so will help combat platforms remain on scene in or over southern waters,
rendering the Chinese presence there less sporadic than was once the case. The
PLA Navy, moreover, has fielded Type 056 corvettes to help establish a standing
presence in disputed expanses. Such platforms will supplement the white hulls of
the China Coast Guard. In short, material capabilities must compensate for the
dearth of forward positions in the region.
Ingress and Egress Points
What about access to and from maritime Southeast Asia? The frontiers of the
South China Sea bear closer resemblance to the frontiers of the Gulf and Caribbean than to those of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is a true middle sea,
enclosed entirely by continental landmasses, apart from the Strait of Gibraltar,
the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and the Suez Canal, an artificial waterway. The

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

47

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 1

HOLMES

43

South China Sea, similarly, is ringed by continental Southeast Asia, a solid barrier
to the north and west. Island states, however, form its eastern and southern periphery. This massive arc sweeps from the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca,
passing through Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Indonesian Archipelago along the way. The South China Sea’s eastern borders, then, are far more
permeable than any found in the Mediterranean, albeit less so than the Lesser
Antilles, which make up the southeastern arc of the Caribbean Sea.
In contrast to the case with the Panama Canal, furthermore, mariners have
alternatives to the Malacca Strait—in particular, the Lombok and Sunda Straits,
navigable seaways that pierce the southern arc of the Indonesian Archipelago. A
glance at the map suggests that with so many access points, shipping can enter
and exit the South China Sea with little fear of interference. In his review of
Caribbean geography, similarly, Mahan contends that the Antilles present few
impediments to shipping despite their auspicious position on the map.40 Indeed,
the southeastern fringes of the Caribbean verge on being open sea.
But naval technology has come a long way since Mahan’s day. Properly armed
and fortified, local militaries could contest adversaries’ use of nearby straits with
relative ease. A mix of fast attack craft, land-based antiship missiles, and underwater mines—perhaps even submarines, for some navies—could give them the
dominant say over wartime transit through these narrow seas. Archipelagoes can
be made formidable barriers.
Local Sea Powers May Punch Above Their Weight
Strategists today cannot simplify the geometry of South China Sea maritime
strategy as neatly as Mahan simplified that of the Caribbean basin. Weak Southeast Asian countries are better positioned and equipped to influence their neighborhoods than were weak American states during the fin de siècle era. As map 1
shows, Mahan was able to inscribe a triangle on his map enclosing all important
geostrategic features found in the inland seas. A line connecting New Orleans
with Colón formed one side. A second side originated at Pensacola and runs
through, and somewhat beyond, Saint Thomas. The final leg started at Colón
and runs through Cartagena and Curaçao, intersecting with the Pensacola–Saint
Thomas leg east of Martinique. Everything outside could be safely excluded from
consideration.
Mahan cited two reasons why strategists could concentrate their analytical
energies within this triangle. One, applying the position/strength/resources
paradigm revealed that there was no seaport of consequence along the desolate
coastline stretching westward from New Orleans, along the Texas and Mexican
coasts, through the northern tip of the Yucatán Peninsula. Two, Mexico was
politically stable and deployed no serious navy. It presented no threat, actual
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or latent. Strategists could afford to disregard the shores west of the Mississippi
delta, because it was inert from a sea-power standpoint. By default, all significant
features lay within the Mahanian triangle.41
Geostrategists today cannot discount the potential of Southeast Asian states
as blithely as Mahan discounted Mexico’s a century ago. The entire South China
Sea rim merits scrutiny. True, China boasts the most maritime potential of any
littoral state in the region—by a wide margin. But unlike Latin American states
of the Mahanian age, Southeast Asian states are not mere objects on which great
powers work their will. They can influence their marine environs. Inexpensive
shore-based weaponry can project force out to sea, harnessing the logic of sea
denial even absent powerful fleets.
Not that the region is devoid of respectable fleets. Some states, like Singapore,
sport small yet first-rate navies. Singaporean mariners are reputed for their skill
and élan, and they operate quality platforms and weaponry. This translates into
a measure of control over the approaches to Malacca, as well as the strait itself.
Others, notably Vietnam, have set out to field viable maritime forces of their
own. Hanoi is acquiring six top-flight, Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia,
furnishing its navy a sea-denial option even vis-à-vis the far stronger PLA Navy.42
A Vietnamese Kilo squadron could contest Beijing’s claims to sovereignty—
control, in other words—over regional waters while complicating the PLA Navy’s
efforts to exploit the full potential of its submarine base on Hainan or its outpost on Woody Island. A stealthy Kilo lying off, say, Hainan could deter traffic
from entering or leaving port, compelling Chinese mariners to undertake timeconsuming antisubmarine measures simply to use their Sanya base.
Indonesia too has announced plans to beef up its maritime power.43 Even the
Philippines, despite a trivial defense budget, has options in the form of a longstanding mutual-defense pact with the United States and a history of playing
host to powerful U.S. sea and air forces. Manila has sought American backing
during recent encounters with Beijing, notably the spring 2012 imbroglio at
Scarborough Shoal.44 American ships have called at Philippine ports more and
more often since. The analogy between the South China Sea, with its lopsided
naval balance, and the Mediterranean Sea, for centuries an arena of strife among
more or less evenly matched naval powers, is closer than that between the South
China Sea and the Caribbean of Mahan’s day. It could be a hazardous expanse
indeed in times of trouble.
The Undersea Dimension
The undersea dimension seems like an afterthought in Mahan’s analysis of narrow seas, presumably because Mahan conducted his analysis before submarines
had fulfilled their potential. For him the primary concern is that seamounts,
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reefs, and other obstructions can narrow the choice of courses for ships cruising
on the surface. Careless piloting could leave a surface vessel aground. Such perils persist. In 2013, for example, the mine countermeasures ship USS Guardian
(MCM 5) foundered on a reef in the Sulu Sea and had to be broken up.45
Yet underwater topography is at least as crucial for submarines cruising the
depths. A passage’s underwater conformation may differ markedly from that on
the surface, meaning that submarines may have to trace a somewhat different
route to make their way through. They also might have to traverse channels in
shallow water, exposing themselves to detection and tracking. This is an uncomfortable prospect for submarine crews, who thrive on concealment. In Mahanian
parlance, then, a passage’s width, length, and difficulty may be different for submarines than for surface craft. Submarines resemble ground forces in that the
terrain beneath them matters—in shallow zones, at any rate.
Not just physical features, furthermore, but a host of variables relating to seawater itself—temperature and salinity, to name two—influence sound propagation, which is central to submarine and antisubmarine operations. Acoustics and
kindred subjects are absent from Mahan’s works yet shape undersea warfare to a
striking degree. It would be worth undertaking a close study of South China Sea
subsurface topography and hydrography, compiling an undersea counterpart to
his analysis of features with which surface navies must contend. Navies increasingly crowd these waters with advanced submarines, rendering water-space management ever more difficult, while raising the prospect of accidents and incidents
beneath the waves. This warrants study.
One sample question: How will Chinese ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs)
based at Sanya, on Hainan Island, reach patrol grounds in the western Pacific
should Beijing choose to send them out? To maintain stealth, SSBNs would first
have to evade any adversary picket submarines lying offshore. Once in deep water, they would cruise eastward toward the Philippines. In all likelihood Chinese
boats would exit through the Luzon Strait, the narrow sea between Taiwan and
the Philippine island of Luzon.
Or, more precisely, maritime geography will force them to exit through the
narrow Bashi Channel, near the northern edge of the strait. The Luzon Strait
is wide by Mahanian standards, but the Babuyan and Batan Islands complicate
matters, jutting out into the strait off northern Luzon. Seamounts and reefs dot
the waters separating the northern Batanes from Taiwan, compressing traffic into
narrow, somewhat convoluted pathways. This subjects SSBNs and other craft to
detection and, in wartime, attack by hostile submarines, antisubmarine aircraft,
or surface vessels outfitted for antisubmarine warfare.46
Chinese skippers, then, will enjoy deepwater concealment for only part of
their voyages, courting danger immediately upon leaving port and when leaving
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the South China Sea. To compound the problem, they will be compelled to elude
antisubmarine forces operating from Taiwan, Luzon, or more remote sites such as
Japan to reach the Pacific high seas. That is a lot of hazardous underwater terrain
to traverse. The interplay among topography, hydrography, and strategy promises
to take on new salience as PLA Navy commanders confront emerging realities
and their opponents mull how to turn strategic geography to their advantage.
Taiwan, the Northern Sentinel
No appraisal of the South China Sea would be complete without a few words
about the geostrategic characteristics of Taiwan, which abuts the South China
Sea to the north. Comparison between Taiwan and the islands Mahan assessed
is inexact but revealing. Taiwan resembles Cuba by certain Mahanian standards.
In terms of position, it stands athwart north–south sea-lanes that convey raw
materials and finished goods to and from Northeast Asian economies. The island
also overlooks and could obstruct east–west routes. Its northern tip, for example,
faces Yonaguni, the southernmost point in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain. As with
the rest of the Ryukyu straits, land sites adjacent to this narrow sea could be fortified to erect an east–west barrier to Chinese shipping. Also, Taiwan’s southern tip
adjoins the Luzon Strait, the best—though, as shown before, far from optimal—
portal between the western Pacific and the South China Sea.
The island is sizable, albeit smaller and more compact than Cuba. Much as
with Cuba, whoever rules Taiwan enjoys considerable freedom to move forces
overland on interior lines, bypassing and offsetting the debilitating impact of a
blockade. And numerous seaports of various sizes and shapes dot its long coastline. Minor fishing harbors and marinas, along with caverns and other natural
features, could provide ample refuge for flocks of small patrol craft. Larger
naval combatants could operate from such major seaports as Keelung and Kaohsiung.47 From the vantage point of natural resources, verdant Taiwan is reasonably well stocked with foodstuffs and other supplies. Its inhabitants, however,
depend on imported oil and gas. This represents a critical shortfall. On the whole,
however, the island would seem to justify qualified applause from geostrategists.
Yet certain drawbacks recall Mahan’s acerbic commentary on Jamaica, when
juxtaposed to nearby Cuba. Taiwan may flank key SLOCs, but the long Chinese
coastline envelops the island in turn. PLA naval and air forces face the island
along many axes, much as ships based at Cuban ports could interdict shipping
bound to or from Jamaica. Only Taiwanese forces stronger than nearby sea- and
shore-based PLA assets could release the island’s full geostrategic potential in the
face of Chinese enmity. The island’s armed forces, however, are unlikely to regain
their qualitative advantage over the PLA, let alone overwhelm their antagonists
with superior numbers. It would be politically unthinkable for Taipei to reopen
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the island to U.S. or other outside forces—even if external powers declared themselves willing to return and thereby to ratchet up tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
Should the mainland impose its rule on Taiwan, however, the island will
come to resemble Key West, an outpost adjoining important sea-lanes and carrying enormous offensive and defensive potentials for the great power that owns
it.48 This new, old asset would extend China’s seaward reach eastward into the
western Pacific, turn the southern flanks of Japan and South Korea, granting
Beijing newfound geostrategic leverage over its rivals, and emplace PLA forces
in a commanding position along the northern rim of the South China Sea. From
there they could project power westward into the Taiwan Strait, eastward into
the Pacific Ocean, northward along the “first island chain,” or southward into the
Luzon Strait or the South China Sea. Perhaps most importantly, the PLA would
have burst through the island-chain barrier, which Beijing regards as a latter-day
implement of containment and an impediment to east–west movement between
the China seas and the western Pacific.
In operational terms, PLA forces stationed on Taiwan could shield the mainland from prospective adversaries, such as the United States and its allies, regulate
Northeast Asian competitors’ seaborne communications, and guarantee free
access through the Luzon Strait for Chinese men-of-war—including the SSBNs
discussed before—while threatening to interrupt opponents’ access.
Thinking about Taiwan as a geostrategic asset is by no means new. Admiral
Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations during World War II, affirmed that
the power that controlled Formosa could “put the cork in the bottle” of the South
China Sea for adversaries. The reciprocal advantage: that power could keep the
bottle uncorked for its own use.49 Analyses like King’s help explain why the United States affixed such value to Taiwan during the Cold War and why China does
today. This “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” to quote General
Douglas MacArthur, helped anchor American containment strategy vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union and China, constraining communist movements up and down the
Asian seaboard.50
Doubters might say that such metaphors represent an antiquarian way of looking at Taiwan. Chinese officialdom evidently disagrees. The important Chinese
manual Science of Military Strategy, for example, constitutes an authoritative
guide to how the PLA leadership views China’s strategic surroundings. “The
reunification of China’s mainland and Taiwan,” its framers declare, is “something
that concerns China’s national sovereignty and territorial sovereignty.” Their appraisal is worth quoting at length. The island, they observe, lies “in the key area”
of maritime communications for East Asia. Sea lines of communication “from the
East China Sea to the South China Sea, from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, as
well as the route from the West Pacific to the Middle East, Europe and Asia pass
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here. [Taiwan] is a sea transportation hub connecting Shanghai and Hong Kong,
Ryukyu and Manila, Yokosuka and Cam Ranh Bay and Strait of Malacca.”51
Gaining control of Taiwan is a matter of immense strategic import for Beijing,
regardless of whether Western commentators concur with Chinese strategists
about the island’s military potential. The Science of Military Strategy authors add:
And [Taiwan] is where we can breach the chain of the islands surrounding us in the
West Pacific . . . as well as a strategic key area and sea barrier for defense and offense.
If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our natural maritime
defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but
also a large area of water territory . . . will fall into the hands of others. . . . [O]ur line
of foreign trade and transportation . . . will be exposed to the surveillance and threats
of separatist and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west side of the
52
first chain of islands in the West Pacific.

China, they conclude, has “no room for compromise” on this geostrategic
asset. If peaceful methods of cross-strait unification prove ineffective, military
means will be “the only alternative.”53 Nor is this a peculiarly Chinese Communist prognosis. It conforms to long-standing views, including that of Chinese
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, who insisted that losing any part of China’s
geographic periphery compromises the integrity of the whole.54 From Beijing’s
perspective, preserving the defensive system warrants the utmost resolve and
effort.
A UNIQUE PERIPHERAL SEA
Finally, two critical differences separate the South China Sea from both the
Caribbean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. First, there are relatively convenient
alternatives to traveling through maritime Southeast Asia. It is possible, that is,
to detour around the South China Sea without undertaking voyages of epic scope
like the ones around Tierra del Fuego or the Cape of Good Hope. The Pacificbased U.S. battleship Oregon was forced to circumnavigate South America in
1898 to get into the Caribbean fight against Spain.55 The battlewagon’s arduous
transit lent credence to Mahanian advocacy on behalf of an isthmian canal. A
few short years later, in 1904–1905, the Russian Baltic Fleet, denied the use of the
Suez Canal, had to steam around Africa, across the Indian Ocean, and through
the South China Sea and waters adjoining Taiwan to engage the Imperial Japanese Navy.56
Distance was clearly a problem in these instances. There was no alternative to
a protracted cruise in the former case, while Japan’s ally Great Britain closed the
Suez to Russia in the latter. Neither geography nor enemy strategy, by contrast,
compels anyone to traverse contemporary Southeast Asian waters. Circumventing this marginal sea imposes significant costs in terms of extra fuel, wear and
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tear on equipment, and crew fatigue, but such challenges are manageable compared to rounding South America or Africa.
Second, there are potential naval stations outside the southern perimeter of
the South China Sea. Many lie in Australia. Forces based there can swing from
side to side between the Indian Ocean and western Pacific without ever venturing
into Southeast Asia. This qualifies Robert Kaplan’s analogy between the South
China Sea and a throat. A throat is the only route from one place to another,
whereas Australia-based forces enjoy the luxury of entering the South China Sea
at points of their choosing—bypassing the throat.
Australia thus bestrides an invaluable position at the seam between the Pacific
and Indian Oceans, external to Southeast Asia. The U.S.-Australian agreement to
station a rotating contingent of U.S. Marines at Darwin, along the northern Australian coast, leverages this convenient geostrategic reality.57 Also, while Canberra
has demurred thus far, Washington may try to expand the basing arrangement
to stage heavy U.S. Navy forces in Australia, perhaps at the western seaport of
Perth. The merits of an external yet nearby geographic position are too obvious to
ignore. Whether alliance politics will permit a realignment this bold remains to
be seen.58 Much depends on how aggressively China conducts itself in the region.
The South China Sea, then, represents a maritime crossroads that commands
enormous worth for seafaring states while presenting few opportunities for
permanent forward basing. Because of its dearth of island outposts, it will prove
difficult for any would-be hegemon to command—even a coastal state like China
that is replete with maritime potential. An oceangoing fleet able to project power
throughout the region will be a must for any power with designs on sea command. China has achieved impressive progress toward a blue-water navy while
fielding its first coast guard and an imposing array of land-based weaponry able
to strike at sea. This portends well from its standpoint.
Nonetheless, Beijing has taken on an imposing slate of commitments along
its nautical periphery, ranging from managing events on the Korean Peninsula,
to the north, through recovering Taiwan, at the midpoint, to fostering maritime
security at Malacca, to the extreme southwest. These commitments stretch finite
assets thin. China’s naval project remains a work in progress, meaning that any
decision to concentrate assets in Southeast Asia places other, equally pressing
interests at risk. Alfred Thayer Mahan would doubt China’s capacity to enforce
its will in Southeast Asia any time soon.59
Mahan might question America’s longevity there as well—and beseech
American decision makers to shore up its position, both by keeping the U.S. Navy
strong and by courting close ties with regional allies and partners. Otherwise,
the pillars of American sea power in a theater of vital interest may prove wobbly
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indeed. Strategists could do worse than to use his framework to think through
these challenges.
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THE JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE IN
THE AGE OF MULTIL ATER AL COOPER ATION
Nontraditional Security
Captain Takuya Shimodaira, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

I

saiah Berlin’s essay The Hedgehog and the Fox—made famous by the adage “The
fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing”—explores the
pros and cons of a highly focused defense strategy.1 The hedgehog curls up in
a ball and defends itself. Hiroshi Doi, former professor at the National Defense
Academy of Japan, advocates a “hedgehog-style defense” for Japan, claiming that
the country’s postwar security policies can still defeat any “sly fox” confronting
the nation.2 However, given the emergence of an increasingly complex global
security environment, it may be argued that Japan’s “defense-only defense policy”
is no longer valid. Indeed, must Japan remain a hedgehog forever?
The security environment surrounding Japan grows ever more complex
and diversified, combining traditional and nonCaptain Shimodaira is the first Japan Maritime Selftraditional security challenges as never before.
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form of humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. If Japan is
to meet these challenges as well as fulfill its duties as a “responsible stakeholder,”
the roles, missions, and force structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
must be modernized.
On 1 May 2012 American and Japanese leaders issued “U.S.-Japan Joint
Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future” declaring, “Japan and the United
States pledge to fulfill our roles and responsibilities by utilizing the full range of
capabilities to advance regional and global peace, prosperity and security.”3 This
reflects the growing expectation that Japan will help promote peace and stability
in the Asia-Pacific region through its close alliance with the United States. To attain a responsible stature in international society, Japan needs to take actions to
enable it to perform its responsibilities relating to security more comprehensively.
Constantly changing domestic and international security paradigms make it necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance
and strengthen its effectiveness. Because Japan’s national interests are closely tied
to the sea, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), a flexible, responsive,
and sustainable naval force, stands at the forefront of the defense of the nation
and plays a central role in the Japan-U.S. relationship with regard to defense
cooperation. It can be argued that the alliance could wither and collapse unless
the JMSDF adapts to these changing times by revising its outmoded defensive
strategy and adopting new roles and missions.
There are many new roles and missions that the JMSDF needs to perform in
the future. Preparing to meet nontraditional challenges is of the utmost urgency,
because such activities can be implemented immediately, do not violate constitutional restrictions, and help Japan fulfill its international obligations. The proposed concept of the “Noncombat Military Operation,” or NCMO (pronounced
“Nocomo”), should be a minimum and realistic step for Japan to become a more
responsible international power.4
In a prior study based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for [Fiscal
Year] FY 2011 and Beyond and lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, recommendations were made for the rapid development of sea-based capabilities (i.e., amphibious lift and corresponding logistics support) as a defense
requirement for Japan today.5 Sea basing is a key capability if disaster-prone and
insular Japan is to face nontraditional challenges. However, to date, there has
been no systematic analysis of the extent to which the JMSDF can actually perform activities in the nontraditional security fields utilizing sea-based capabilities. It is therefore necessary to determine which roles should be played by the
JMSDF in the nontraditional security fields.
This article describes the diverse capabilities required by the JMSDF under
the rapidly evolving security environment and focuses on the requirements of
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sea basing. It begins by analyzing America’s amphibious capabilities, including
its evolving roles and missions, and then examines Japan’s duties in terms of the
Japan-U.S. alliance. Lastly, it recommends a new role for the JMSDF utilizing sea
basing.
NEW CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR THE JMSDF
First, Japan must develop the will as well as the capability to cope with its security challenges unilaterally. That is the right of every nation and the primary responsibility of its military forces. Tackling the broad array of security challenges
outlined previously is largely beyond the capability of any one military force, even
that of the United States. That is why multilateral cooperation is so important,
particularly for naval forces. Accordingly, it is necessary, in addition to deepening the strong Japan-U.S. alliance, to promote multilateral cooperation between
the JMSDF and its neighbors during peacetime. Military forces today routinely
gather at the sites of natural disasters around the globe to support disaster relief.
Host nations lack the organic capacity to meet the emergency needs of their
populations in the face of widespread destruction. Japan is obligated to join such
efforts. Japan is simply unready to face alone the aftermath of a major earthquake
centered in a large urban area like Tokyo. International support under such circumstances is necessary, and the JMSDF must be able to work with international
forces sent to help. Therefore, to meet its responsibilities at home and abroad, Japan requires capable naval forces that are maintained in the highest state of material readiness and manned with crews prepared to perform a broad array of HA/
DR missions, whether unilaterally or in concert with allies and partner nations.
Given Japan’s pressing financial situation, the JMSDF will find it challenging
in the near term to develop the requisite sea-base and amphibious capabilities.
The most realistic approach would be to focus on existing defense capabilities
and maximize their effectiveness through innovation, comprehensive planning,
strenuous training, and close cooperation with the United States. Furthermore,
a multilayered approach is necessary, taking advantage of the distinctive characteristics of the entire range of available forces, including military, civilian,
governmental, and nongovernmental agencies. The most important thing for
the advancement of multilateral cooperation is the establishment of trust. More
concretely, to establish trust globally and specifically in the Asia-Pacific region, it
is necessary for Japan to assist and cooperate seamlessly with other countries in
times of difficulty, and diplomatically express its opinions and take actions from
a responsible position.
The most common threat in the region is undeniably major natural disasters.
That was made apparent following the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 and
Super Typhoon Haiyan, which struck the Philippines in November 2013. In both
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cases, military forces proved invaluable for rendering aid.6 Thus, training for HA/
DR activities in peacetime not only fosters friendship and trust among regional
neighbors but enhances the operational proficiency of international forces working together for humanitarian purposes.
Moreover, training in preparation for such situations is an important expression of national will and commitment to protect one’s homeland. Even with
increased multilateral cooperation, a country needs to maintain the ability to
protect its sovereignty through initiative.
In a widely known 1979 work, Ken Booth classified the capabilities of naval
forces as military, diplomatic, and policing roles.7 In the future, the JMSDF needs
a fourth capability—civil roles. This means the JMSDF should begin focusing
on the lives and welfare of the Japanese people in times of duress. For a country
with limited national resources, not fully exploiting all military capabilities in
peacetime equates to wasting resources. Any organization, either military or civilian, that fails to account for the welfare of the citizens is derelict in its duties in
a democracy. If the JMSDF is to perform both its military and civil-defense roles
successfully, it will need to acquire new capabilities while maintaining them in
the highest state of readiness.
The centrality and force structure of U.S. amphibious forces offer an important lesson for the SDF. Japan’s acquisition of organic naval amphibious
forces will ensure improved multilateral cooperation with the United States and
a rapid-response force that is capable in times of crisis. Congressman J. Randy
Forbes has argued that the United States needs to renew its amphibious capability that has been neglected over the last decade while fighting two wars, in Iraq
and Afghanistan.8 Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, despite tight
budgetary constraints, executed BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012, the largest amphibious
training exercise in ten years. The exercise showed the importance of integrating
military forces, civilian agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
It also emphasized the synergy between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and
reaffirmed the importance of a robust amphibious capability in the U.S. national
defense strategy. The rising importance of sea power in the Asia-Pacific region,
particularly amphibious power, is a critical enabler of the U.S. strategic rebalance
toward the region.9 In other words, the utility of amphibious operations has been
reaffirmed by the United States as well as Japan. The JMSDF should improve
interoperability with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force while developing a
more capable amphibious force.
Joint-force documents of the United States divide amphibious operations into
a number of categories: assaults, raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and support to other operations (like HA/DR).10 It would not be realistic for Japan to
attempt to develop all these competencies to the same level as the United States.
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Rather, it should prioritize the defense and safety of Japan, and facilitate the
diffusion of responsibility for humanitarian responsibilities to the international
community. Therefore, minimum requirements should consist of a limited amphibious assault capability for defending and regaining control of small islands
and archipelagoes and providing amphibious support to other operations. The
latter in particular may be helpful for deterring disputes and military threats, as
well as addressing challenges in nontraditional security fields.11 These capabilities
should be pursued by the JMSDF in peacetime because these sea-based capabilities are also very effective in HA/DR operations.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SEA BASE, AND CHALLENGES
With regard to sea basing, one of the most important defense capabilities Japan
requires today, there are the lessons learned from the international HA/DR
response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The U.S. Naval War College monograph Waves of Hope summarizes the lessons of large-scale joint efforts involving organizations such as the United Nations, armed forces dispatched from a
number of countries, and NGOs, and it analyzes the “hard power” assets involved
and “soft power” effects. First, sea basing minimizes the friction between local
indigenous populations (arising from religious, cultural, or ideological differences) and intervening military personnel deployed ashore. Second, transfer of
personnel and supplies from a sea base to shore by helicopters and air-cushion
landing craft (LCACs) facilitates effective relief operations in disaster areas where
basic infrastructure is limited or the capabilities of local government to respond
are greatly reduced. Third, HA/DR efforts directly or indirectly help to improve
diplomatic efforts between countries strained by ideological differences, as demonstrated by Indonesia’s improved relationship with the United States following
9/11. Finally, the presence of the U.S. military helped to reassure regional allies
that a rapidly rising China could not silently fill a geopolitical vacuum caused by
the improved U.S. commitment to the Middle East.12
These lessons had a considerable impact on U.S. diplomatic and military strategies for the Asia-Pacific region. They also led the U.S. Navy to recommit itself
to increased multilateral cooperation while recognizing the magnitude of the
HA/DR impact on diplomatic relations, as well as the utility of power projection
from a sea base.
On 17 January 2012, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the Joint Operational
Access Concept—a major initiative to develop effective joint operational capabilities. This document showcased the importance of sea-based platforms for collection, maneuver, and logistical support to operations ashore.13 In pursuit of this
concept, the U.S. Navy is developing a new class of naval vessel, the mobile landing platform (MLP). The first ship of the class, USNS Montford Point (T-MLP 1),
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is 785 feet long, and has a full-load displacement of 78,000 tons, a speed of fifteen
knots, and a range of around nine thousand nautical miles. One of its principal
features is a hull based on tanker designs and built to commercial rather than
military standards. Although it lacks advanced damage-control systems, its cost
is significantly lower than previous military-standard designs, and it can support
three LCACs. Likewise, an MLP off the landing site can receive supplies from
“connector” vessels and support operations ashore. When all its supplies have
been offloaded by LCACs, an MLP can move to a safe area to be resupplied or
stand by to backload forces from ashore.14 Recent reports suggest the U.S. Navy
plans to deploy three MLPs.15
In addition, the U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command is currently developing
plans for a megafloat-type Intermediate Transfer Station (ITS). This sea platform
can berth multiple vessels. When its components are connected, the ITS forms
a large sea base capable of landing and recovering aircraft. It can also serve as a
base for LCACs while serving as a landing pad for helicopters and flying boats.16
Finally, the Office of Naval Research is developing a high-speed Transformable
Craft, or “T-Craft,” with extended cruising range and carrying capacity, to utilize
the concept of a sea base in a more practical way.17
With the U.S. Navy’s sea-base plan as a reference, what kind of sea base should
be adopted by Japan? The core of such a plan could be a composite force termed
the “Sea Stability Fleet.” It would be a cost-effective, sea-based collection of
various existing military and civilian vessels that could be assembled into a task
force that is scalable, rapidly deployable, and well suited to support interservice,
interagency, and NGO efforts.18
One possible interim solution is the development of an MLP-like capability
using megafloats. A megafloat was constructed in 2002 to demonstrate how
nascent commercial technologies could be employed to extend Haneda Airport.
This megafloat was later disassembled and transferred to Shimizu City in Shizuoka Prefecture, to Minami Awaji City in Hyōgo Prefecture, and to Minami Ise
Town in Mie Prefecture.19 The megafloat could be easily adapted as a sea base
for HA/DR activities in and around the home islands. Another solution would
be turning to the private sector, especially NGOs. By means of a “private finance
initiative,” the diversity and flexibility of NGOs can be effectively exploited for
the development and maintenance of public facilities. Under such an initiative,
the government would contract with NGOs to operate private cargo carriers, ferries, and roll-on/roll-off ships. Synergy could then be achieved among military,
civil, and private agencies, even with limited resources, personnel, facilities, and
funds. In particular, cooperation with NGOs, which in the past have historically
had limited partnerships with the JMSDF, could be a driving force in improved
interoperability and positively reinforced civil-military relations.
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY, AND
CHALLENGES
Successful amphibious lift from a sea base is also a capability that is necessary
if Japan is to conduct a NCMO effectively from the sea. On 5 January 2012,
President Barack Obama announced new strategic defense guidance emphasizing the importance of power projection.20 This guidance included Navy powerprojection capabilities in relation to the Air-Sea Battle concept. In addition to
this, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps published jointly in March 2012 a concept
document stressing the need for successful power projection in A2/AD environments.21 The core of this concept is a cross-domain synergy between the U.S.
Army and Marine Corps.
Entry operations by the Army and Marine Corps in an A2/AD environment
would involve limited-objective strikes and raiding by sea-based forces, destruction of enemy A2/AD capabilities, delivery of a coup de main, seizure of ports
and airfields, and establishment of expeditionary facilities to enable follow-on
operations. The entry force would have two components: one for assault and
one for follow-on operations. It would consist of Marine air-ground task forces
(MAGTFs), Army airborne units, and Army air-assault forces. These amphibious operations would be characterized by vertical and horizontal approaches,
combining the “Ship to Objective Maneuver” (STOM) and “Mounted Vertical
Maneuver” (MVM), and would allow forces to operate by various means, such as
assault landing or airborne approach.22 It would confuse the enemy and reduce
his geographical advantage. Success in the entry operation would contribute to
effective dominance over the sea and air and help synergize forces.
The U.S. Marine Corps’s response to the challenge of amphibious operations
in the twenty-first century started with the concept of “Operational Maneuver
from the Sea” in 1996.23 In May 2011 a document explaining STOM, the current,
central operational concept, was completed.24 In this concept paper, doctrines
for amphibious operations characterized by STOM are summarized as follows:
• To treat the sea, air, and land as a unified littoral maneuvering space
• To continue to apply the single-battle concept even in the setting of a rapid
operational tempo or changing operational domain
• To provide joint-force commanders with improved options among soft- and
hard-power enablers
• To limit the type and number of forces ashore
• To focus equally on soft- and hard-power missions
• To emphasize maneuvering flexibility and avoid established defenses or
obstacles
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• To use a cross-domain approach
• To use dispersed forces
• To employ scalable landing forces
• To increase options for partnering organizations and groups
• To gain local area control for periods of time, as necessary.
In short, the effectiveness of this power-projection capability lies in its combination of MAGTFs with airborne and heliborne forces for mutual support and
synergy. The Army and Marine Corps are able to contribute mutually to this
joint operation by gaining and sustaining access. As summarized by Robert O.
Work, then Under Secretary of the Navy, long-range arms and power-projection
capabilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps would be central to U.S. military
power in the future.25
Against that background, what kinds of power-projection capabilities should
Japan develop? The U.S. power-projection capabilities, developed over the past
hundred years and honed by nearly continuous practice, are undoubtedly the best
in the world. It cannot be overstated that the United States is currently the most
reliable ally of Japan. These facts underscore just how important it is for the SDF
to emulate U.S. power-projection capabilities.
To achieve the best outcomes possible, the SDF must exploit its existing assets
to support U.S. power-projection capabilities in a crisis. To accomplish this, it
would be necessary for Japan to deploy helicopters and LCACs, combine them
with airborne and heliborne units, and integrate the remaining forces, in methodologies similar to the U.S. MAGTF’s, for STOM and MVM. Therefore, it is
critically important to craft a robust plan to enhance the synergy between existing maritime and ground forces in times of peace rather than crisis.
The challenge, then, lies in discerning just how to combine components flexibly, and achieve operational synergy when the power required exceeds the aggregated strengths of each component now more than ever. The JMSDF is pushing
the limits of its capabilities in many situations. Needed capabilities in the future,
however, cannot be provided by the Ministry of Defense or the JMSDF alone.
Emergent security situations call for a 360-degree response involving all facets of
power a nation can bring to bear. Similarly, in an emergency, it becomes equally
important for a nation to employ assets at the local level (e.g., province, state,
city), in addition to national resources. In this vein, it is important for all national,
state, and local entities to train and exercise together repeatedly in peacetime to
accumulate knowledge and experience.
For the United States, a maritime nation with global responsibilities, the U.S.
Navy and Marine Corps represent an essential component of the nation’s security
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force.26 Operating from the sea with a multidomain force offers many advantages.
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are designed to maintain forward presence and
deliver decisive sea power on a global scale whenever and wherever needed.27 The
JMSDF, for its part, should fully utilize its newly acquired amphibious support
capability to address common nonconventional threats in the Asia-Pacific region
through multilateral cooperation. In addition, it is necessary that the JMSDF
maintain its influence with forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power
projection, and maritime security, which are the cores of sea power.28
JAPAN’S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE
The significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance to developing Japan’s new sea base
and amphibious lift capabilities cannot be overplayed. The alliance has played a
significant role in ensuring the peace, safety, and the continued independence of
Japan. However, history has shown that the nature of this alliance changes from
time to time. The power balance in the Asia-Pacific region is being destabilized
now by the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States, indicating
possibilities of both international cooperation and friction.29
In 2001, John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago predicted a collision
between the United States and China. He envisioned a growing role for alliances:
“If a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to
remain safely on the sidelines.”30 Since the Cold War, an increased requirement
has evolved to strengthen the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship to cope with
the rise of China, address the growing instability on the Korean Peninsula, and
assuage concerns centered on the Taiwan Strait. The shared concerns of Japan
and the United States resulted in the adoption of the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” of April 1996. In addition, a new
document, “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” which was
revised in 1997, announced enhanced collaboration with the United States in
response to an armed attack against Japan both directly and in surrounding areas
that could have important influence on Japan’s peace and security. In 2002, the
Japan–United States Security Consultative Committee was launched to accelerate
mutual consultation. On 21 June 2011, twenty-four common strategic objectives
were presented.31 Efforts must now be made to refine and implement these objectives in addition to deepening the alliance.
In today’s Japanese security environment, multiple international actors interact in a complex manner. As such, it is not easy to understand fully the current
security situation, let alone make preparations against future contingencies. If

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

65

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 1

S H I M O DA I R A

61

Japan is to address these difficult challenges, complicated by history, geography,
and resources, how should it adapt and change for the future?
The first key is a perspective on nonstate actors. Tsutomu Kikuchi, a professor
at Aoyama Gakuin University, sees the Asia-Pacific region as a place where the
theories of realism and liberalism are combined and suggests that the priority
among the core values of the state (i.e., national security, economic prosperity, and political autonomy) can change according to a complicated bargaining
game.32 The common factor that unifies these two approaches is the pursuit of
creating and maintaining order in the international system in the absence of a
central overarching government. While this concept does limit itself to the state,
it also envisions loose collaboration with nonstate actors, implying the possibility
of steady growth in the depth and width of collaborative relationships. Research
has not borne out the extent to which regimes and government can provide solutions to the various challenges facing international society, which is built primarily on the basis of the state. However, the participation of nonstate actors, such as
internationally recognized entities, companies, and NGOs, as well as the coordination and cooperation of states, may point to solutions for international security
issues in the future. It is important to enhance such collaborative relationships
in terms of their depth and scope, through multilayered cooperative agreements
that recognize the strengths of each participative entity in the grand strategy.
The second key is the effective employment of nonmilitary instruments of
power, or soft power. The security environment surrounding Japan poses new
complex challenges where military power is not effective or appropriate. The
maritime challenges faced by Japan include piracy, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, international organized crime, major natural disasters, environmental destruction, and the need to acquire resources. Japan must ensure
it retains free access to the sea lines of communication for maritime commerce.
In other words, global maritime security is in Japan’s national interests. At the
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum Ministerial
Meeting of July 2010, then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that
“the United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons.”33 These tangible interests are
increasingly threatened and it is not possible for one nation to deal with these
threats alone. Preventing the emergence of these threats through soft power is
preferable to the use of kinetic force. Nevertheless, direct challenges to peace and
security should be responded to in a forthright manner.
Though nation-states are still the major actors in the current international
system, nonstate actors cannot be neglected. Their interests and policy measures
have diversified, and many options are available to them. Therefore, a realistic
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response to the new security issues is to approach them from a global point of
view where order is maintained by multiagency and multilateral cooperation.
To accomplish these goals, the ability to coordinate complicated international activities and assimilate an abundance of global intelligence is required.
Acquiring this capability and knowledge would broaden Japan’s capabilities and
improve its response capabilities to emerging crises. Japan is capable of assuming proportionate responsibility for the safety and security of the seas in the
Asia-Pacific region. While China continues to expand its presence in the South
China Sea and the East China Sea, a realistic approach for Japan involves the
promotion of multiagency and multilateral cooperation in the maritime domain.
Japan will protect its national interests through military and nonmilitary means,
while pursuing a position of regional leadership. In the interim, the best way to
secure regional peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region is to promote initiatives that encourage close coordination and collaboration between the Japanese
military and civilian agencies in the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In this way
Japan assumes critical new roles and responsibilities, and the Japan-U.S. alliance
can be further deepened. This is an issue of the utmost urgency for Japan if it is
to enhance its relationship with the United States.
NEW ROLES OF JMSDF: THE NCMO APPROACH
What must be done by the JMSDF to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance? It is
critical that the JMSDF undertake concrete operational planning to implement
the Air-Sea Battle concept in development by the United States. Considering
the present environment, with its myriad nontraditional challenges, Japan’s
traditionally passive mind-set toward security will no longer be accepted by the
international community. Japan will find itself increasingly isolated unless it assumes proportionate responsibility for meeting these new challenges. Given this
sense of crisis, the question “What can be done now?” must be pursued in a more
realistic way.
Recognizing an unfavorable legacy from World War II, Japan has resolved
to address historical concerns with its neighbors and to remain committed to
its stance as a peace-loving nation. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe strongly insists
that Japan remain a “proactive contributor to peace.”34 Abe has worked tirelessly
over the past few years to revitalize the Japanese nation, including its foreign and
defense policies, to make it a more normal nation. At a meeting of ASEAN and
Japan in Tokyo during the December 2013 “40th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation” commemoration, he stated, “We reaffirmed our enhanced
commitment for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability, which is in the
regional and global interests.”35 One of the ways in which the JMSDF can enhance
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its commitment to strengthening cooperation is to pursue disaster management
on an international scale.
Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) is a conceptual template for full-spectrum dominance on the battlefield employed globally by U.S. joint forces.36 In JV 2020, as
shown in table 1, military operations are largely categorized as “war” and “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).37 MOOTW include a range of both
combat and noncombat operations. The areas where combat and noncombat
operations overlap include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, shows of force
(including raids), and noncombatant evacuation. The purely noncombat operations of MOOTW include freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance, and
protection of shipping. All these activities may be performed simultaneously or
as distinct from one another.
The JMSDF must play a leading role in the purely noncombat operations of
MOOTW to increase multilateral cooperation, protect its national interests,
maintain freedom of navigation, and deepen its ties with the United States.
A NCMO is defined as a military operation not involving combat. As stated
earlier, MOOTW include combat actions, so Japanese participation in some
MOOTW is prohibited by law. In contrast, a NCMO can be characterized as
feasible within the framework of existing Japanese law, and the JMSDF can
take more initiative in peacetime operations. Possible NCMO activities include
rendering assistance to military forces employed in the pursuit of global peace,
policing that contributes to the maintenance of international order, and offering
humanitarian assistance in times of international disasters.
TABLE 1

THE VISION OF NCMO
Military
Operations

Field

Goals

Examples

Combat
Noncombat

Fight & win

Large-scale combat
operations, attack, defend,
blockade

Military
operations
other than war
(MOOTW)

Deter war & resolve
conflict

Peace enforcement
counterterrorism
show of force
raid/strike
peacekeeping/noncombatant
evacuation operation
nation assistance
counterinsurgency

NCMO

War

Promote peace & support civil authorities

Freedom of navigation,
counterdrug, humanitarian
assistance, protection of
shipping, civil support

Activities

International order
maintenance, international logistics
support, international
humanitarian
assistance

Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of JV 2020.
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Taking the initiative in NCMOs is advantageous in five ways. First, Japan
would gain a leading position in international society by fulfilling its international obligations. Second, it would be beneficial for both Japan and the United States
in the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance to share security roles. Third, it would
bring benefits to international society. It is relatively easy to join NCMO activities
without restriction. Participation in NCMO activities enhances multilateral cooperation and builds common background to make trust among nations. Fourth,
it could be beneficial to China as well, by enabling it to participate in NCMOs and
take on new international obligations of its own. Fifth, even in difficult financial
circumstances, a NCMO can be conducted by utilizing existing assets.
Two challenges exist. First, a change of awareness is necessary. In other words,
Japan can no longer persist in the mind-set of “It is impossible” under traditional
legal restrictions but rather must build a mind-set of “Yes, it is possible,” by finding activities that are lawful under the Constitution today. A stable security environment is absolutely necessary for the existence and continued development of
Japan. Without the assurance of continued stability in the region, it is impossible
to sustain free maritime trade. If Japan is to continue to reap the benefits of trade
in the future, it must be a proactive contributor to ensure the environment can
produce these benefits. This requires Japan to take on more responsibility for
security previously undertaken by the international community.
To attain these goals it will be necessary for Japan to exploit its powers of
defense fully and actively. If they are utilized and practiced for peacetime actions, capabilities must be developed to respond to unexpected events while
utilizing national resources more effectively in peacetime. One need look no
further than the employment of U.S. military forces in a HA/DR crisis. Yoshinobu Yamamoto, a professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, has assessed
that the current international system has led to the diversification of the duties
of military forces, whereby they must take increasingly dynamic action in the
wake of humanitarian crises and disaster relief operations.38 Japan must change
its attitude concerning security from a “passive” to an “active” view—in other
words, from “security afforded from the outside” to “security achieved with the
collaboration of others.” In addition, it cannot be overstated that in international
society, a country not actively committed to such peaceful activities is not satisfactorily fulfilling its share of responsibilities and duties required to maintain
international order.
Second, to establish a global security environment, especially in the AsiaPacific region, a NCMO should be led by the JMSDF, which is at the forefront
of the defense of Japan. This objective may be difficult in the near term, given
regional tensions, but it needs to be undertaken soon. For this purpose, Japan
and the United States need to reapportion their roles and response capabilities in
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TABLE 2
MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF NCMO
Type

Activities
Security surveillance
Cracking down on illegal cross-border activities

International order maintenance

Protection of shipping
Securing safety of navigation routes
Maritime interdiction operations
Provision of supplies

International logistics support

Maintenance and repair
Transportation
Medical services
Disaster relief

International humanitarian assistance

Protection of noncombatants
Medical transportation
Search and rescue

a more effective way, on the common understanding that the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacific benefit both countries.
More specifically, roles that could be allocated between Japan and the United
States are specified in table 2. Such roles include maintenance of international
order (e.g., security surveillance, crackdowns on illegal cross-border activities,
protection of shipping, safety of navigation routes, and maritime interdiction),
international logistics support (e.g., provision of supplies, maintenance and
repair, transportation, and medical services), and international humanitarian
assistance (e.g., disaster relief, protection of noncombatants, medical transportation, and search and rescue).
Voluntary JMSDF participation in NCMO activities encourages Japan to take
more responsibilities as a stakeholder in regional and global security. NCMO is
an action-oriented approach that can be implemented in peacetime. Recently,
stabilizing operations have gained increased importance for the United States
as well, and the topic most emphasized is “Phase Zero,” engagement during
peacetime.39 This suggests that there is an opportunity for Japan to utilize its selfdefense capabilities to take an active part in international military operations. Japan should address and discuss such questions as “What can be done now?” and
“What should be done?,” while taking action on the basis of the NCMO approach.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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The JMSDF needs to initiate concepts and take action. It is necessary that the
JMSDF change its way of thinking to “Yes, it is possible.” Likewise, the JMSDF
must actively offer the international community increased options for Japanese
involvement that do not violate Japan’s Constitution but improve the regional
security environment. Increased NCMO actions and initiatives would enable
Japan to enhance its standing in international society while presenting an image
of a responsible state.
Considering the growing importance of coalition operations, the JMSDF
should add a renewed importance to the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance,
which is the foundation to security in the Asia-Pacific region. The alliance, which
continues to build on “values and benefits,” blossoms into one that includes mutually beneficial “actions.”
E. H. Carr, an authoritative author in the field of international politics, once
remarked, “It remains true that a new international order and a new international
harmony can be built up only on the basis of an ascendancy that is generally
accepted as tolerant and unoppressive or, at any rate, as preferable to any practicable alternative.”40 Today, in an age of a diversifying multilateral framework,
the JMSDF must play an increasingly significant role in the formation of that
international order.
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C YBER WAR, C YBERED CONFLIC T, AND THE
MARITIME DOMAIN
Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak

I

t has been well over a decade since the first “prophets” of information warfare
proclaimed a new age of conflict fought not just on air, sea, and land but with
electrons in what came to be known as “cyberspace.”1 Since these early predictions, many incidents have confirmed that criminals, random hackers, and
government-sanctioned specialists can wreak havoc on governments, military
communications systems, and corporations. The Stuxnet worm alone helped
delay—by months, perhaps years—the long-standing efforts of Iran to acquire
sufficient nuclear material to build nuclear weapons.2 Recent revelations of hacking campaigns against such publications as the Wall Street Journal and New York
Times have broadened concerns to include even the integrity of American democratic institutions.3 Meanwhile, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command has
characterized cyber attacks designed to gain access to the intellectual property
of American corporations as the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history.”4
How cyber assaults and government responses have been interpreted is not
uniform, however, especially with regard to whether the world will eventually
engage in “cyber war.”5 There is a community of scholars and analysts who argue
that cyber war will not happen or that the impact of cyberspace on armed conflict
will be limited.6 Others in the broad field of security studies, traditional computer science, or corporate communities claim that while some form of conflict
is happening, government officials, military officers, and legislators are suffering
from “threat inflation.” They argue that hyperbolic projections are leading to bad
policy decisions, especially with regard to specific adversaries, and that there has
been overinvestment in offensive cyber weapons rather than prudent defensive
measures.7 A best-selling nonfiction book has been criticized for contributing
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unnecessarily to public fears about the potential for cyber warfare.8 Many of
these critics argue that what are being called “cyber attacks” are really instances
of espionage, allowed by international law, or simply crime, which is not the
mission area of the nation’s military services.9 Some analysts detect the influence
of the military-industrial complex on policy debates. If hackers, official or not,
from China and Russia, terrorists, and criminals use the Internet to penetrate U.S
government systems, contractors see opportunities for increased revenue. As two
observers of cyberspace argue, “There’s an arms race in cyberspace, and a massively exploding new cyber-industrial complex that serves it.”10
Our position on this ongoing debate is that neither side has it right. Those
who have hyped cyber war as a completely new phenomenon or insist that cyber
threats are impossible to anticipate have missed key continuities with the past.
Especially missing is an underlying understanding about how humans and technologies have evolved and how the ways in which we analyze the cyber arena will
contribute to future conflicts. Despite the complexity of cyberspace, it is possible
to understand the broad trends in conflict and institutional responses. Those
who dismiss cyber war as mere hype or as driven by potential profits dismiss
much too quickly growing evidence of the importance of cyber operations for
the Navy and the nation.
Many participants in the debates on cyber conflict demonstrate insufficient
understanding of cyberspace. In particular, they do not demonstrate sufficient
command of the level of integration across public and private systems, across
sectors from economic to defense, and across levels of criticality in key societal
functions. For example, in earlier eras, one or even many bank heists could
not have taken down significant portions of the American financial system. In
contrast, what has been characterized as a single-digit mistake crashed the New
York Stock Exchange for several hours in 2010.11 In August 2013, the Amazon
“cloud” suddenly stopped working for hours, with no public explanation; the
best estimate is that during that period 40 percent of the Internet vanished in the
United States—that is, there was simply 40 percent less activity.12 What is labeled
espionage by observers seeing only a few incidents at a time can have cumulative
effects on deeply integrated national systems. Distinguishing between what is
crime and what espionage is not easy, nor is determining what actually represents
a long-term campaign of deceptive attacks. To make such distinctions clearly
requires recognition, in the first place, of the implications of extreme integration
for security in modern society. Critics often have considerable difficulty with this
cognitive leap—which is particularly unfortunate, as many of these critics have
considerable influence in national and international policy.
In this article we will attempt to explain the challenges and opportunities
of cyberspace for U.S. national security, especially naval forces. First, we will
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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examine how cyberspace has affected conflict over the last decade and how it
will do so in the coming decades. Next, we will review how the U.S. government
has responded to the increasing number and variety of attacks on its own institutions and on the private sector at home and abroad. Third, we will focus on the
institutional evolution of the U.S. Navy as it attempts to fulfill the responsibilities
assigned to it by national-level strategies within the framework of its traditional
missions, capabilities, and culture. Finally, we will examine the specific systemic
operational challenges and opportunities posed by cyber operations. Our intent
is to help naval scholars, analysts, and operators begin understanding the new
world of cybered conflict in the maritime environment.13
CONFLICT AND CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace has opened up new avenues of conflict, added layers of complexity
to existing tactics and operations, and become increasingly influential in the
strategic calculus of several major powers in the international system. Cyberspace is neither totally new nor totally out of control, but it is now a global sociotechnical-economic system with major effects on the physical, economic, and
societal security of nations. Cyberspace has made it much too easy for aggressive
states and nonstate actors to reach remotely into other societies, threaten critical
government systems, and affect essential operations of both public and private
institutions.14 The question is how to characterize this new reality.
Although “cyber war” has entered into the common lexicon, we generally
avoid the term, because it misleads more than it illuminates. Instead, we prefer
the term “cybered conflict.”15 The phrase characterizes the essential nature of
modern military operations, from peacetime to high-intensity warfare. Cyber
activities by military forces (and often intelligence agencies, law-enforcement
organizations, and associated departments) take place in all types of conflict, during all phases of military operations, and at all levels of war. From our perspective, cybered conflict characterizes the whole spectrum of old and new forms of
conflict born of, enabled through, or dramatically altered by cyberspace.
All Phases of Military Operations Are Now Cybered
U.S. joint doctrine posits a notional six-phase model of joint and combined
military operations, ranging from Phase Zero (“Shaping”) through Phase III
(“Dominate,” or “breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment”) to Phase V (“Enable
Civil Authority”).16 For our purposes here, the details of what occurs in each
phase are less important than the fact that cyber tools, skills, units, and perceptions play roles in all of them. Whether shaping the future operating environment
by preparing for long-running conflicts of varying tempos and effects or for
cybered conflicts ranging from disruptions of critical systems to cyber-enabled
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destruction of military forces, American military specialists (including naval
officers and sailors) and their civilian counterparts from the intelligence agencies and the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security use a wide range of
offensive and defensive tools to support actions in the physical world. At each
stage they also have to defend against the efforts of adversaries—whether official
state representatives, terrorists, or criminals—trying to thwart American or allied
operations or to exploit them for their own ends.
All Levels of War Are Now Cybered
Classic national-security scholarship as taught at institutions of professional military education in the United States divides thinking about war into three levels:
tactics, operations, and strategy. According to joint doctrine, “strategy is a prudent
idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater and multinational objectives.” By
contrast, “tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.” For its part, “the operational level links strategy and tactics by
establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and
strategic objectives. It sequences tactical actions to achieve objectives.”17
Our position is again straightforward. Cybered conflict enters into play at all
three levels and connects them iteratively and systemically. At the strategic level,
national policies must provide commanders with the goals for cyberspace (and
to which cyber operations must contribute) and guidance regarding how cyber
instruments may be used consistent with national law, as well as means to acquire
and operate those tools. At the tactical level, commanders must fight battles using
not only kinetic means but also offensive and defensive cyber instruments. As
joint doctrine observes, all three levels overlap during the execution of a military
operation; therefore, “commanders and their staffs at all levels must anticipate
how their plans, operations, and actions may impact the other levels (those above
and those below).”18
All Types of Conflict Are Now Cybered
Typologies of conflict are many. The Department of Defense defines nineteen
types of warfare, ranging from acoustic to undersea.19 These various definitions
usually speak to the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power successfully, protect the force, or complete the
mission. These elements might include enemy and friendly armed forces, infrastructure, weather, terrain, and the electromagnetic spectrum within operational
zones and areas of interest.20
U.S. military forces now prepare to fight in five domains:21 land, sea, air, space,
and cyber. In 2011 “cyber” was added—not without some modest resistance—as
the fifth domain, a nonphysical arena of military conflict.22
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We believe, however, that for security and military purposes cyberspace is not
a domain but a substrate. In our usage, a “substrate” is an underlying layer on
which modern society is built. Cyberspace uniquely underpins all four other warfighting domains. This substrate has a topology that is largely and (surprisingly
to some) territorial. Our argument that cyberspace is a substrate is thus contrary
to official usage and to increasingly commonplace assertions that cyberspace is
a domain.23 One reason that cyberspace is in fact not strictly a domain is that it
is a built environment—imagined, created, developed, sustained, and extended
by human intentions and actions. One analyst has noted “the generative capacity for unrelated and unaccredited audiences to build and distribute code and
content through the Internet.”24 As Michael Hayden, a retired Air Force general
and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, once pointed out to an
audience of technologists, “God made the other four [domains]. You made the
last one. God did a better job.”25
One implication of cyberspace’s being a built environment is that it can be
unbuilt, remodeled, and perhaps in an extreme case even destroyed (say, by
electromagnetic pulse), at least temporarily and within spatial limits. This logic,
then, allows for the notion that an Internet “kill switch” exists or can be created.
No less an authority than the founder and chairman of Microsoft, Bill Gates, acknowledges that the Internet can be “switched off ”: “It’s not that hard to shut the
Internet down if you have military power where you can tell people that’s what’s
going to happen,” Gates said. “Whenever you do something extraordinary like
that you’re sort of showing people you’re afraid of the truth getting out, so it’s a
very difficult tactic, but certainly it can be shut off.”26 In several recent conflicts,
governments, including those of Egypt and Syria, have in effect flipped the switch
to turn off Internet access, however imperfectly, for their societies. The strategic,
operational, and tactical objectives of these acts are unclear at this point. Moreover, the effects have been temporary, as experts inside and outside the countries
work to make alternative connections.
Since World War II, the trajectory of U.S. military planning has favored joint
operations, with the services fighting together from their respective domains. As
we will discuss below, the services and a number of government agencies (for example, the National Security Agency, or NSA) share responsibility for operating
in cyberspace, defending military and civilian systems and infrastructure, and,
ultimately, conducting cyber operations as part of kinetic operations. But unlike the four other official war-fighting domains recognized by the government,
cyberspace, as a substrate, as we have noted, intersects with all the others, and it
is vulnerable to widespread disruption. This makes cyberspace all the more valuable; it is in effect the technological high ground, for not only the military and
intelligence services but government, civilian, and commercial sectors as well.
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Cyberspace is thus not a separate conflict space or host to a particular type of
conflict. Cybered conflict occurs along a spectrum that includes conflicts from
large to small—total war, small wars, wars of choice, and a host of others. In the
next twenty years, the tools of cyberspace will become so ubiquitous that we prefer to use the adjective “cybered,” since “cyber” is likely to be taken for granted
and abandoned. In the meantime, cyberspace is changing how governments
and their militaries and nonstate actors fight wars and conflicts. Organizing and
operating in joint, interagency, and combined (with friends, partners, and allies)
terms for cybered conflicts are not only sensible but strategically and operationally essential for success.
NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE
Given their decades-old and growing dependence on information and communications technologies for economic dominance and military power, the U.S.
military and government agencies have slowly developed policies, strategies, and
organizations to meet the challenges and possibilities of cyberspace. High-level
recognition of threats emanating from “cyber” began as early as the 1990s. In
1996 President William Clinton’s Executive Order 13010 created the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which included threats to the
nation’s economic and national security from cyber attacks within the scope of its
activities.27 Two years later, on the basis of the commission’s recommendations,
Presidential Decision Directive 63 established several cyber security–related
organizations, largely focused on malicious hackers or criminals who could
threaten critical national infrastructure.
The full extent of cyber threats became pressing after 9/11. That terrorists
could use the web to organize themselves to attack the United States and other
adversaries was becoming clear. In one high-profile example, documents found
in abandoned Al Qaeda houses after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan included
guidance from Osama Bin Laden on how to use electronic means to continue the
jihad and suggesting that 90 percent of Al Qaeda’s future efforts would involve
cyberspace.28
Chinese strategists have begun to develop their own concepts of cyber conflict,
focusing on major state adversaries, including the United States.29 The Persian
Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated to China (and other close observers) how hightechnology militaries could defeat adversaries who had advantages in troop
strength. The stunning results of U.S. operations against numerically superior
forces presented a major challenge to China’s perception of its own advantages in
future conflict—massed assets ranging from manpower to ships and missiles. According to some scholars, China’s search for a compensating strategy to match the
United States led it to rediscover Sun Tzu’s understanding of “indirect warfare.”30
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Several Chinese colonels even proposed a concept of “unconstrained warfare,”
a campaign that begins long before any armed conflict is apparent. This “warfare” seeks to disrupt potential enemies using the vulnerabilities of their (real or
potential) information systems, without regard for international norms or laws.
As a Western analyst concludes, “China [now] has the most extensive and most
practiced cyber-warfare capabilities in Asia, although the technical expertise is
very uneven.”31
By 2003, President George W. Bush signed several strategy documents focusing specifically on cyberspace. Rather than subsuming specific issues under a
general concern for critical infrastructure, as President Clinton had done, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative specifically addressed the need to secure cyberspace and presented
that mission as a systemic challenge. These documents divided responsibility
for national cyber security among the Department of Defense (DoD), the newly
established Department of Homeland Security, and the White House itself. While
the White House retained overall policy authority, Homeland Security was given
the task of ensuring “critical infrastructure protection” of the homeland—but in
terms of a “coordinating,” not regulating or operating, mission. DoD was charged
with protecting its own global grid of computers and communications systems
but received no authority to inform or protect anyone else’s network, even if
their health determined whether the DoD’s own Global Information Grid could
be protected. The Department of Defense and its subagencies rely heavily on
commercial networks to transfer data across the globe;32 nevertheless, individual
federal agencies, states, and private corporations were left by and large to defend
themselves.33
Even with the increased attention by the Bush administration to cyber security, the breadth of the nation’s vulnerability was not yet fully apparent. In
2003 only 60 percent of the American population owned computers, and only
50 percent had personal access to an Internet connection.34 Pressure on officials
and policy makers would increase as more citizens, businesses, and government
activities came to depend on uninterrupted information and assured access to
cyberspace, to include the Internet, the World Wide Web, and over time, peerto-peer computer networks.
Toward the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the unsettling successes of
the cyber penetrations, extractions, and remote “backdoor” operations mounted
steadily across DoD and other agencies.35 Existing (“legacy”) informationassurance policies, programs, and tools were failing to stem the tide of attacks.
To make matters worse, a growing portion of publicly revealed data on cyber
attacks pointed toward the existence of a small but global population of highly
skilled, determined, and persistent “wicked actors.”36 Their successes were often
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discovered only months or years later, long after the damage had been done. In
2006, the Bush administration issued another series of documents to clarify toplevel policies, procedures, and responsibilities. The National Security Strategy and
Quadrennial Defense Review outlined the broad bases for U.S. government policies for dealing with cyber war and cyber threats more generally, within the wider
context of conventional threats and the evolving international environment.37
Most notably, the Department of Defense published its National Military
Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, which assigned U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and the Joint Staff to develop an implementation plan for the
defense of cyberspace.38 The concept of a joint command to deal with cyberspace
gradually emerged from this planning effort. The timing of the decision to create
a unified cyber command was influenced by the well-intentioned miscalculation
of several senior Air Force leaders who in 2005–2006 unilaterally declared their
service the lead agency for cyber security. Publicity associated with an Air Force
effort to develop a national cyber command may have prompted Robert Gates,
then Secretary of Defense, to become involved directly in laying the foundation
for a DoD-wide command for cyberspace operations.39 Meanwhile, the other
services, including the Navy, had begun preparing to create cyber-security and
-warfare units of their own.40
During roughly the same period, 2004–2007, General James E. Cartwright, as
commander of STRATCOM, was struck by the magnitude of ongoing assaults on
DoD networks. He became concerned by massive losses of classified internal data
and by the constant flood of attacks experienced. General Cartwright’s efforts
to protect STRATCOM and DoD itself from cyber threats fueled the design of
a major command devoted to cyberspace. In particular, he argued that the new
organization should be a “subunified” command (that is, a subordinate unified
command, reporting in this case to STRATCOM) so that it would be less likely to
be marginalized. General Cartwright continued to sponsor the idea of a national
cyber command when he became the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in 2007.41 It would, however, take more than the interest of a vice chief to create
such a command.
In late 2008 a computer “worm” infected unclassified and classified American networks, traveling via USB memory sticks from infected computers in
Afghanistan to DoD systems across the globe. The worm opened so-called back
doors that potentially allowed adversaries to control infected systems. Upon
discovering the breach, DoD rapidly closed down networks and restricted the
use of USB sticks and most removable media, to stop reinfection.42 This infection was followed closely by the “Conficker” worm, which targeted the Microsoft
Windows operating system used by the armed services of many NATO members,
including the United States. Conficker spread quickly and opened new back
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doors accessible to unknown attackers.43 For a period, someone, somewhere, had
remote access to computer networks on NATO warships in port and to systems
used by combat units in the field.44 These back-to-back infections changed the
priority given cyber security by the White House and DoD.45
By the spring of 2009, experts generally accepted that protecting the government, and particularly DoD, against Conficker and a host of other cyber
threats would require major new steps.46 During the first year of President
Barack Obama’s administration, the urgency increased substantially; investigative reporting has revealed that the president and his closest national-security
team were not only working on defensive measures but contemplating offensive
actions using cyber weapons.47 Upon taking office the Obama administration
ordered a “60-Day Cyberspace Policy Review,” spearheaded by Melissa Hathaway,
a former Bush administration cyber-security expert, to shape the fundamentals
for future cyber-security strategic and organizational changes.48 In May 2009,
with the review complete, President Obama declared cyberspace to be a first-tier
priority for national security. The White House Cyberspace Policy Review stated
that “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national
security problems facing the new administration.”49
In June 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced the formation of a new
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) as a subunified command subordinate to
STRATCOM and collocated it with the government’s main source of computer
and electronic expertise, the NSA. To ease the flow of information between the
two organizations, the director of NSA was to be “dual-hatted” as the commander of CYBERCOM. The arrangement allowed at least one clear point where
authorities granted by Title 10 and Title 50 of the U.S. Code could be balanced
and decisive actions taken.50 Furthermore, a single leader could review all operations, emerging trends, and long-range effects to develop and coordinate
comprehensive tactics, operations, and strategies. In principle, then, the organizational structure allowed the new command to deal with the complexity of
cybered conflict. “Cyber warriors” in Cyber Command and the intelligence and
information experts of the National Security Agency would in this way more
readily collaborate to detect, track, thwart, or stop adversaries crippling DoD’s
operational readiness.51
The individual military services had equally important roles in foreseeing
threats, defending their mission areas and forces, and disrupting cyber attacks
“forward.” In a June 2009 DoD memorandum, Secretary Gates asked each of the
service secretaries to establish a component to support Cyber Command, a component that “possesses the required technical capability [to secure freedom of
action in cyberspace] and remains focused on the integration of cyberspace operations. Further, this command must be capable of synchronizing war-fighting
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effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil
authorities and international partners.”52 Each service was to stand up an interim
command by 1 October 2009 and to have it fully operational by 1 October 2010.
The services were allowed to design their own organizations and to incorporate skills, tools, and units as they saw fit, as long as all were able to contribute to
the mission of U.S. Cyber Command. The Navy and Air Force in particular had
already made considerable progress, in anticipation of the order. Meanwhile, the
Department of Homeland Security was instructed to reinvigorate its efforts to
persuade the critical infrastructure community—largely privately held—to improve its defenses against remote attacks. By midsummer of 2010, all the services
had established rudimentary cyber commands. The process of reconciling differences in structure, guidance, and mission then began in earnest. This process
continues unabated today, and we will later discuss its implications for the Navy.
In May 2011 the Obama administration outlined its publicly releasable, external policies in the International Strategy for Cyberspace;53 the Secretary of
Defense issued the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
two months later.54 Each statement aimed to inform the American public and
the publics of allied states that the United States is taking cyber threats seriously.
These documents also signaled to adversaries that preying on American targets
would no longer be easy or risk-free. The U.S. government would defend itself
and strike back as necessary.55
THE NAVY AND CYBERSPACE
At the time of the July 2009 Gates memo, the Navy was already designing new
organizations capable of meeting cyber challenges. The Navy had spent most of
the 2000–2008 period trying to understand the threats posed by cyber attacks
and intrusions.56 It had established a task force to study how attacks through
cyberspace were affecting Navy assets and operational readiness. The task force’s
members understood early that the service needed to identify cyber-capable
personnel with skill sets ranging from intelligence techniques to network systems
and electronic warfare. In the fall of 2009, Admiral Gary Roughead, then Chief of
Naval Operations, stood up Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet.57
The new cyber-focused command needed to provide the entire Navy with
the specific missions, guidance, technical tools, and unit-level organizational
structures necessary for cyber defense and offense. However, in doing so it had
to work within the traditional fleet structure, to be compatible with the structures
and missions of existing numbered fleets, and to serve as the Navy component
supporting U.S. Cyber Command as a whole. The task force’s members had also
known—drawing on the longtime, well-established relationship between the
U.S. Navy intelligence community and the National Security Agency—that the
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complexity of cyberspace as an operational environment would demand rapid,
accurate responses at tempos commensurate with the scale and harm of the
threats. These qualities would be exceptionally difficult to achieve if cyber was
not mainstreamed across the service. These responses would be nearly impossible to execute rapidly if bureaucratic “silos” were left in place between the Navy
and joint intelligence, electronic warfare, network administration, and cryptology, among other specialized organizations.58
In January 2010, when Fleet Cyber Command (known as FCC, or Fleet
Cyber) was declared operational as the Navy’s component of CYBERCOM, its
organization was unique among its service counterparts. Rather than splitting
combat-support functions, such as intelligence, from operational combat missions as other services have done, its structure integrates them and thereby supports both U.S. Cyber Command and the Navy’s own requirements. A single flag
officer leads not only FCC, an Echelon 2 command (i.e., reporting directly to the
Chief of Naval Operations), but also the newly recommissioned Tenth Fleet, as a
subordinate Echelon 3 command—an institutional design intended to allow the
Navy to act quickly in a hostile and deeply cybered world.59
Nonetheless, and despite the best efforts of their designers, leaders, and champions, Fleet Cyber Command and Tenth Fleet have not found it easy to meet
the challenges of cyberspace. First, both have themselves been assaulted from
cyberspace even as they experience the normal growing pains of a new command
structure. Second, long-standing internal divisions in the naval service have complicated their manning, training, equipment, employment, and assessment. Inside and outside the Navy numerous debates are ongoing about what constitutes
the cybered conflict space and even whether it is truly a “domain,” as designated
by DoD. Among its critics are some who fear change, some (a small number) who
understand computer systems, and even optimists convinced that a fully integrated approach to cyberspace would achieve nearly everything that might be done
in the physical world. In brief, like much of the U.S. government, CYBERCOM,
and its counterparts in the other services, Fleet Cyber Command is still learning
its own missions, strengths, weaknesses, and evolving opportunities.60
In late November 2012 the Navy took several other steps toward sustaining cyber capabilities. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information
Dominance / Director of Naval Intelligence (Vice Admiral Kendall L. Card) and
Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command / Tenth Fleet (Vice Admiral Michael S.
Rogers) signed three documents:
• Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance 2013–2017 61
• Navy Cyber Power 202062
• Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017.63
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Each demonstrates the evolution of Navy thinking about how to serve, survive,
and excel in a cybered maritime environment. It is too soon to evaluate fully the
Navy’s progress in effective cybered conflict. It is time, however, to relate the
Navy’s thinking to what is coming in the dynamically evolving global cyberspace.
Trends already evident across the digitized world will affect future military conflict, the cyber threat environment in the maritime domain, and the Navy’s own
efforts to establish organizational and operational frameworks for meeting cyber
challenges in the near-to-medium term. Several of these trends will impact the
Navy’s ability to fulfill the “sailing direction” issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, that “cyberspace will be operationalized with
capabilities that span the electromagnetic spectrum—providing superior awareness and control when and where we need it.”64
THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERED CONFLICT IN THE MARITIME
DOMAIN
What is different about the challenges facing U.S. naval forces during cybered
conflicts?65 How can naval forces contribute to combined and joint operations
that include cyber operations? The problem is not just that the cyberspace substrate connects most of the world and allows intrusions from a wide range of state
and nonstate actors. Rather, we argue, it is that cyberspace favors the offensive
military capabilities of adversaries and enhances their potentially destabilizing
effects on the nature and level of interstate conflict in the coming years.66
The offense/defense balance in international affairs has long been considered critical to the prospects for the reduction of conflict and the promotion
of international peace.67 Recent scholarship concludes, at least preliminarily,
that “innovations in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) allow
states to take greater risks and adopt more vigilant or offensive positions toward
adversaries. Cyber capabilities do not cause armed conflict, but make decisions
to escalate easier and cheaper.”68 Scholars are only now developing a serious research program to understand the impact of offensive cyber instruments on the
future of conflict.69 There are still scholars who remain skeptical about the utility
of offense/defense theory for understanding the impact of technological change
on war and peace or, more important, the effects of cyber operations. One, for
example, argues, “This is not to say that cyber attacks would have no effect, only
that they are extremely unlikely to prove strategically decisive. A capability to
address cyber threats is then useful, but planning for cyber warfare must be conducted within the larger framework of recognition that these capabilities are not
in fact a game changer.”70
In our view, the “game changing” aspects of cyberspace do not lie in cyber warfare at the high end of the spectrum of conflict. Rather, the strategically decisive
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aspects of cyberspace concern the three significant advantages that its current
globally unfettered structure offers attackers: relatively risk-free opportunities in
the scale, proximity, and precision of cyber “weapons.” These advantages make
attacks cheaper, easier, and more effective for both state and nonstate actors.
While they may be temporary and transitional, they exist now, and in our judgment they will continue to exist for the next fifteen to twenty years.
First, like the superpowers of old, adversaries can readily use the web to scale
attacking units from small to large, tightly organized or loosely linked. Further,
attackers can use the web for communication, training, supply, and operations,
even as they scale up and down and back again. For one example, they can
cheaply scale up by buying, or even renting, “botnets” on the global black market.
A botnet—a linked network of software hidden in millions of innocent computers—can be commanded to participate in attacks. Today there are hundreds of
thousands of botnets in use, for sale, or lying dormant, on machines whose users
do not know that they are infected.71
Second, to pose a threat, adversaries have no need to move into close physical
proximity to collect critical information or to deploy long-range expensive weapons. Relatively high-quality “signals intelligence” is now available to anyone with
time and an Internet connection.72 Third, the precision in targeting is no longer
constrained to line-of-sight, blue-water, or over-the-horizon military capabilities.
Cyber-enabled attackers can vary the precision of their targeting from a single
person to cities, regions, or entire nations.
However, these three factors, notwithstanding the offensive advantages they
offer attackers, may also provide opportunities for the U.S. Navy’s offensive and
defensive cyber operations.
Scale
Given the reliance of global commerce; governments at all levels; and military,
intelligence, and law-enforcement organizations on the communication systems
and computers associated with cyberspace, the institutional scale required to
cause real harm has dropped dramatically.73 Small organizations—including
criminal enterprises, terrorist groups, and subunits of national militaries—can
now use the Internet to spy on, harass, and attack with relatively modest investments in personnel and equipment. States with modest cyber resources can
achieve disproportionate effects with appropriate tools, skill, and organizational
structures. Small states might also achieve asymmetric advantages by investing in
cyber instruments or employing proxies with better capabilities.
Small, covert, and even part-time organizations scattered in large enough
numbers across the globe can undercut traditional threat and warning indicators employed by U.S. intelligence agencies. The modern military’s standard set
of such indicators identifies emerging cyber threats much less effectively than it
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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does conventional attackers. For the Navy, as for the other services and government agencies, it will be even harder to assess the cyber capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries than to evaluate their conventional and nuclear
forces. One pressing question urged by such uncertainty is how resilient the Navy
can become.
Proximity
Until the modern era, most conflict was confined to visual range.74 For most of
history, the farther an attacker from physical view, the less one could know about
whether a given weapon or unit was the right choice to use against it, at that time,
in that place. Even during the Cold War only major powers could develop and
deploy large numbers of over-the-horizon weapons; they were expensive to build,
required considerable long-distance intelligence to be effective, and outstripped
standard damage-assessment techniques.
Proximity thus mattered enormously for attackers.75 Intelligence was (and
is) crucial for fighting and winning. Getting up close to look, and in a timely
manner, was throughout history the most straightforward way to collect usable
information. Critical and timely knowledge—the “signals intelligence” of superpowers and close neighbors—has never, however, been cheap to acquire or easy
to validate.76
With the global connectivity of cyberspace, however, no longer does an enemy need to move into physical proximity to pose and execute a threat. Now
too, adversaries both actual and potential can obtain intelligence inexpensively.
If hackers can access a system and gain control of key functions, they can hide
successes, elude defenses, and leave behind back doors by which to reenter in the
future. Hackers need not be on the same continent as, let alone physically touch,
targeted computers.77
Often the information that cyber attackers need to target a system is already
online, posted for legitimate reasons. Terrorist sites when raided are almost always found to contain caches of maps, specific data, and operationally relevant
material on potential targets that had been harvested from publicly accessible
Internet sites. Such information is often considered public information that
must be provided to citizens, investors, and internal customers. Democratic
norms and laws regarding transparency and accountability often encourage or
even require government agencies and private enterprises to make available information that would be useful to cyber thieves, spies, and attackers. Public and
private cyber-security experts have sought to discourage such “oversharing,” but
most Western democracies have a long way to go. After the attacks on the United
States in September 2001, for example, much public data about nuclear power
plants and nation-spanning oil pipelines were removed from public websites

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

89

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 1

D O M B R O WS K I & D E M C HA K

85

in the United States; such data had already been found in Al Qaeda computers
seized in Afghanistan.78
While great powers and some sophisticated states, like Israel, still enjoy comparative advantages in signals and various other technical means of collection
and assessment, intelligence gaps between these states and their adversaries may
be closing. Strategists, planners, and policy makers will eventually need to adapt
to this new geostrategic reality of cyberspace.79 For maritime powers throughout
history, forward-deployed fleets have been crucial for defeating land powers. Naval forces operating in theaters far from home could quickly and independently
collect information and decide whether and how to act. Only peer maritime
powers, and few land-based adversaries, could challenge that powerful capability. The U.S. Navy is still in the business of long-distance power projection. In a
cybered world, however, the task is more problematic. The Navy must adapt to
the loss of its own proximity advantage. No longer will its bases, battle groups,
forward infrastructure, and allied navies be immune just because they are over
the horizon or far from the battle space. We believe that a more diffused set of
threats and adversaries will be able to fight at a distance against the Navy and the
nation. Another major research question for the Navy, then, is how to make proximity matter again, how to regain its traditional operational advantages against
cyber-capable foes.
Precision
The history of warfare demonstrates the many physical constraints on precision
in choosing how often, where, and when to attack, given the size of the target and
its ability to frustrate or defeat its attackers. Historically, precision has been expensive; few polities aside from empires, superpowers, and perhaps close neighbors have had the means to target their enemies precisely, in order to achieve
operational success or conserve resources. In a cyber attack or a conventional
operation accompanied by cyber tactics, this constraint fades into merely a question of time, knowledge, and occasionally patience. Attackers can now choose
very specific targets—for today, for this tool, for this duration, and for this or
that end. They can focus on individuals—by bank account, name, citizenship,
location, or entertainment preference. They can also target specific firms, cities,
or nations with similarly individualized parameters, with fairly small investment
in readily available computer applications.80
Correspondingly, adversaries can use imprecision strategically as well. Cyber
attackers often intentionally build a certain amount of imprecision into their
“weapons” to ensure they hit their intended targets. For example, to take down
a particular subset of users of an innocent application, attackers can purchase
destructive malicious software, such as a “Trojan,” on cyber crime’s global black
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market;81 with it they can attack the application anywhere it is installed in the
world. Among the victims will be their true targets; for the attackers, the others
represent either irrelevant collateral damage or extra benefit. Such wider harm is
rarely a concern to cybered attackers, except perhaps when the attack is undertaken by state actors bound by international law.82
In fact, when precision in the form of restraint is displayed, that characteristic
itself suggests that the attackers are state actors. Usually only states concerned
with international legitimacy try to avoid the potential for collateral damage
posed by cyber weapons (Trojans, malware, etc.) that escape “into the wild.” One
of the key indicators that a government had been involved in attacks on Estonia
in 2007 was the degree of constraint exhibited in the timing, choice of targets, and
duration. Many analysts presume that proxy actors were paid by Russian officials
to attack Estonian targets but not beyond certain redlines.83 Precision, however,
may also reflect organizational maturity and a wider view of the consequences
of success, of failure, or of errors that send the attack spinning out of control.84 If
true, the Russian actors behind the attacks showed restraint not because they had
to but for their own reasons.85
For the Navy and the U.S. military more generally, the development of precision weapons, both offensive and defensive, has long been a priority—at least
since the development of the Norden bombsight in World War II.86 Precision increases the effectiveness of weapons and reduces costs (although in direct terms
this is contestable, given the per-unit cost of many precise weapons). Professional
militaries have often increased accuracy to decrease the volume of munitions
employed, limit the number of aircraft sorties required, reduce (at least in theory)
logistical expenses, and, ultimately, minimize collateral risks. At the same time,
cost-effectiveness is said to lower the barriers to using coercion and reduction in
collateral damage to increase the legitimacy of some forms of warfare, by some
domestic and international observers.87 One of these has argued that “precision
weaponry has revolutionized contemporary warfare by multiplying the effectiveness of using air and ground power together.”88 In a similar fashion, cyber operations may, by changing the roles of scale, proximity, and precision in warfare, increase the effectiveness of air, sea, land, and space operations when employed to
reduce collateral damage and avoid risk to forces undertaking legitimate action.
In the cybered world, precision targeting is not necessarily an expensive option open only to major powers. Precision can help achieve aims without crossing
redlines that might provoke wider kinetic conflict. Cybered conflict can occur
along a spectrum across all phases of war, and long before any kinetic exchange,
adversaries can use precision cyber tools to tilt the conflict in their favor. In particular, adversaries may use precise cyber weapons to undermine the resilience of
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the targeted state’s military or infrastructure, or even its entire economic system,
sometimes without declaring their intention or being identified as the attackers.
The critical research question here for the Navy is how to turn the offensive
advantages of precision into a more costly liability for attackers. Standardization in software and hardware systems, for example, can make offensive action
easy for adversaries. The now-standard obligation to reduce costs by acquiring
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment often makes systems cheaper but
more vulnerable in cybered conflicts. The U.S. military, including the Navy,
might avoid providing the COTS advantage to potential adversaries by revising
its acquisition process, to include the design of information architectures and
the procurement of system components. It will require considerable ingenuity,
but increasing variation within otherwise standardized equipment; off-the-shelf
software architectures; and routine-driven procedures, units, or deployment patterns may hold long-term benefits.
Twenty years ago, the proponents of a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA)
led by the U.S. military made all manner of claims for the impact of precision
weapons on the future of conflict. This is not the place to wade into arguments
about the nature of the RMA, past or present. But the impact of cyberspace on
the scale, proximity, and precision of warfare, combined with the utility of cyber
instruments in all phases, levels, and types of war, suggests a far greater impact
for cyber than the classic RMA. By confronting directly the advantages of scale,
proximity, and precision in cyber conflict, the Navy and CYBERCOM may both
increase the effectiveness of traditional air, sea, land, and space operations and
prepare for the inevitable more dynamic and complex cybered threat environment. In short, the challenge to the Navy is to reduce all three systemic advantages for attackers: to make it harder for them to choose to be precise or not at
their will, more difficult for their operations to be “close” though not physically
close, and more expensive and personally risky for them to organize dispersed
strangers or covertly to manipulate masses of distant innocent systems.
THE CURRENT AND FUTURE CYBER “LITTORAL”
Cybered conflict is here to stay and must be taken seriously even if cyber war in
the conventional sense—that is, resulting in combat deaths—is not likely. Cyber
operations, both offensive and defensive, will play major roles in all levels of war
(from terrorism and counterinsurgency to high-intensity conflict and all the
gradations between). Conflict involving cyber will neither stay wholly within
networks nor prove over time to have been a fad or simply a subset of existing
tactical, operational, or technological categories. From both empirical and conceptual perspectives, cybered conflict is neither a “flash in the pan” or a “lesser
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included case”; it has already proved to be an evolutionary force, slowly altering
the likely future conditions for interstate competition and the potentials for kinetic forms of battle. Scholars, analysts, and, most important, operators need to
think systematically about how cyber operations—offensive and defensive, to the
extent that distinction still makes sense—affect tactics, operations, and strategies.
Future military and security analyses of “cyber” writ large by the U.S. government, or indeed that of any state, should adopt a systemic approach adapted
from the logic of complex socio-technological systems and how new developments change what can be used by defenders and abused by adversaries. For
example, since such systems are in reality “patterns of artifacts, institutions, rules
and norms assembled and maintained to perform economic and social activities,” the Navy’s scholars and strategists need to think through what current and
new technologies, from 3D printing and autonomous private vehicles to new
materials, will do to change those patterns.89 Many current arguments about
cyber operations in the government and policy communities are characterized
by hype, false analogy, and, worse, misunderstanding of the technical, engineering, and scientific underpinning of the terms. Instead, the conversation should
be about what is today being systematically lost, threatened, and penetrated on a
vast scale. Furthermore, emergent technologies labeled “disruptive technologies”
will change the calculus, some reducing scale, proximity, and precision obstacles
even further, others offering opportunities to enhance barriers if the defenders
are wise enough to see the opportunities.90
Cybered conflicts occur only partly inside computer and communications
networks; what the Navy has viewed as the “littoral” in bounding its area of concern (traditionally the intersection of the land and sea) is increasingly difficult
to identify. Large sections of what matters to the maritime services now overlap
with traditional military, intelligence, and even commercial operations across
the nation and the globe. Furthermore, the internationally accepted rules of war
are difficult to apply in cyber war. However, in the context of a broader notion of
conflict (i.e., as cybered conflict), these rules would find resonance with much
of what happens before and during a kinetic conflict.91 Other well-known forms
of conflict, such as hybrid warfare, asymmetric conflicts, and counterterrorism,
are also cybered conflicts to the extent that key events depend on the cyberspace
substrate.92
The U.S. government has struggled since the Clinton administration to
adapt to the policy, legal, organizational, and operational demands of conflict
in cyberspace. Progressing by fits and starts, key policy makers have reached
a consensus that cyberspace is an important arena for conflict, one worthy of
resources, specialized organizations, different interagency relationships, and
eventually perhaps legislative action.93 Much remains to be done, especially with
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regard to domestic policies, organizational implementation, and resourcing, but
since the establishment of CYBERCOM and its service equivalents the defense
and intelligence communities have become better equipped to meet external
cyber challenges and take advantage of American cyber technologies to protect
national interests.
Two of the most likely and challenging scenarios for future crises, perhaps
even shooting wars, will clearly involve cyber operations: Iran and North Korea.94 In each case, Phase Zero operations involving both sides, as well as third
parties, already appear to involve cyber attacks of various types. If kinetic operations eventually take place, we may see the results of several decades of cyber
“preparation of the battlefield,” ranging from tainted supply chains to embedded
malware. For the time being, serious assessments and many details are obscure
and will likely remain so until leaks and eventual declassification reveal the full
extent of cyber operations.95 In the interim, a more systemic view will enable
the United States, with its already-demonstrated considerable cyber capabilities
in disruption work, to balance those capabilities with the resilience needed for
robust “cyber power.”
The Navy will be an integral part of that cyber power. The Navy has led
service-level efforts in developing, deploying, operating, and sustaining complex electronic systems in the past.96 Thanks to innovative institutional changes,
it may be the service best positioned to integrate cyber fully into its culture,
organizational structure, and operations.97 As a maritime force, it has a longestablished cultural acceptance of the deception, masking, mobility, and improvised independent operations that deployed ships have needed for survival in
peace as well as war. At present, however, an assumption of uninterrupted communications has diminished its institutional capacity to sail resiliently under the
cyber “radar,” despite millions of opportunistic “hunters.” The newer forms of
conflict enabled by cyberspace require a rediscovery of inclinations buried in
the Navy’s history and culture and a repurposing of them for the new—much
more complex, deceptive, and sensor-rich—environment. The “littoral” may be
defined more in terms of what one keeps the enemy from easily knowing and how
abruptly one can emerge in the enemy’s near proximity than of what beach needs
to be crossed. The sociotechnical systems the service depends on today need to
change, at the hands of officers and sailors who understand the basics of the cyber
substrate as it is today and as it is evolving. We argue—though only time and trial
by fire will confirm the proposition—that the Navy may be uniquely qualified to
adapt to cybered conflict, if the research is done and the new sociotechnical lines
of evolution are identified.
A systemic understanding of cyber and research along lines identified above
are needed not only for the Navy but also for the nation as a whole, if the Navy
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is to develop its portion of national cyber power. In the coming transitional cybered conflict age, cyber power will rest on a balance between the resilience of
the system being attacked and that system’s ability to reach forward and disrupt
in advance the small numbers of very skilled wicked actors able to overcome that
resilience. This balance of resilience and disruption will apply to the Navy as
well as the nation as a whole. When it is achieved, the nation will have in effect
pursued an overarching cyber “security resilience” strategy redressing the advantages that today cyberspace gives the offense. Effective and robust cyber power
diminishes the value of any adversary’s “counterresilience” strategies intended
to wear down deceptively the resilience of the defender’s whole socio-technicaleconomic system.
Today the United States has allies who are well intentioned but simply cannot
find the economic resources to invest in the cyber security that they know their
economic, critical infrastructure, and national-security systems require. When a
service or nation becomes a cyber power, it will have greater freedom of choice
in the coming transitional era and better chances of maintaining that power in
the era that will follow. The more the Navy is able to answer the systemic cyber
challenges and reduce the scale, proximity, and precision advantages attackers
enjoy today, the better prepared it will be for the bordered, encrypted, and technologically diverse future international system. The more systemically the Navy
contributes to its own cyber security, the more critical a player it will be in ensuring the cyber power and the well-being of the nation as a whole, as the cybered
world gradually restructures itself in response to global economic, demographic,
technological, and security challenges.
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PROMISING PRIVATEERS?
Understanding the Constraints of Contemporary Private Security
at Sea
Christopher Spearin

F

or the secretary-general of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, contemporary
piracy is nothing less than a “global menace.”1 There are several piracy “hot
spots” the world over, each with its own dynamics, but it is Somali piracy that
in recent years has particularly caught the attention and raised the ire of states,
shippers, and international organizations.2 International Maritime Organization
(IMO) statistics reflect the quantitative dominance of Somali piracy. In 2010 and
2011, the number of alleged attacks in international waters off East Africa and
on the Indian Ocean (into which Somali pirates now venture) was 84 percent of
the global totals in each year. In 2012, owing to developments both on land and
at sea, the Somali weighting declined, but it was still a considerable 54 percent of
global totals.3
Largely because of the private-security efforts against Somali pirates—one
of the policy measures credited in reducing the incidence of pirate attacks—the
word “privateer” is back in vogue.4 In a 2012 reDr. Spearin is an associate professor in the Department of Defence Studies of the Royal Military College port, Australia’s Lowy Institute casually equated
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private military and security companies (PMSCs)
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piracy, has acknowledged the limits of state naval
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forces and referred to “security teams–privateers”
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as an option.7 Others have argued that privateering would be an ideal vehicle for
legal and operational coordination between public and private actors in dealing
with piracy. On some occasions these proponents specifically identify the PMSC
industry, and in others they refer to private initiative more generally.8
This article argues that usage of the word “privateer” is inappropriate for understanding what PMSCs are now doing at sea and what they might be capable of
doing. Operationally, a sufficient understanding is important because the maritime environment, especially counterpiracy work, presents growth opportunities
for PMSCs (both start-ups and firms looking to diversify following contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan). According to some estimates, between 40 and 70 percent
of commercial shippers utilize private security to counter Somali piracy.9 This
raises a number of thought-worthy issues regarding efficacy and the management of violence. As well, appreciating how experiences on land have framed
the industry and what PMSCs can realistically offer at sea will help in perceiving
the dynamics of contemporary security governance in the maritime realm. At
the strategic level, a sufficient understanding is necessary because many of these
invocations of privateering specifically refer to the United States, a considerable
consumer of PMSC services on land. This is important, on the one hand, because
the United States is the only state with the “command of the commons,” and U.S.
Navy commanders have long been given responsibility to ensure safe passage in
sea-lanes.10 On the other hand, the relevant national policy document on piracy,
a 2007 presidential memorandum, is fairly flexible as to response options.11
This article offers four points to advance an accurate understanding of
PMSCs. First, through a historical consideration, it contends that privateering
conjures up images of vessels of capability and availability not prevalent in the
PMSC industry. While seafaring has always been an expensive endeavor, most
PMSCs today cannot incur the costs or offer the kinds of capabilities the privateers once did—because of technological changes, bifurcation between military
and commercial vessels, and cost sustainment. Second, while their rationales
changed over the centuries and their “warlikeness” was sometimes questioned,
privateers were nevertheless fundamentally on the offensive. In contrast, PMSCs
have been normatively structured to take a defensive or protective posture. Third,
the conception of contemporary privateers pursuing the public good of security
obscures both PMSCs’ pursuit of security as a private good and reasons shippers
engage them. The repercussion may be that though the United States wishes to
advance both a global maritime partnership and PMSC usage at sea, the latter
works somewhat in opposition to the former, because shippers are now “responsibilized” for their own security. The article closes with a last argument: even
if responsibilization brings to mind an earlier era of seafaring, that of “letter of
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marque” vessels, it too is not an appropriate term to understand fully the activities of PMSCs.
VESSEL CAPABILITY AND AVAILABILITY
Privateers—nonnaval ships and their crews, or private men-of-war, conducting
authorized violence at sea—were at their height from the thirteenth century to
the nineteenth century.12 Initially, a merchant aggrieved by a citizen of another
country (involving, e.g., debts, stolen goods) could apply for “letters of marque
and reprisal” from his sovereign authorizing him to seek restitution. These letters, an attempt “to bring the anarchy of retaliation under the rule of law,” indicated both the amounts sought and expiration dates.13 Though “letters of marque”
and “letters of reprisal” differed—the former were for seeking restitution within
the territory of a sovereign and the latter beyond it (for example, by capturing
flagged ships of the offending state)—the term eventually collapsed into the allembracing “letter of marque and reprisal.” Such commissions increasingly became part of public warfare; their use to pursue private reprisals was uncommon
by the mid-1700s.14 They were licenses allowing private actors using their own
resources and ships to attack merchant shipping. More generally, while expiration dates were still in place, other limits were generally removed, and privateers
could attack and capture enemy ships of whatever sort during wartime or seek
out pirates (deemed the enemy of all humankind) on a commercial basis. Arguably, this is the common perception of the privateer.
Though sovereigns did not, per se, hire privateers, they did provide regulatory
infrastructures to facilitate their voyages and payment. For instance, privateers
had to bring captured vessels into friendly ports (those that recognized the privateering license, and not those of an enemy state) for adjudication and eventual
remuneration. The rationale for these rules was fourfold: they ensured that commissions would be sought in the first instance; they punished privateers who did
not act in accordance with their commissions (if privateers mistreated captured
crews or injured neutral countries, bonds could be forfeited); they set a legal
distinction between privateers and pirates; and they permitted official “condemnation” and extraction of taxes, when applicable, before financiers or privateer
crews realized any profit from the sale of captured cargoes and vessels.15 Thus,
sovereigns developed prize courts—for instance, in France in 1373 and in England in 1426. In the late 1700s, the courts of the newly independent United States
arose from the Admiralty courts of the British colonial system. Overall, while
their efficacy was debatable, these rules did provide a measure of due process, in
terms of both how violence was employed at sea by private actors and how those
enacting violence were compensated.
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Sovereigns, and then states, developed and maintained this elaborate infrastructure also in part to obtain access, however indirect, to a special form of an
expensive technology—ships. While small vessels could become privateer ships,
the ideal privateer was larger and possessed certain characteristics.16 Such vessels
required sufficient seaworthiness for open-ocean voyages and, at times, heavy
armament to allow them to prey on transoceanic trade. They needed sufficient
speed to capture fast merchant ships or to flee from adversity (see below). They
also had to be large enough to carry sufficient manpower to dispatch prize crews
capable of taking over captured ships and bringing them into friendly ports.
Constructing, maintaining, and operating vessels of this sort would have been
a considerable expense to state treasuries already stretched by public navies. Indeed, over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Britain’s Royal Navy in itself
was possibly “the largest industrial unit . . . in the entire western world.”17 Whereas the Bank of England served as the source of credit to finance this public force,
France, for a contrasting example, lacked a similar central bank and relied even
more heavily on privateers.18 American privateers for their part considerably
outnumbered the fledgling Continental Navy during the War for Independence
and the U.S. Navy, its successor, during the War of 1812.
In terms of physical maritime capabilities, some naval analysts contend that
there were sharp distinctions between warships and privateering vessels, which
were basically converted merchant ships.19 The former, which took advantage
of technological developments in naval architecture and weaponry, were slower,
more heavily armed, and suited to a range of military tasks, especially confronting like vessels. The latter were faster and lighter in armament. One analyst offers a contemporary analogy: “In no case did [privateers] use the large ships of
the line, comparable in power projection to 20th century battleships or today’s
aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines.”20
Nevertheless, distinctions between state and nonstate capabilities should not
be overdrawn. During the span of centuries in which privateers operated, there
was only a slow specialization of vessels for military tasks. Privateers were not
somehow backward or second-class. As has been argued by a scholar who has
examined the record of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, privateers “were
just as ‘modern’ as their state and state-sponsored naval counterparts, in terms of
the weapons, ships, and maritime crew they used.”21 The reflections of military
historian John Keegan on “men-of-war of the wooden world” underscore the
broad commonality between naval and merchant types: “[Naval vessels] did not
differ in construction, means of propulsion or essential configuration from their
merchant sisters.”22 In fact, in some cases armed merchant ships held their own
against naval vessels. English and Dutch merchantmen in the 1600s sometimes
proved superior to Portuguese and Spanish warships, and French privateers
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during the reign of Louis XIV could be a match for the English frigates of the
day.23
Such distinctions as existed offered merchant ship owners flexibility. Both
naval vessels and merchantmen were expensive to build and maintain, but the
former had no commercial equivalence. Also, given that commerce raiding was
a wartime task, especially designated and state-owned commerce raiders would
represent a burdensome sunk cost during peacetime. As one scholar suggests,
political and financial considerations combined to make privateering ideal:
[Commerce raiding] could be carried out using physical assets . . . that had a peacetime commercial use and therefore had received healthy investment from the private
sector in the years . . . [prior to war]. Indeed, war increased the risk of commerce
and thereby made it less attractive, inclining merchants to look for alternative
24
employment.

In short, merchant vessels were relatively easy to convert for privateering; their
transaction costs were lower.25
Nineteenth-century technological and operational developments, however,
made it difficult for private actors to bridge the gap and offer other naval services. Whereas privateering had for centuries been characterized by wood,
sail, and cannon, the 1800s brought substantial advancements: power sources
(steam, combustion), propulsion systems (the paddle wheel, the screw propeller),
protective materials (iron, steel), and weaponry (gunnery, torpedoes, mines).
These changes significantly increased unit cost and generated sharper distinctions between naval and merchant classes, which in turn reduced shipowners’
transaction-cost advantages:26
When merchant vessels could be transformed easily into privateers, the privateering
system meant that in wartime a ready stock of potential privateers could be drawn
from at low cost. As military technology developed, however, substitution between
private and military use became more difficult, and the cost-saving advantages of
privateering declined. It was one thing to transform a merchant vessel into a privateer
27
and quite another to build a nuclear submarine.

With states, through their navies, now accepting the sunk costs of purchasing,
operating, and maintaining sophisticated and specialized equipment and supporting logistical systems outside of wartime, the space in which private actors
could operate was constrained.28
What is more, the demise of commerce raiding by private actors, alongside
the decline of piracy (and likewise private pirate hunters), may have itself further
segregated commercial actors. It has been argued that reductions of privateer activities in different parts of the world starting in the late 1700s allowed merchantship construction and operation to be optimized, in that armaments were no
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longer needed, nor the sizable crews that had been required to use those weapons
or to seize other vessels. This contributed to merchant productivity increases and
higher tons-per-man ratios.29
In the contemporary era, PMSCs have gone a step farther. To avoid overhead,
they mostly put guards on merchant ships rather than provide escort vessels.
Though reports have suggested that as many as forty vessels might be ready for
antipiracy work, the actual vessel-based presence in pirate-infested waters is
considerably less.30 In short, PMSCs are not platform-centric; they differ from
privateers who offered what were for their time substantial and robust vessels.
To account for this difference, one should note the often-prohibitive initial
capital outlays and the costs of redesign and refurbishment that would otherwise
be incurred, outlays that even so can achieve only constrained levels of capability.
Regarding nonmilitary vessels today, PMSCs confront the same limitations that
merchant owners did in the nineteenth century. This is implied in an observation
of the mid-1990s about contemporary maritime technologies:
Although . . . [naval technology and merchant marine technology] will have much
in common and there are varying degrees of technological overlap, as, for example,
in the manufacture and composition of naval fleet replenishment vessels, auxiliary
craft, amphibious landing ships, hydrographic ships and patrol boats, the operational
parameters and sub-systems of naval operational vessels are often radically different
31
from merchant ships.

PMSCs attempting to “bridge the delta” would face considerable expense. Certainly, they can dip into the limited pool of smaller and older state vessels, those
not already traded between navies and coast guards. However, refurbishment is
required, in part for updating, and in part because certain capabilities are likely to
have been stripped prior to sale. PMSC vessels have been taken from the former
stocks of, for instance, Scandinavian navies, the Japan Coast Guard, and the U.S.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.32 As a result, and unlike the
privateer ships of old, they have rather limited tactical and strategic mobility,
seaworthiness, and armament.
These capability limitations and the temporary nature of contract employment further limit the economic viability of PMSCs at sea. Not all shippers
confronting Somali piracy risk using PMSCs, and for those that do it is often
on a per-passage basis, for which the costs of using a special vessel are higher
than onboard personnel. PMSC vessels would also have little opportunity for
sustained state employment, because of their limited capabilities and constraints
(which will be noted below) on integrating them in larger state naval endeavors.
Indeed, analysis of state gunboat diplomacy finds that vessels that are up to date,
versatile, advanced, and threatening are at a premium. These qualities are not
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fortes of the PMSC industry currently.33 The PMSC industry generally sees in
operating its own vessels uncertain profit streams, sizable sunk costs, client-base
uncertainty, and unknown environmental prospects (e.g., a decline in piracy in a
theater would collapse opportunities there). Accordingly, it does not emphasize
vessels, either qualitatively or quantitatively, as did the privateers of old.34
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE DIFFERENCES
Privateering, because of its underlying commercial rationale and its emphasis on
capture rather than destruction, was arguably not as “warlike” as state military
activities (though some navies awarded prize money well into the twentieth century). The financial necessity for privateers of collecting prizes placed a premium
on flexibility and independent action. As noted above, confrontations with enemy warships were not unknown, but the risk of being outgunned was evident.
The costs of a privateer ship sunk, damaged, or captured were borne solely by
the investors and (in more ways than one) its crew; they were not spread across
a state’s treasury. Moreover, even if a privateer captured an enemy warship, such
ships when condemned usually did not fetch as much money as merchantmen.
During the War of 1812, one American privateer apologized to his employer for
capturing a British naval vessel in the West Indies: “Having sought a contest with
a king’s ship, knowing that is not our object.”35
In a similar vein, blockading and merchant convoying by privateers were relatively uncommon because of the coordination required and the frequent absence
of catchable and lucrative prizes.36 In any case, these tasks were problematic for
privateers. Given that their crews did not receive wages but rather shared in the
bounty after adjudications of prize courts, their financial imperative in the face
of adversity was to flee.
What violence a privateer did commit, therefore, was usually calculated to
minimize damage so as to preserve the prize’s value. One can look at the minimization of violence in two ways. In the micro sense, this desire extended to the
point that some U.S. privateers during the War of 1812 mounted fake, wooden
cannon in hopes of simply overawing their prey. In the macro sense, if privateering arguably lowered the costs for a state to engage in warfare, the means
it employed, in a direct way, were not very destructive. Indeed, the destruction
wrought by state forces in recent centuries dwarfs the contribution of commercial
nonstate actors.37
Yet one can argue that the privateer, however “unwarlike,” was generally on
the offensive—a characterization at odds with the contemporary PMSC industry. Privateers trolled the seas looking for targets to attack; destruction at sea, or
the lack of it, was not central to intent and role. In contrast, for PMSCs, while
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weaponry is sometimes used and destruction can result, the desire is to get the
client “off the spot,” to repel an attacker. In policing terms, PMSCs, land or maritime, are not in the business of apprehending and delivering suspected pirates
for incarceration. In military doctrinal terms, PMSC activities emphasize the
defensive rather than the offensive—that is, “operations in which forces await
for the approach of the enemy before attacking” over “operations in which forces
seek out the enemy in order to attack him.”38
This is not to deny, again, that PMSCs use lethal force at sea. Indeed, once
violence begins, a PMSC may act in very robust ways, knowing the unlikeliness
of backup from public or other private forces. Neither is this to deny that such
use of force is controversial.39 Just as land-based PMSCs have been criticized for
aggressiveness in protecting vehicle convoys, PMSC violence at sea can produce
serious repercussions should a firm mistake other seafarers, such as fishermen,
for pirates.40 Concern also applies to the declaration of exclusion zones around
client ships by firms that have incurred the expense of escort vessels.41 But this is
to say that for the PMSC industry, the “offensive” and “seeking out adversaries”
are almost as pejorative as “mercenary.”
Three components inform the defensive nature of the PMSC industry. This
identification is based on recognizing that a norm is “a standard of appropriate
behavior for actors with a given identity” and thus has qualities both intersubjective (meaning shared understandings) and evaluative (meaning sense of “oughtness”).42 First, on the part of the PMSC industry itself, there is an overwhelming
focus on defensive qualities, a focus that advances self-definition and niche
capabilities. Additionally, this defensive focus places PMSCs in contradistinction
to mercenaries, which, as part of the norm-forming process, are increasingly cast
as offensive-minded actors. For one analyst, defensive activities “minimize the
effect of the charge that they are fighting (and therefore killing) in exchange for
financial gain.”43 Another provides support: “If a private security contractor were
assigned the offensive duties of a regular soldier, that fine line between contractor and mercenary would be breached.”44 Contractors on land have themselves
made similar observations: “Our job in Iraq is not to fight, it is to run. We can
only open fire to defend our clients or our own lives.”45 The formative message
offered by such industry groups as the British Association of Private Security
Companies is similar: “Any military would argue that offence is often the best
form of defense. The private security companies don’t have that luxury; they are
defensive forces.”46
Intersubjectivity also implies consideration of the viewpoints of state actors.
They similarly distinguish, for three reasons, between the offensive and the defensive, with the former acceptable only if performed by states. From one angle,
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states wish to avoid association with the pejorative word “mercenary.” The U.S.
Federal Acquisition Regulation, for instance, makes the point doubly: “Private security contractors are not mercenaries and are not authorized to engage in offensive operations.”47 From another angle, one can view the distinction as a division
of tasks, though not necessarily an exclusive one. General Peter Schoomaker, who
served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 2003 to 2007, believed that PMSCs
allowed military units to conduct combat operations and “higher priority jobs.”48
Nevertheless, public forces still conduct tactically defensive tasks, such as naval
convoying, in countering Somali piracy.49 Finally, one can view the offensive/
defensive distinction as an exercise of self-definition. It helps hone and specialize
state-armed forces in terms of their functions, a process that has arguably been
under way since the end of the Cold War.50 The “value added” or unique contributions of state militaries can thereby be expressed in terms of their particular
and exclusive offensive character, and in so doing a professional distinction and
a warrior ethos are emphasized.
This stance—that only a state’s military, because of its training, character, and
authority structure, is to do certain things and have access to certain weapons—is
reinforced in a variety of academic, military, and think-tank forums. Surveys of
civilian and military officials indicate much greater acceptance of PMSCs working to protect property, personnel, or convoys than of PMSCs performing tasks
like “combat” or “fighting counterinsurgency.”51
Lastly, there is the “framing” of the PMSC industry by the international community writ large. For the founder of the International Stability Operations Association, another PMSC industry association, international endeavor cannot
be underplayed: “In the Geneva Conventions there is no difference between
offensive and defensive combat, which is pretty interesting. The way it’s sort of
come down and been sorted out by the international community is it really does
make that differentiation.”52 As a case in point, one sees the creation of Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights in 2000. Endorsing states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and corporations agree that
consistent with their function, private security should provide only preventative and
defensive services and should not engage in activities exclusively the responsibility of
state military or law enforcement authorities. Companies should designate services,
technology and equipment capable of offensive and defensive purposes as being for
53
defensive use only.

One can also look to the 2008 Montreux Document on Pertinent International
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict—a state-based
initiative designed, first, to uphold international humanitarian law and, second,
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to offer states (and by extension other actors) good practices to consider when
utilizing PMSCs. This document similarly affirms “using force and firearms only
when necessary in self-defense or defense of third persons.”54 Building on this,
the 2010 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
lays down that “signatory Companies will require that their Personnel not use
firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the
imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.”55 Finally, IMO guidance
for shippers places PMSC usage in the context of Best Management Practices
(BMP), which are preventative, reactive, and defensive in orientation. “Full BMP
implementation” is the first resort for shippers; the use of PMSCs is the last. The
IMO’s BMP document, like the others, states that firms “should only use firearms
against persons in self-defence or in defence of others.”56
PMSCs arguably possess great offensive potential. A related irony is that
despite their defensive posture, firms often employ and are managed by former
special-operations forces (SOF) personnel, perhaps the most offensively oriented
embodiments today of the warrior ethos. This SOF “flavor,” however, does not
translate into offensive activities but into the following:
• These personnel work well in small, self-reliant groups—an important factor,
given the aforementioned frequent lack of backup, either by private or public
forces;
• They are generally people-centric, rather than platform-centric, in their
approach;
• Their presence serves as a marketing tool as firms become linked to the heralded activities of contemporary SOF.57
Without a doubt, these distinctions between offensive and defensive and between state and nonstate actors are no small issues, given the arguments about
what PMSCs are and what they might do at sea. There is in play a significant
recasting of the roles of the public sector as traditionally understood. As has been
suggested, PMSCs diverge from “the past trend towards an ever more restrictive
understanding of what role private actors and markets should play in regulating
the use of force.”58 However, the contention here is that the private sector does
not enjoy a tabula rasa. As identities and roles shift, the expectations of states
and other international actors frame PMSC activity and impact how the firms
view themselves. Changes in identity and expectation, therefore, would have to
occur before the PMSC industry could become prominent in the application of
offensive force like the privateers of old. The context and capabilities, and the
resulting imagery, are different.
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PUBLIC GOOD, RESPONSIBILITY, AND COORDINATION
In the maritime context, the idea of pursuing security as a public good, one that
is nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, is challenging, both legally and practically.
Whereas varying degrees of sovereignty can be exercised in territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones, no state is sovereign on the oceans. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) reaffirms that the rights of
states to enjoy freedom of navigation are not to be unduly restricted, a concept
dating from the thought of Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century. UNCLOS
also makes plain the limits on the degree to which ships flying the flag of one state
can interfere with the operations of ships flying that of another. Additionally, the
utter vastness of the oceans makes it difficult for states to exercise control for long
periods of time. This factor points to some of the difficulties the thirty or forty
warships forming the various flotillas countering Somali piracy have faced as the
pirates have become more resourceful and have traveled greater distances away
from Somalia’s shores.59
Nevertheless, one can still take the notion of contemporary pirate-hunting
privateers as an exercise in outsourcing the pursuit of security as a public good
for two reasons.60 First, because privateers would be hunting pirates who prey
on international shipping generally, all seafarers would potentially benefit from
their offensive-oriented activities.61 These modern privateers would be working to uphold freedom of navigation for all. Second, as mentioned at the outset,
the understanding of PMSCs as privateers and calls for privateering are usually
linked to the United States. To a degree, this reflects the significant interaction
between PMSCs and U.S. forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. It also reflects the historical reality that navies of hegemonic sea powers, going back to
the late nineteenth century, have traditionally—though not without significant
legal and operational difficulty—backstopped this freedom of navigation for
both altruistic and self-interested strategic and commercial reasons.62 The rise of
hypothetical pirate-hunting privateers, therefore, would see the transfer/sharing
of the tasks of maintaining freedom of navigation to/with commercial nonstate
actors, with states, particularly the United States, participating in terms of de jure
management and direction through letters of marque.
In contrast, PMSC engagement, as advocated by U.S. Navy voices for the international shipping industry as a whole, has focused on employment by shippers
rather than by states or on PMSC self-employment and remuneration through
an adjudicated prize system. Indeed, history suggests that only the latter could
receive the “privateer” label. Thus, for example, in 2008, when Vice Admiral Bill
Gortney was in command of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, he contended that “companies
don’t think twice about using security guards to protect their valuable facilities
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ashore. Protecting valuable ships and their crews at sea is no different.”63 Rear
Admiral McKnight (Ret.), setting up a dichotomy of either hiring PMSCs or
avoiding dangerous waters, likewise asserted that “the maritime community
must take responsibility for their vessels and ensure safe passage of their cargo
and crew through this [i.e., the Gulf of Aden] pirated region.”64 In 2010, Admiral
Mark Fitzgerald, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, offered this openended recommendation: “There has got to be security on these ships in my
opinion. . . . It is up to the commercial industry to figure out how to deal with
this. But I do not think that we can give them a 100 percent guarantee that we can
protect them, nor should we.”65
Though the U.S. Navy is the world’s only global navy and has a stated policy
of keeping sea-lanes open, these calls put shippers on notice, given the limited
naval capabilities of many European merchant-flag states and the fact that openregistry states generally lack naval-projection capabilities altogether. Subsequently, many states have developed authorization procedures and guidance on how
shippers should use PMSC services (e.g., financial considerations and vetting
procedures). In a similar way, the Montreux Document identifies considerations
for states and other actors, like shippers, to contemplate.
The end result is that PMSC usage is currently based on individual shippers
making security decisions. While pursuit of security as a public good is not inconceivable, at present the pursuit focuses on security as a private good—one that
is excludable and rivalrous.66
One can place this in the context of what has been called the “great risk shift,”
by which responsibility for security writ large is diffusing away from states as a
collection, or from “the state” as an institution.67 This is “responsibilization,” a
reframing of accepted conceptions such that nonstate actors are seen “as a set
of autonomous subjects both responsible for and capable of securing themselves”
rather than as objects whose security is provided by the state.68 On land, for instance, this is evident in how humanitarian and development NGOs increasingly,
if uneasily, rely on PMSCs.69 In some cases donor states even insist that NGOs
employ private security.70 At sea, utilization of PMSCs by shippers, therefore, is
an extension of these trends, with the exception that the binary divide between
state and nonstate is recast as one between a hegemonic navy and the shipper.
The concern is that responsibilization may hinder U.S. plans to develop cooperative relationships among maritime users—a collective plan to foster security
as a public good. In the maritime environment, given its vastness and the much
smaller likelihood that a merchantman in need would receive immediate naval
response, newfound independence may marginalize cooperation between state
and nonstate actors. On the one hand, the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower” looks beyond interstate cooperation to counter transnational
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and irregular challenges: “Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.”71 PMSCs might
value intelligence exchanges with state forces. On land, for instance, operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually featured offices designed to offer situational
awareness, a common operating picture for contractors and the military, and
coordination. On the other hand, even with these structures in place in Iraq and
Afghanistan, participation was voluntary, and many PMSCs did not engage. At
sea, some shippers eschew state-provided convoying because of the unavoidable
time delays involved. As well, shippers likely decline to report instances of piracy
and pirate contact, to avoid unwanted publicity, insurance hikes, and again, delays and associated financial impacts. Finally, the commercial demands of shippers and the cumbersome and slow vessels they mostly operate dovetail with the
PMSC industry’s defensive posture; shippers are not in the pirate-apprehension
business.72 In sum, this responsibilization may lead to the increasing individualization of response rather than the fostering of collective action.
“17TH CENTURY CRIME . . . 21ST CENTURY SOLUTIONS”
If we reach back into history, can we find a phenomenon that better captures
PMSC activism today than does privateering? Indeed, in some ways, responsibilization suggests a return to earlier times. There was in the age of sail an expectation that when shippers “bore the full costs of their actions, they tended freely to
take responsibility for their lives. And thus those in the private sector provided
the goods and services that were needed.”73 During this time, shippers armed
themselves, in part because of the relative weakness of naval forces, and in part
because of the fear of predation by pirates and enemy privateers alike.
In this vein, several maritime analysts identify from the early 1600s onward a
distinction—evident first in the British case and later in the American—between
vessels termed “privateers” and others called “letters of marque.”74 A captain of
one of the latter held an actual letter of marque, authorizing him to arm his ship
for security during long voyages. A letter-of-marque vessel was primarily a cargo
carrier, not optimized as a privateer—which would have a larger (non-wageearning) crew, greater speed, and heavier armament.75 The armament of a “letter
of marque” allowed some operational flexibility; the vessel could risk running
blockades and avoid the inconvenience and expense of convoying.76
While some of these rationales are congruent with today’s considerations regarding PMSC usage, there are important differences. First, the raison d’être of
PMSCs and privateers is the threat or application of violence, whereas this was
only one among a host of elements for the letter-of-marque vessel. Second, in
today’s environment, merchant crews, backed up by seafarer unions, are generally
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unwilling to take up arms. Third—like privateers but unlike PMSCs—“letters
of marque” were substantial ships for their day. Finally, in addition to capturing
a vessel as the result of a successful defense (and thus benefiting financially), a
letter-of-marque vessel might also seek out an enemy ship and capture it as a
prize, as privateers did, should the opportunity arise. Put differently, the “letter
of marque” had an offensive character lacking among PMSCs. This terminology,
then, is no better than “privateer” for the contemporary context.
In that context, the material, regulatory, and ideational differences between
contemporary PMSCs and privateers make plain how commercial nonstate violence is presently organized and enacted in the maritime realm. One can see the
world as it arguably is, rather than as one presumes it is or would like it to be.
One can see an industry that mostly eschews the usage of platforms. The PMSC
industry is largely manpower-centric, and the few vessels it employs are limited
when compared with either the privateers of the past or warships of today. One
can see, whereas historical privateering was mostly offensive-minded, an industry that is today predominantly defensive in its orientation, given the efforts of
(self-)definition undertaken by PMSCs (desiring specifically to avoid the pejorative word “mercenary”), states, and other actors. We can see an industry that,
thanks to responsibilization, is focused largely on pursuing the private good of
security in an independent manner on the behalf of its shipper clients. In sum,
in 2009 the American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, offered this judgment
regarding piracy: “We may be dealing with a 17th century crime, but we need to
bring 21st century solutions to bear.”77 Understanding what contemporary commercial nonstate violence looks like, rather than harkening back to an earlier age,
is similarly necessary.
Additionally, clear understanding of the nature of and constraints on the
private security industry at sea, as currently constituted, is important to assess
accurately its future implications. Indeed, there are several vexing questions for
which an appropriate mind-set, for analysts and policy makers alike, is required.
Concerns are already raised about duplication of effort, difficulties of multinational command, and limitations of intelligence sharing among state forces
working to counter Somali piracy. In what ways and to what effect can PMSCs
be injected into these considerations? PMSCs are increasingly being viewed as
security experts in their own right. To what degree will techniques they introduce that promote their own industry be detrimental to or complementary with
state initiatives? Answers to these sorts of questions are important: “While states
seek to realize their programmes by mobilizing the knowledge, capacities and
resources of others, other auspices [i.e., actors] are clearly acting in very similar
ways to realize their agendas.”78 This article, therefore, is one step in identifying
the actual components of these agendas and how they may evolve in the future.
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INNOVATION FOR ITS OWN SAKE
The Type XXI U-boat
Marcus O. Jones

T

he origins of this article lie in a new study of the Nazi German economy
by Adam Tooze, a fragment of which argues that the need to overcome the
technological deficit built by the Western Allies in antisubmarine warfare from
1939 triggered a major shift in U-boat design and production after 1943.1 Tooze
points out that an emphasis on technological solutions to strategic and operational problems had by that point become a hallmark of the Nazis’, and especially
Hitler’s, thinking. (Other examples were the Tiger and Panther tanks at Kursk,
both of which types proved dysfunctional as platforms, and neither of which
proved decisive to the outcome.) So interpreted, the Nazi penchant for imputing to innovation the means to solve a whole class of operational and strategic
problems seems to resemble “technological fixes” in other fields of innovation.2
In so arguing Tooze writes off the findings of Richard Overy, who points to the
failure of the regime to develop positive relationships between industry and the
war effort as reflecting a “peculiar irrationality of the ‘Nazi social system.’” Tooze
highlights the research of Ralf Schabel on jet-engine development in the aircraft
industry, research asserting that exaggerated technological expectations resulted
from Germany’s hopeless strategic dilemma and
Dr. Jones is associate professor of German economic that the systems themselves, while quite promisand military history at the U.S. Naval Academy. He ing, were rushed into mass production and combat
is the author of a study of German industry and ocwithout adequate testing or development. Interestcupation policy in World War II, as well as of articles
ingly, he then characterizes Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
on Bismarckian strategic policy and the U-boat campaigns of both world wars. Dr. Jones earned his PhD decision to embrace the Type XXI submarine in
at Yale University in 2005.
1943, under the technocratic direction of Albert
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Speer’s ministry, as reflecting both the increasing
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unreality of German armaments propaganda and a progressively more authoritarian cast of the German war economy.
While agreeing entirely with Tooze’s identification of a strong relationship
between Nazi Germany’s broad strategic and economic problems and the technological innovations seen as panaceas for them, this paper argues that the U-boat
Type XXI was nonetheless not nearly so unrealistic a solution as his account suggests, nor as reflective of a grossly dysfunctional culture of innovation as other
commonly cited cases may be. If one assumes Nazi Germany’s essentially flawed
strategic decision to interdict the Allies’ commerce traffic in the Atlantic, then the
German navy, under the technological and operational constraints then prevailing, had no better option than to develop a platform that accomplished what the
Type XXI promised. This revision of Tooze’s case arises from the assumption that
the culture of naval architecture and engineering before 1943, organized around
largely traditional methods of design and construction, was wholly inadequate
to Germany’s strategic problems. In the absence of more promising alternatives,
the decision to subordinate the shipbuilding industry ruthlessly to innovative
technocratic priorities appears more rational than otherwise. It may also serve
as a cautionary example of the extent to which social explanations of technological adaptation must include appreciation of the iron operational constraints on
military effectiveness.
Naval warfare is arguably more revealing of the intimate connections between
technological trends and broader political, economic, and military circumstances
than is warfare of nearly any other kind. As Karl Lautenschläger has argued, “naval warfare in general is sensitive to changes in technology, because it is platforms
as well as weapons that are necessary for combat at sea. Whereas armies have historically armed and supported the man, navies have essentially manned and supported the arm.”3 Determination of the reasons for the paths of innovation taken,
as well as the pace and character of innovation itself, has bedeviled historians of
technology for generations. Every military technological innovation is shaped by
a complex of influences, but most notably by some conception, however well or
poorly understood, of the operational scheme within which it is intended to fit.
The technologies that defined Germany’s Atlantic campaigns had their roots in
expectations about future conflict that seemed entirely reasonable in the 1930s
but proved woefully misguided when the full implications of Hitler’s strategic
ambitions became apparent by 1942. In the decade before the war, the nascent
Kriegsmarine envisioned a limited naval war primarily against France, and after
1938, England. The prevailing operational scheme, which found its strongest
exponent in Admiral Erich Raeder, then commander in chief of the navy, emphasized a balanced fleet comprising heavy and light elements to threaten enemy
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naval and commercial interests in a dispersed manner. The primary role of submarines in this concept was twofold: to serve in a fleet-support and screening capacity, for which a limited number of larger, longer-range, and faster submarines
would be required; and to conduct a commerce war of limited range and intensity
against French, and later English, maritime assets in the eastern Atlantic, for
which a large number of smaller, cheaper, and easily produced boats was necessary. Although some elements within the German naval command in the mid1930s, notably Admiral Dönitz, envisioned a strategy of commerce interdiction
that emphasized an autonomous role for U-boats, the then-prevailing doctrine
saw the U-boat as but one of a broad mix of assets in a balanced fleet. Most importantly, and to the extent that the anticommerce strategy of Dönitz could be
said to have shaped procurement decisions in the late 1930s and early phases of
the Second World War, the notion of wolf-pack tactics against convoys made the
acquisition of as large a number as possible of comparatively simple, inexpensive,
medium-sized submarines a priority in naval planning. However, at no point before 1942/43 could the German navy be said to have enjoyed a substantial priority
in German armaments production. As a result, the German navy began the war
with scarcely more than two dozen oceangoing submarines, and not before 1942,
arguably past the critical point of balance in its commerce war against Britain, did
it have a number sufficient to mount consistent group operations.
As those familiar with the course of the Atlantic war until May 1943 understand, initial German success was gradually eclipsed by superior Allied technology, code breaking, organization, and especially shipbuilding capacity—arguably
the most decisive single element in determining the outcome of the naval war.
On the tactical level, where the platforms themselves were decisive, the increasing
number and effectiveness of Allied convoy escorts and countermeasures, especially electronic means of detection, led to unacceptably high losses of the Types
VII and IX U-boats that made up the bulk of the German fleet. According to the
commander of the U-boat force, Dönitz, losses to mid-1943 amounted at most
to 13 percent of the deployed boats. The severe setbacks that the fleet suffered in
early 1943 amounted to some 30 to 50 percent of the deployed force, with losses
in May 1943 of forty-three boats, or more than a boat a day on average.4 The
limited utility of conventional diesel submarines had become irrefutably obvious. If defensive tactics could deny the submarine surface mobility and compel
it to rely on its subsurface capability for survival, then it became nearly useless
as an offensive weapon. Defensive platforms detected U-boats with radar, sonar,
high-frequency direction finding (“Huff Duff ”), and—most effectively—roving
aircraft, which became increasingly common by late 1943. Aircraft or surface
ships could then prosecute the contact, compelling the boat to dive and holding
it down long enough for a convoy to lumber away. With its slow surface and even
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slower submerged speed, a conventional Type VII or IX U-boat was hard pressed
to develop a second attack angle, and then only if antisubmarine units were not
hounding it.
In a draft assessment of the naval strategic situation in September 1942, the
Kriegsmarine High Command starkly expressed its first noteworthy reservations
about whether the U-boat campaign could have the desired decisive effect on the
Allies’ capacity to sustain their war effort, a finding based as much on the vulnerability of existing platforms to Allied countermeasures as on anything else.5 Although the finding was stricken, the final report acknowledged that “not one war
in history was won by the use of a single weapon,” a caution reflecting the simple
fact that Germany could not sink enough tonnage fast enough to overcome the
enormous American shipbuilding capacity.6 Although Hitler had declared on
many occasions that he considered U-boat warfare crucial for the overall war
effort, not until after the surrender of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad did he seize
on it as the sole remaining offensive potential available to the Third Reich and
accord it a meaningful priority in war production.
These circumstances lay behind the radical shift in platform design and production priorities after 1943. The essential question facing the strategic leadership after the midyear debacle was whether to abandon the Atlantic—which
would amount to an almost inconceivable admission by professional officers of
the strategic bankruptcy of their service—or to redouble the effort and shift the
terms on which commerce warfare was waged through evolutionary advances
in platform survivability and effectiveness.7 Dönitz, commander in chief of the
German navy as of January 1943, opted for the latter, with the full backing of
Hitler. The platform that would bring about this transformation was the Type
XXI submarine.
Historians have generally thought of the Type XXI—along with other systems
like the Me 262, V-1 and V-2 rockets, and the Tiger tank—as an example of Wunderwaffen, wonder weapons. Since 1945 many have fixated on the revolutionary
military technologies that the Third Reich developed in the last two years of
the war.8 The cultural impetus behind the concept, as implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by historians in the uneven and largely enthusiastic literature on the
subject, was an irrational faith in technology to prevail in operationally or strategically complex and desperate situations—a conviction amounting to a disease, to
which many in the Third Reich were prone in the latter years of the Second World
War.9 To the extent that it shaped decision making, faith in the Wunderwaffen
was a special, superficial kind of technological determinism, a confidence in the
power of technology to prevail over the country’s strategic, operational, and doctrinal shortcomings. To the extent that leaders, officers, engineers, and scientists
after 1943 believed innovation to be the answer to Germany’s strategic dilemmas,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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they displayed a naive ignorance of how technology interacts with cultural and
other factors to influence the course of events. In particular, they reflected a willful ignorance of the extent to which even substantial technological superiority
has proved indecisive in human conflict throughout history.10
The origins of the Type XXI program lay in a test platform built in 1939–40 by
a brilliant propulsion engineer, Helmuth Walter, who intended it to serve as a
prototype of a genuine submarine weapon.11 Submarines to that point, their name
notwithstanding, had actually been little more than extremely slow, vulnerable,
largely helpless torpedo boats capable of brief submergence. The underwater
speed and endurance of standard U-boat types were insufficient to stalk and close
on typical convoys, though they traveled at speeds of only eight knots or less, and
were barely adequate against slower formations; U-boats were forced to spend the
bulk of their time on the surface, vulnerable to all manner of countermeasures.
Walter’s test bed, designated V80, achieved an impressive twenty-eight knots
submerged and seemed to address the need for a genuine high-speed underwater
platform. The boat suffered from a range of thorny technical problems, however,
most notably the type and quantity of fuel required by the closed-cycle Walter
engine—highly volatile Perhydrol, or hydrogen peroxide. To power the boat
the Perhydrol was reduced by chemical processes, generating extremely highpressure gases that spun a propeller-geared turbine at nearly twenty thousand
revolutions per minute. A submarine operating such a closed-cycle system could
remain submerged as long as its fuel supply permitted. However, the Walter
turbine required colossal amounts of fuel to meet even modest performance
parameters, far outstripping the bunkerage capacity of existing U-boat designs.
Walter, ever inventive, therefore conceived of a U-boat with a pressure hull of
a figure-eight form: the top half would house the machinery, weapons, and the
crew, while the bottom would contain the large amount of fuel necessary to
power the turbine. The design draft was designated the Type XVIII.
In a November 1942 meeting on U-boat design projects, the director of naval
construction, Heinrich Ölfken, along with a pair of engineers, Friedrich Schürer
and Klaus Bröking, happened on the idea of utilizing the Walter architecture to
house a conventional electric propulsion system able to drive the boat at underwater speeds higher than those attained by existing designs.12 The lower loop of
the figure eight, where Perhydrol would have been stored, afforded space for an
enormous increase in battery capacity, effectively triple that of a conventional
Type IX U-boat.13 The massive battery plant would run a powerful electric-drive
system, necessitating diesel power to charge the batteries much less often than
current boats required. Preliminary testing revealed that the performance of the
hybrid design, although it fell far short of the prototype Walter boat, far exceeded
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that of existing platforms, especially underwater. Admiral Dönitz, still commander of the submarine force, agreed that the concept merited further development and approved additional design work and testing. Theoretical calculations
and modeling were complete by January 1943; five months later, the naval staff
was provided with a preliminary design draft.
The resulting boat, designated Type XXI, displaced some 1,620 tons and was
capable of a submerged sprint of eighteen knots sustained for an hour and a half,
a moderate speed of from twelve to fourteen knots for ten hours, and silent running at five knots for sixty hours. Most importantly, it was designed from the outset to incorporate the sensors, countermeasures, and other devices understood by
that point to be indispensable in the commerce war: water-pressure-controlled
automatic depth-keeping equipment, an improved passive listening array, active
sonar, a radar-search receiver, effective active radar, and a snorkel. Dönitz presented the Type XXI design to Hitler at a conference on 8 July 1943 to win his
approval for the additional allocations of resources and labor required to realize
a production program. Having persuaded Hitler, Dönitz issued an order on 13
August for the full-scale transition to building “Elektroboots.” Initially, he had intended the Type XXI to replace the outmoded Type IX, but after the catastrophic
performance of his boats in May 1943 he determined that it should take the place
of the Type VII convoy-attack boat as well.
One cannot exaggerate the importance of the experience of the U-boat service
in May 1943 to Dönitz’s decision to shift production to an entirely new platform
in wartime. As the officers and sailors who manned the U-boat fleet, and who
had fought so doggedly, now found, no amount of willpower or doctrinal ingenuity on the basis of existing boat types could overcome the collective effects of the
countermeasures the Allies employed so well by 1943. The obsolescence of the
German navy’s U-boats, which in the early years of the war had been the scourge
of the British war effort, had come about so quickly and completely that it was
compelled in the circumstances of a failing war to attempt a leap in submarine
capability simply to have any hope of affecting the Battle of the Atlantic. In other
words, Dönitz argued, his submariners had no choice but to innovate further, on
the basis of their disadvantage. Thus understood, the capabilities of conventional
U-boats by 1943 represented a “reverse salient” in a technological system (in
this case, the interlocking network of technologies and practices of a maritime
commerce war as a whole)—that is, “components in the system that have fallen
behind or are out of phase with the others.”14 In technological terms, the reverse
salient is the weak link that impedes progress. The concept has its origins in
descriptions of warfare, where it refers to a section of an advancing military
front that has fallen behind the rest, typically becoming the point of weakness in
an attack and a zone, a sack, of vulnerability in defense, a lagging element that
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

127

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 1

JONES

123

prevents the rest of the force from fulfilling its objective. Until the reverse salient
is corrected, an army’s progress comes to a halt. “When a reverse salient cannot be
corrected within the context of an existing system, the problem becomes a radical
one, the solution of which may bring a new and competing system.”15
Even had Germany produced a large number of Type XXI boats in time to
field them during the war, or brought forth any at an earlier date, it is doubtful
whether they could have corrected the salient and fulfilled the promise of the
Wunderwaffen. Historians have spilled much ink to argue how revolutionary a
technology the Type XXI was and how qualitatively different would have been
the terms on which the Battle of the Atlantic was fought had Nazi Germany sent
substantial numbers of these high-performance platforms to sea. But a sober consideration of the new boat’s capabilities in the context of existing Allied countermeasures makes plain that it would not have shifted the terms as much as Dönitz
and the rest of the German leadership hoped. The Type XXI offered no expansion
of missions beyond the three basic ones performed by submarines between the
outbreak of the First World War and the launch of nuclear-powered USS Nautilus
in 1954: coastal defense, naval attrition, and commerce warfare.
To be sure, the class certainly stood to enhance the ability of the German submarine force to fulfill its missions more effectively. But it could not have enabled
the force to perform the other three significant roles of submarines that arose
later in the twentieth century: projection of power ashore, fleet engagement, and
assured destruction. Only the nuclear submarine, with its ability to remain submerged as long as the crew could feed itself and remain sane, offered navies the
means of fulfilling those tasks, and then only in conjunction with technologies
as yet undeveloped during the war. Most importantly, the Type XXI would have
done nothing to solve the target-acquisition problem, arguably the single greatest obstacle to success in the U-boat campaign against Allied shipping. Without
long-range patrol aircraft to detect convoys and fix their positions, submarine
commanders had to rely on what could be glimpsed from atop the conning towers of their tiny craft. Limiting the effective range of observation was not only
the submarine’s low freeboard but the generally miserable weather of the North
Atlantic Ocean. Even patrol lines of U-boats strung out across large areas frequently missed sizable convoys, and the vast majority lumbered by anyway. Only
the Luftwaffe, which Hermann Göring guarded with jealousy and bile, could
address that deficiency. For these reasons, it is important to understand the Type
XXI as an evolutionary technological development of existing undersea warfare
technologies, as opposed to a platform of the kind that changes entirely the nature of naval power altogether.16
However, in the design and production of the Type XXI lay evidence of innovation greater than that represented by the platform itself. The two principal
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shortcomings in the German navy’s approach to commerce interdiction in the
Atlantic lay, first, in its resource disadvantage in the war economy relative to
the other services—an inferiority that was itself a function of the lesser strategic
significance of the Atlantic war for the Nazi regime—and second, in the capacity
constraints of the German shipbuilding industry. The former shortcoming was
addressed to some extent on a political level in mid-1943, when Dönitz secured
Hitler’s acknowledgment of the importance of the U-boat war and approval for
the Type XXI program, along with his promise, however nebulous, to resource
it adequately. Dönitz dealt with the latter in a more radical manner. No amount
of political capital could extract a higher unit productivity from the alreadystretched shipbuilding industry, which was understood by that point to be essential to turning the tide of the Atlantic war. Certainly, one could not reasonably
expect Type XXI submarines to be produced at the same rate as earlier types, or
anything like it, as the new design was far larger, more complex, expensive, and
resource and manpower intensive than its predecessors. A transformation of
shipbuilding itself was essential.
In 1942, German U-boat construction, which by this point accounted for
the bulk of total shipbuilding capacity, was organized around largely traditional
methods of design, engineering, and production. The navy enjoyed a preeminent
position in defining standards and regulating construction processes, as well as
generally warm relations with the traditional shipyards, all of which guaranteed
a high level of quality but did not meet the demands of mass production in a
materiel-intensive war effort. That unsuitability was apparent as early as 1941,
when the minister for munitions, Fritz Todt, broached the possibility of setting
up a “Main Committee” for shipbuilding, based on the promise of industrial
self-regulation, to centralize and make more efficient U-boat production. Rudolf
Blohm, head of the enormous Blohm und Voss shipyards and an archreactionary
capitalist, chaired the new organization, along with Ernst Cords of Krupp Germaniawerft. A key obstacle to higher rates of production at acceptable cost was
the navy’s custom of ordering boats on a quarterly basis; true mass production of
the requisite components, large and small, required larger orders over lengthier
periods of time, for which manufacturers could plan and invest on an appropriate scale.17
The committee quickly brought about a partial and largely successful reorientation of production of the conventional Type VIIC, the standard U-boat class
of the war. Noteworthy in these early reforms were the establishment of longseries production and the subcontracting of major-component manufacture on
a provisional basis to inland steel-construction firms—the latter being a critical,
often-overlooked precedent of the Type XXI program. Moving production of
major subcomponents to inland subcontractors permitted the specialization of
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manufacturing processes and reduced the time a U-boat spent in the slips during assembly, important for increasing shipyard throughput and for reducing the
yards’ vulnerability to Allied strategic bombing.
As already described, with Dönitz’s appointment as commander in chief of
the German navy in January 1943, just prior to the disastrous convoy battles of
May, came a major shift in the orientation of the U-boat fleet. Dönitz was persuaded that nothing short of an industrial miracle would supply enough Type
XXI boats to tip the balance of the Atlantic war. In a devil’s bargain, therefore, he
relinquished the navy’s traditional strict control over ship design, engineering,
and construction to Albert Speer’s armaments ministry, which at that point was
expanding its control into every corner of the German war economy. Speer’s price
for the manpower and raw materials to mass-produce the new class of submarine
was the subordination of the dockyards to his ministry. Even with the backing
of his powerful organization, however, the best initial estimates for an accelerated development program foresaw the arrival of the first boats only in late 1944,
with series production beginning in March 1945.18 Conventional U-boats had
generally required between two and two and a half years to mature from concept
to serial production; assuming that a conventional development curve applied
as well to the Type XXI—an optimistic assumption, since it was a far larger and
more complex boat—the earliest the new class could join the fleet would be 1946.
A breathing space for the Allies of more than two years would presumably mean
the loss of the Atlantic entirely.
To close the time gap, Speer resolved to break the conservative engineering
and construction culture of the established dockyards with a radical program of
modular construction and dispersed, serialized component manufacturing. In
July 1943 he appointed Otto Merker, an impetuous forty-year-old industrial engineer with extensive experience in automobile and fire-engine manufacturing, to
head the Main Committee for Ship Construction. Merker proposed that the new
class of U-boats be assembled from eight large, prefabricated sections weighing
between seventy and 130 tons apiece, assembled inland by firms that had been
to that point, in most cases, rolling and shaping plate steel for pressure hulls. The
advanced design and engineering work for the new class and the detailed planning for its production were assigned to a new, centralized organization called
the Ingenieurbüro Glückauf, established in Blankenburg/Halberstadt to take over
tasks traditionally handled by the yards of individual shipbuilders. Intense Allied
bombing and communication difficulties drove the decision both to centralize
the Ingenieurbüro and to situate it far from the waterfront. Nearly 50 percent
of all German steel firms were to be involved to varying extents in manufacturing and assembling the hull sections and machinery for the new boats; many
of the vendors had never before performed high-precision finished work and
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would require substantial technical direction to meet the exacting standards of
pressure-hull construction. The prefabricated sections were to be transported
by barge on inland waterways to three final assembly points: Blohm und Voss in
Hamburg, Deschimag in Bremen, and Schicau in Elbing, east of Danzig. Utilizing
such methods, Merker claimed, the first Type XXI could be launched by 1 April
1944, with production rising to thirty boats per month by autumn of that year. In
fact, with the entire organization leaning ruthlessly toward the lofty production
targets, the first copy was launched—amid great fanfare—less than three weeks
late, on 19 April 1944, the day before Hitler’s birthday.
Nonetheless, the Type XXI U-boats had almost no impact on the outcome
of the Second World War, save perhaps to absorb large amounts of manpower
and resources that might have been devoted more wisely to the manufacture of
aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions. Indeed, a senior engineer
in the naval shipbuilding program estimated that a single Type XXI submarine
consumed a volume of armaments-grade steel equivalent to some thirty tanks,
a meaningful offset for the war in light of the much shorter production time for
an armored vehicle.19 By that logic, the program cost the war effort some five
thousand tanks, a very consequential figure, and could be said to have hastened
the defeat of Germany on the Eastern Front. The new class hardly seemed a
formidable prospect at the outset, at any rate. The first copy, assembled hastily
as a showpiece for the führer’s birthday, leaked so badly upon launching that it
required pontoons to remain afloat; following the ceremony, it was towed immediately to dry dock for extensive repair.
The extraordinary complexity of the new boats, the novelty of the tactical
concepts they made possible, and the difficulties of training new crews to man
them in the mine-infested waters of the Baltic—to say nothing of the vagaries of
producing them as the Western Allies relentlessly bombed German production
centers—ensured that none of the roughly eighty produced by the end of 1944
was fit for action on delivery. Only two sallied forth on war patrols before the end
of hostilities; neither sank an enemy vessel. Early Type XXI hulls suffered from
defective diesel-engine superchargers, faulty hydraulic torpedo-loading systems,
trouble-prone steering systems, and countless other deficiencies, making them
decidedly less of a threat than originally foreseen. The improvised character of
the boats’ production made addressing these early shortcomings daunting. Basic
to modern naval shipbuilding—and among the greatest challenges to effective
platform development throughout the history of modern military procurement
—is the feedback loop from the fleet back to the design bureau and shipyard
about the actual operation of a vessel on patrol and in combat. Almost no early
iteration of a ship class emerges from the slipways in a form optimized for its mission, and countless changes, large and small, factor into subsequent iterations.20
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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The very processes that ensure the efficiency of serial production make such
loops challenging, if not impossible, to establish. It had been this concern that
lay at the core of navy objections to the abdication of authority over shipbuilding
to the Speer organization, and it proved a major reason for the checkered early
history of the program.
Certainly, the authors of the production concept had enormous obstacles to
surmount to realize its potential.21 As has been noted, few of the inland firms
tasked with constructing the hull segments and machinery could initially meet
the standards required, at least under the fraught circumstances of a failing war
and the ruthless timetables established by Speer’s organization. The tolerances
involved in submarine construction were and remain extremely exacting. Type
XXI hull sections were initially delivered to the shipyards with deviations of up
to three centimeters in some cases and had to be torn apart and reconstructed
properly—with massive outlays of time and effort—in the ways. Pressure testing revealed potentially lethal defects in the welding of the first boats, a result of
poorly fitting components, new inspection standards, and construction methods
unfamiliar to the facilities performing them. But the design agency, engineering
staff, and shipyards addressed and overcame these problems by autumn 1944.
However, easily the greatest impediment to full realization of the serial production process, as postwar assessments make clear, was the intense and devastating Allied bombing campaign against its key components, especially the
shipyards and installations at the waterfront.22 The increasing vulnerability of the
shipbuilding industry to bombing had made it necessary to scatter and move production away from launch sites. Enormous resources and labor were devoted to
the construction of an elaborate inland system of barges and cranes to transship
the boat segments to the finishing yards. The delivery system never really functioned smoothly, and in any case a sizable administrative apparatus was required
to oversee the just-in-time process. The ingenuity of the Merker organization was
never adequate to the challenge of Allied strategic bombing, the downstream effects of which were felt at every point.
As Tooze sensibly points out, “the disappointment of the XXI programme was
due to the familiar problems of pushing a revolutionary new design straight
from the drawing board into mass production, without extensive testing.”23 He
faults the Speer ministry in particular, for clinging stubbornly to the system
of dispersed sectional construction, arguing that an evolutionary approach to
production, instead of a revolutionary new one, would have likely yielded more
favorable results. Indeed, the engineer Friedrich Schürer raised such concerns
in late 1943, as the joint complications involved in both a radical new platform
and novel methods of engineering and production became increasingly clear.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1
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He suggested that the construction of the first boat proceed in a conventional,
customized fashion, to develop experience with the platform itself. As Merker
pointed out, however, to build the first Type XXI by conventional means would
require no less than eight months, while the sectional method, however flawed,
would require only four. The entire apparatus of dispersed sectional construction, moreover, was scheduled to commence operation in April 1944.24 Merker’s
argument cuts to the entire point of the program—time was of the essence. The
desperate operational and strategic circumstances of the German naval campaign in the Atlantic necessitated no less than an all-or-nothing approach to the
production of the only platform that offered any prospect of success against an
overwhelming Allied technological and materiel advantage.
As Dönitz well understood, a small number of even superlative boats would
have produced little change in the Atlantic. The only hope for an effective naval
interdiction strategy lay in building the Type XXI in numbers similar to, or
greater than, those in which the Type VIIs had been constructed before 1943,
thereby overcoming simultaneously the Allied superiorities in technology and in
materiel. As we have seen, that goal was not achieved. But even so, it is astounding that a platform as complex and resource intensive—by the standards of any
combatant nation—as the Type XXI could move from the drawing board to the
water in a year, and by a radically new manufacturing process. The technology of
the platform itself ultimately amounted to no more than an incremental or evolutionary improvement in the German ability to close the Atlantic; it most probably
would not have realized the extraordinary effectiveness hoped for by its proponents then and admirers today. But the innovative method of constructing the
new class represented a revolutionary transformation of economic practice in a
war defined primarily by the mobilized productive potentials of the combatants.
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DO NO HARM
Levinger, Matthew. Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2013. 265pp. $20

Conflict resolution is often compared to
medicine. Both fields pursue research
not as an end in itself but to relieve suffering and promote healing. Both have
as their first tenet “Do no harm.” Writers
on conflict too must display academic
rigor yet show sufficient clarity and force
to engage a diverse readership. Most
importantly, they must offer ideas that
will be helpful in real-world situations.
Levinger’s book excels on all these
counts. This work, focused on largescale violence, is intended as a “practical
reference and field guide” for diplomats,
military officers, development specialists, nongovernment organizations,
and corporations operating in conflict
zones. Levinger is highly qualified
for this task, having held positions in
executive education on conflict management at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Museum, the United States Institute of
Peace, and George Washington University, where he is currently visiting
professor of international affairs and
director of the National Security Studies Program at the Elliott School.
A three-part structure addresses the
nature and causes of conflict, analytical

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/1

tools, and a process for transforming analysis into action. Of particular
value is the attention Levinger gives
to the social dynamics of collaborative
analysis, illuminating how interaction among individual and institutional participants can affect outcomes,
both positively and negatively.
Levinger begins on a cautionary note,
pointing out that while the level of
conflict has declined since the Cold War,
resource shortages and other factors
could reverse that trend. He reviews
leading theories on conflict’s causes,
offering useful insights into the psychology of escalation and the role of women
in reducing conflict as well as sustaining it. A chapter on risk assessment and
early warning discusses monitoring
systems, including the U.S. government’s Monitoring Progress in Conflict Environments program. Levinger
stresses early detection of genocidal
violence, which can be “more explosive
and extreme than other conflicts.”
The section on analytical tools describes conflict assessment frameworks, narrative analysis, conflict
mapping, and scenario analysis. All are
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powerful instruments, but Levinger
offers caveats. He recommends beginning with a self-assessment to clarify
one’s own interests, and he cautions
that any analysis can only be a “snapshot.” Moreover, “in many cases, the
interpersonal relationships and the
deliberative process established during
the conflict assessment will be more
valuable than any specific conclusions.”
An illuminating chapter on “cognitive
minefields” addresses three challenges
familiar to many readers: groupthink,
“black swans,” and psychic numbing.
Regarding the latter, Levinger argues
that contrary to conventional thinking,
emotional response is integral to sound
decision making. In the words of psychologist Paul Slovic, the ideal process
is “a dance of emotion and reason.”
Levinger prescribes five steps for integrating analysis into program planning and implementation: framing the
problem, defining objectives, conducting
situational analysis, designing a program
of action, and monitoring progress.
More discussion would have been
useful here on specific ways of integrating senior leaders’ perspectives into
working-level deliberations and on helping them in turn to grasp the dynamic
complexity of volatile situations. As
Levinger notes, “conflict analysts should
not seek to become decision makers, but
rather to help decision makers become
better conflict analysts themselves.”
Levinger offers illuminating case studies,
tables, charts, and boxes highlighting key points. The comprehensive
appendixes, glossary, and list of resources add further to the value of this
book. It should be standard reading
in every security-studies program.
LAWRENCE MODISETT

Portsmouth, Rhode Island
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Harrison, Ross. Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide
for National Security, Foreign Policy, and Business
Professionals. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,
2013. 197 pp. $29.95

Ross Harrison, a professor at Georgetown University and well-known strategic theorist, takes the novel approach
that the basic tenets of strategy are applicable to nearly all human endeavors.
Rather than accepting the traditional
view that the strategic theory relevant to
a national-security professional is inapplicable to a corporate executive, Harrison introduces a multistep approach to
identifying and applying what he characterizes as universal strategic principles.
Harrison sees the aim of all strategies, regardless of the field in which
they are utilized, as being to navigate
a multidimensional external environment to the ultimate benefit of
one’s chosen endeavor. Whether you
are a military officer confronting an
asymmetric-warfare challenge or an
entrepreneur seeking to expand your
product’s market share, the underlying principles of sound strategy remain
constant. Harrison identifies three
unchanging dimensions in any strategy: systems, opponents, and groups.
The author states that systems relate to
the external environment confronting
all strategies, a “web of relationships
where a change in one part has an effect on the other parts.” A “system” can
be as defined as a formal alliance, like
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or as diffuse as the entire Middle
Eastern region and its political, economic, and cultural characteristics.
Harrison’s most subtle and nuanced
proposition is that the formulation
of strategy in the context of external
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environments is directly impacted by the
systems that shape that environment.
Harrison’s discussion of the opponent—
whether a transnational terrorist organization or a corporate competitor—as
a universal dimension of strategy builds
on his understanding of systems. While
one can seek to change the external
environment in one’s favor by strategizing against a system—for example, U.S.
efforts to promote democracy in the
Middle East as a long-term strategy to
prevent radicalization and extremism
—there is a more direct approach
available against individual opponents.
Businessmen can assess their competitors’ products and decide to invest in
specific market areas where they perceive opponents to be weak. Nationalsecurity strategists can recommend the
implementation of counterinsurgency
strategies focused on protecting local
populations because they perceive opponents to be alienating the citizenry.
Finally, Harrison discusses the impact
of groups on strategy, whether citizens organizing to protest a business’s
environmental record or mass public
opinion impacting the strategies of governments. By enunciating his concept of
groups, systems, and opponents, Harrison performs the service of providing
broad categories encompassing virtually
all the actors that confront strategists
of either a commercial or security bent.
In so doing he underlines the point
that regardless of the area of endeavor,
a strategist will face conceptual frameworks very similar to those facing
colleagues in other fields. An important addition to the study of strategy,
Strategic Thinking in 3D does much
to expand the traditional understanding of strategic theory from a narrow
subject lacking commonality between
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multiple fields of activity to a universal
framework for achieving one’s goals.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY

Washington, D.C.

Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground Up: TwentyFirst-Century Combat as Politics. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. 256pp. $32.50

Emile Simpson served in Afghanistan as
an infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha
Rifles. At first glance, the book might
appear to be an account of his experiences there; in fact, however, it is a sophisticated examination of twenty-firstcentury warfare and of the employment
of the military instrument of power.
Its front cover is embellished with the
endorsement “Deserves to be seen as
a coda to [Prussian military theorist/
philosopher Carl von] Clausewitz’s On
War.” This is no small feat, and Simpson
delivers an intellectually sophisticated
account of the changed nature of warfare, examining war through two lenses.
The first lens is the traditional use of
armed force to seek to create military
conditions within which a political
settlement can be reached. Second, he
examines armed force deployed for a
distinctly political purpose. While these
modes are by no means mutually exclusive and can be employed by the same
actor at the same time against the same
enemy, Simpson asserts that understanding the difference between these two is
essential to achieving national-security
objectives in the twenty-first century.
Simpson continually refers to two ideas
from Clausewitz. The first is polarity—
the simple idea that wars are usually
contests fought between two sides. The
second idea is that traditionally, strategic
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audiences are contained within the
nation-state structure. When war is a
contest between two sides, the audiences
are easy to identify, and traditionally
these audiences understand the outcome of the war in terms of the contest
between the armed forces of the sides.
When multiple strategic audiences, some
of them not contained within or associated with nation-states, do not understand or interpret the military outcome
in the same way, “the military outcome
does not provide a stable basis upon
which to define a conflict’s outcome.”
Simpson argues that “strategic confusion
can result when conflicts characterized
by competition between many actors in
a fragmented political environment are
shoehorned into a traditional concept of
war, which is two polarized sides.” The
information revolution and advances
in communications and social media
have exacerbated this problem, forcing
overlap not only between the tactical
and strategic levels of war but between
the tactical and policy levels as well.

have weighed in on the changed nature
of warfare in the twenty-first century,
such as David Kilcullen, Colonel Gian
Gentile, and Antonio Giustozzi. A
visiting defense fellow at Oxford in
2011, Simpson fuses a firm grasp of
traditional humanities and philosophy
with his experience in Afghanistan.

Simpson describes war as a competition
between strategic narratives. Accordingly, planners at all levels should be
targeting strategic audiences as centers
of gravity. It is a matter not so much of
the Clausewitzian dictum that war is
designed to compel your enemy to do
your will but of compelling your target
audience to understand your message.
War from the Ground Up provides case
studies for this proposition ranging
from the coalition effort in Afghanistan
in 2006 to the British strategy in the
Borneo conflict in the mid-1960s. The
author also addresses other insurgencies throughout the narrative, including
the conflict in Sri Lanka and Russian
operations in Chechnya, and refers to
the work of prominent authors who

Andrew S. Erickson is a leading authority on Chinese naval developments.
His research and linguistic abilities are
matched by his careful, systematic analysis. In this work Erickson thoroughly
surveys the existing literature in English
and Chinese addressing Beijing’s efforts
to deploy antiship ballistic missiles
(ASBMs) able to strike large warships at
ranges of more than a thousand miles.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

He has provided us with what may be
one of the most important books on
strategy in a long time. No short review
can do justice to this remarkable book,
which should be read by all military
officers and policy makers, as well as
anyone involved with the planning
and execution of military operations.
JEFFREY SHAW

Naval War College

Erickson, Andrew S. Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications. Washington, D.C.:
Jamestown Foundation, 2013. 110pp. $18

The author credits China with developing ASBMs as part of its strategy of “using the land to control the sea.” However,
this represents a misinterpretation of naval history. While it is true that “a ship’s a
fool to fight a fort,” it is also true that no
nation has successfully defeated a naval
force with land power alone. Examples
include President Thomas Jefferson’s
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construction of coastal forts and of
a fleet of inshore gunboats to fight
Britain’s global navy, and the successful U.S. amphibious campaign against
Japan’s island bastions in World War II.
Erickson’s key question is, How successful is China’s ASBM system? He
concludes that a functioning ASBM
has been developed by Beijing but
that final operating capacity remains a
work in progress. Erickson highlights
a crucial weakness in China’s efforts
to deploy such a complex system of
systems when he describes the “tremendously complex and difficult
process” of ensuring “extremely close
coordination” among several branches
and agencies in a Chinese bureaucracy
notable for lacking that attribute.
The ASBM-warhead issue is not satisfactorily addressed in the literature. Why
would a U.S. commander assume that
an incoming ballistic missile is armed
with a conventional warhead and not a
nuclear one? Employing ASBMs poses a
possibly insuperable danger of escalation
from conventional to nuclear warfare.
As Erickson points out in his conclusion,
“PLA sources reveal overconfidence
in China’s ability to control escalation,
which is itself an extraordinary danger.”
The author’s conclusion that an aircraft carrier group “would have a large
electromagnetic signature” ignores the
progress made in the 1980s in operating
under dramatically reduced electronic
emissions conditions. Also, the author
errs if he attributes to China a unique
policy of “asymmetry” in the development of weapons designed to counter
U.S. military strengths. Any intelligent
military does that. I also question the
author’s conclusion that the United
States is “on the ‘wrong end of physics’” with respect to matching China
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militarily, in view of his inability to
describe countermeasures presently
under development or in force.
However, these are minor criticisms of a
thoughtful evaluation of current Chinese
efforts to defend the homeland and exert
control over the waters Beijing believes
vital to national-security interests. Also
impressive is Erickson’s appreciation of
the possibility of “deeply destabilizing”
strategic effects of successful Chinese
maritime control strategies on the Asian
political situation—that is, a successful ASBM will not simply be a tactical
weapon. This is a book that every naval
officer and civilian analyst must read.
BERNARD D. COLE

National Defense University

Nordquist, Myron H., and John Norton Moore,
eds. Maritime Border Diplomacy. Boston, Mass.:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2012. 366pp. $146.98

In 2011 the thirty-fifth annual conference on the law of the sea and oceans
policy was held in Bali, Indonesia.
The conference attracted (as it always
does) an impressive array of presenters
and attendees. The editors offer with
this work a compilation of the papers
presented. Perhaps because they made
no concessions to make the presentations “accessible,” the result is something of a rarity—a compilation that
remains interesting and useful. Each of
the seven sections has much to recommend it. All are potentially useful, and
the “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms”
section is especially well presented.
This collection is a fascinating spectrum of topics ranging from specific
cases, such as the “2008 China-Japan
Agreement on Cooperation for the
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Development of East China Sea Resources” and “Law of the Sea Aspects
of Indonesian National Legislation on
Submarine Communication Cable,” to
much broader tropics. These include at
least one discussion on climate change.
The issue of maritime boundaries (as
one hopes most readers of the Naval
War College Review will know) is
highly complex, and some of the more
notable disputes of the present are
so charged as to carry with them the
potential to escalate into hostilities.
Perhaps the contending claims over the
Paracel and Spratly Islands are the best
known of these disputes, but maritime
disputes can be found in every ocean
in the world. Set against a backdrop
of continuing tensions in the South
China Sea and the U.S. “pivot” to the
Pacific, this work is especially timely. It
is also varied. Not only is the ParacelSpratly dispute addressed, but so are
issues involving the United States and
Mexico, and Canada and France.
The contributing authors are an impressive lot. They include senior government ministers, ambassadors, senior
members of foreign ministries, and
scholars of international maritime law.
Unfortunately missing from the lineup
are military or coast guard authorities,
who would have brought yet another
point of view to the discussion.
Not surprisingly, this work ranks high
on rigorous scholarship, meticulousness
of citation, and careful crafting of arguments. The tone, however, is legalistic,
and in many cases the authors clearly
expected from the audience familiarity
with ongoing arguments and history
that a lay reader might not possess.
One of the more surprising facets
of this book is the optimism of the
authors, taken together, about finding
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peaceful solutions to the issues. As
Ian Townsend Gault points out, such
techniques as zones of cooperation,
while by no means perfect, may be
more effective than they seem at first
glance. Also, Rodman R. Bundy’s
discussion on potential approaches to
dispute resolution utilizing the services of a third party is illuminating.
Those with more than passing interest
in these issues should definitely read
this book. It is well written, organized,
and delivered. It deserves a place on the
bookshelf of any maritime-related business, government office, or law firm. Unfortunately, it is not likely to become a
household item, because of its technical
and legal focus, not to mention its cost.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Struett, Michael J., Jon D. Carlson, and Mark T.
Nance, eds. Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance. New York: Routledge,
2013. 226pp. $29

Piracy presents an extraordinary set of
challenges to navies, law-enforcement
agencies, jurists, shipowners, and
seafarers, challenges that have generated a voluminous literature. Historical piracy has become a subject
du jour, and there is even an evolving discipline of piracy studies.
Piracy also challenges internationalrelations theory. Most theoretical
responses have been either neorealist or
neoliberal, viewpoints that assume that
both states are the central actors, acting
rationally under unitary governments.
Neorealism seeks to explain piracy
(most studies have focused on Somali
piracy without reference to the attacks
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that have occurred in Southeast Asia
or off Nigeria) in terms of state failure,
and counterpiracy as the maximization
by states of their competitive advantage
over other states in an international
system where material capabilities are
changing. For its part, neoliberalism argues that states seek to create norms and
shape them through international institutions. These facilitate cooperation and
enable states to act through them under
international law, albeit for self-interested
reasons. Exponents of this theory see
United Nations action and UN Security
Council resolutions as reflecting the
aims and objectives of their sponsoring
powers. It also explains why so many developmental initiatives have foundered
within Somalia—because they seek to
aid the creation of a Western-style liberal
democracy rather than political arrangements that may align more closely with
Somali political and clan structures.
However, the book under review also
collects a number of essays articulating
a third approach, called constructivism.
That theory departs from state-centric,
rationalist approaches to suggest that
social processes, including norms
other than international ones, as well
as issues of identity, inform security
interests across a range of players and
shape their actions accordingly.
This collection focuses particularly
on the topic of global governance, a
construct that places particular emphasis on institutions and regimes (in this
case security regimes) and implies that
international institutions are actors in
their own right. In this view, these actors
have objectives that are often different
from those of their member states and
that in turn shape the behavior of those
states and of nonstate actors. Interestingly, and rightly, it takes the view that
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because piracy occurs in a space outside
territorially bounded state authority,
maritime depredation asks profound
questions about who exactly decides
what is right and wrong, and why.
Several contributors make the point
that differences between state responses to piracy reveal governance
gaps in the interstate system, gaps that
pirates have exploited—and states too,
a point emphasizing the indissoluble
connection between piracy and state
action. The role of international law
comes under particular scrutiny. Legal
discourse has played a crucial role
in framing the piracy problem in the
modern era, arguably at the expense of
political and economic approaches.
In the end, this important and useful
book asks everyone with an interest
or a role in piracy issues to confront
questions that affect all users of the
sea, military and civilian. Are we
witnessing the end of an old regime,
the reactivation of old legal mechanisms, or the development of a global
governance regime based on international institutions? Moreover, where
will this process end and will notions
of universal jurisdiction, and perhaps
global citizenship, spread out from their
current enclaves and touch us all?
MARTIN MURPHY

Alexandria, Virginia

Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern
Middle East. New York: Doubleday, 2013. 592pp.
$28.95

As the subtitle suggests, the First World
War, with its unintended consequences,
unbridled imperial ambitions, and a
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complicated maze of duplicitous dealings among untrusting allies, underlies
the making of the modern Middle East.
One could easily add martial lunacy
to this list of horribles, as this brief but
highly relevant treatment of Britain’s
mismanagement of the Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and Gaza campaigns will attest.
None of this is news, but the topic has
garnered a great deal of attention in
recent years. Anderson covers the familiar ground well, outlining the political,
diplomatic, military, and economic
drivers of imperial ambitions as the
Western allies plotted the dismantling of
the Ottoman Empire. In telling this tale
Anderson discusses the usual suspects:
Mark Sykes, Henry McMahon, King
Husayn, Faisal ibn Husayn, Lord Kitchener, and a host of others. More interestingly, however, he ties in as well a number of important players who generally
get short shrift. The German diplomats
Max von Oppenheim and Curt Prufer
are major players in the story. So too is
Djemel Pasha, the Turkish governor of
Syria. The role of the American William
Yale, first as an officer of Standard Oil
Company of New York and later as a
special agent for the State Department,
is also significant, if only for beginning a
ninety-five-year tradition of fundamentally misreading the region. Finally, the
importance of Aaron Aaronsohn and his
Zionist spy ring that supported British
operations in Palestine receives its due.
Anderson’s T. E. Lawrence is a complicated and enigmatic man who “seemed
intent on baffling” historians. Noting his many admirable and not-soadmirable qualities, Anderson neither
praises nor condemns but rather tries
to understand this hugely talented but
ultimately unsuccessful man. Relying heavily but not uncritically on
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Lawrence’s writings, Anderson attributes
his tactical, operational, and essentially
political-military successes to brilliance,
timing, and sheer luck—the latter largely
owing to his managing to avoid the
consequences of having infuriated any
number of very senior officers. Anderson portrays well the tension caused
for Lawrence by the duplicity of British
and French diplomacy vis-à-vis the
Arab uprising between his loyalty to
Britain and his sense of personal honor.
Among the cast of dishonest brokers
Anderson paints as the worst Mark
Sykes, a brilliant but unprincipled dilettante with no apparent compunction
against lying to his own government or
to Britain’s allies. Working diligently to
advance Britain’s imperial interests by
managing the flow of (and often inventing) information, Sykes accumulated
a great deal of responsibility for the
postwar mess that was and remains the
Middle East. Others contributing to the
mess are a whole bevy of senior British
and French officials, and also Woodrow
Wilson, whose profound ignorance,
idealism, and arrogance opened a
Pandora’s box of ethnic and nationalist
desires that still smolder throughout the
region. As for the Arabs, often portrayed
as victims, they seem here not to have
been as gullible as it may appear. Citing
Husayn’s and Faisal’s not-alwaysaboveboard diplomacy, aided by Lawrence’s unauthorized revelation of the
secret Sykes-Picot agreement, Anderson
argues that the Arabs were not exactly
“rubes” when it came to power politics.
A journalist by trade, Scott Anderson
is a frequent contributor to a variety of
periodicals and the author of two novels
and several books of nonfiction. His bibliography is extensive, but the paucity in
it of Arab and Turkish sources is notable.

143

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 1

In addition, his use of nonstandard notations can render specific citations a little
fuzzy. This is a minor issue, however,
as Anderson’s synthesis is superb, his
analysis is sharp, and his writing style is
engaging. All in all, this is a very useful
contribution to the body of work, one
that helps foster a better understanding
of the dynamics shaping today’s Arab
Spring and beyond. Given America’s
track record in the region, anything that
helps broaden our understanding of the
Middle East can only be a good thing.
THOMAS E. SEAL, COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
RETIRED

Stafford, Virginia

Boscawen, Hugh. The Capture of Louisbourg,
1758. Campaigns and Commanders. Norman:
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2011. 504pp. $39.95

The British amphibious operation to
capture the French fortress at Louisbourg in Canada during the Seven Years’
War was the largest joint operation undertaken by British forces in that period.
This major event in naval history has
not been overlooked by historians, but
no one until Colonel Hugh Boscawen,
British Army (Ret.), has been able so
effectively to combine the skills of an experienced army officer with those of an
insightful modern historian in analyzing
this campaign and its commanders.
A direct descendant of the British naval
commander at the capture of Louisbourg, Admiral the Honorable Edward
Boscawen, Colonel Hugh Boscawen
brings his own experience of thirty years
of active military service in the Coldstream Guards to bear on the subject,
with his knowledge of modern-day
campaign planning and execution. Such
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credentials might have led an author
in the wrong direction, resulting in an
anachronistic and hagiographic tale full
of modern military jargon. However, in
Hugh Boscawen’s hands they have led
to a model of careful historical scholarship informed by professional military
understanding, experience at sea as a
yachtsman, and access to family papers.
Starting out from the key conceptual
point that campaigns and commanders should be seen in the context of the
aims, ways, and means of their own day,
Boscawen has carefully and judiciously
examined the subject. Over many years,
he made a thorough study of both the
published English- and the published
French-language scholarship. Going
much farther and deeper, he examined
in detail the extensive public and private
records in four French and eight British
archival depositories, as well as other
primary-source materials in Canada,
the United States, and private hands.
Colonel Boscawen opens his study with
an overview of the strategic situation
that the competing powers of Britain
and France faced in the period immediately leading up to 1758, and of the
contrasting organization of those governments and their leaders. Boscawen
goes on to examine the background to
the construction of the French fortification at Louisbourg, ranging from the
reorganization of the defense of New
France following the Peace of Utrecht
in 1713 to the perception on both
sides that Louisbourg had become an
important trading point, the key bastion
in the defense of the Saint Lawrence
River and Quebec, as well as the French
fisheries on the Grand Banks. When
war broke out again between the two
countries in 1755, neither was immediately prepared to react decisively.
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Colonel Boscawen traces the initial planning for the Louisbourg campaign up to
August and September 1757, when the
Select Committee of the Privy Council
in London began to look at priorities
for the next campaigning season. By
December a campaign plan had emerged
and operational planning had begun;
meanwhile, the French were taking their
own action to strengthen their position
in Canada. The British assault force
began to gather at Halifax in April, while
snow was still on the ground. By 2 May
Admiral Boscawen had arrived, immediately selecting key land and sea officers
to form a joint staff to plan the landing.
Such a staff was a remarkable innovation, for which the need had already
been made clear in earlier eighteenthcentury British experience. Among several initiatives this group took were joint
operational training and a system of operational control for the landing boats.
In eighteen days in May 1758 at Halifax,
fourteen British regiments, artillery,
rangers, and the fleet were transformed
into a cohesive expeditionary force.

Once ashore, Brigadier James Wolfe was
able to gauge the range of the fortress’s
guns and to locate the initial position
that Amherst would use for the first
parallel in the siege that ensued. Turning
to the French side, Boscawen follows the
French as they defended their position.
He then traces the action in two parts—
the siege, between 1 and 15 July, and
the bombardment, from 16 to 27 July.

Colonel Boscawen provides a detailed
description of the initial assault landing, under the command of the newly
arrived Major General Jeffery Amherst.

Naval War College
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As Colonel Boscawen points out, British success at Louisbourg marked the
beginning of the end of New France,
and it also began a series of British joint
amphibious operations during the remainder of the war. It also showed early
signs of the coming changes in military
affairs, marked by increasingly organized industrial and agricultural support
for larger armed forces. Boscawen’s
study is a model of historical analysis,
judiciously dealing with both sides of
this joint operation in military and
naval dimensions. It is a major contribution to understanding an eighteenthcentury amphibious operation.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s program manager

T

for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

he Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy,
recently approved an update to his CNO Professional Reading Program
(CNO-PRP) for the 2014 calendar year. He has declared, “I encourage you to read
these relevant books—they are about our profession. The list is designed to help
us learn more about our proud heritage and gain a greater understanding of what
it means to be a 21st Century Sailor.” The update added five new books:

• Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare, by P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, is the
latest publication from two of the nation’s most forward-thinking intellectuals in the field of advanced technology. Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy
(Ret.), describes this book as “the most approachable and readable book
ever written on the cyber world. A must-read for practitioners and scholars
alike.” The book addresses many of the specific challenges the Department of
Defense confronts in keeping pace with the latest technologies and methods
for maintaining data security. In this emerging war-fighting area, where tools
and tactics are constantly changing, this book will help keep the Navy’s cyber
warriors on the cutting edge.

• Leading with the Heart: Coach K’s Successful Strategies for Basketball, Business, and Life, by Mike Krzyzewski and Donald T. Phillips, provides entertaining and informative lessons on how to build a culture of success. The
story of Duke University basketball coach Mike “Coach K” Krzyzewski is a
great example of living the American dream through hard work and dedication. The son of working-class Polish immigrants, he earned a scholarship
to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he first played and later
coached basketball. His secrets to success are communication, trust, collective responsibility, caring, and pride. The parallels for a military leader—
such as in team building, dealing with high turnover rates, and learning
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to overcome defeat—are readily apparent. As the title advertises, there is
something for every reader, in every walk of life, to take away from this
inspirational book.

• The Trident: The Forging and Reforging of a Navy SEAL Leader, by Jason Redman and John Bruning, tells the story of Lieutenant Jason Redman’s odyssey
as a Navy SEAL and wounded warrior. His experiences as an enlisted man
who rose through the ranks and earned a commission reflect the inspiring
courage, dedication, and commitment he showed throughout his career.
Redman was severely wounded in a firefight in Iraq and earned national
attention when he posted a sign on his hospital door at Bethesda warning all
who entered not to feel sorry for him because of his wounds. In his introduction to the book, Robert Gates, formerly Secretary of Defense, writes,
“There already are many books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There
will be more, including by those who experienced the fire of combat. This
story, though, is not just about a SEAL on the Iraqi battlefield, but a SEAL at
war with himself and his ultimate victory. I believe his story will inspire the
reader, just as it did me.”

• Turn the Ship Around, by Captain David Marquet, U.S. Navy (Ret.), recounts the true story of how the fast attack submarine USS Santa Fe (SSN
763) went from worst to first in the Pacific Fleet. Captain Marquet describes
his experience as a new commanding officer of Santa Fe and the creative
approach he used as the crew prepared for its scheduled deployment just
six months after he took command. This book takes traditional, businessoriented management books one step farther by translating the valuable
lessons of seasoned business leaders into a story to which Navy readers can
relate—of a typical command overcoming challenges and getting ready to
go to sea.

• The Twilight War, by David Crist, details the past three decades of U.S.
military operations in the Persian Gulf region, including the formation of
U.S. Central Command and the Fifth Fleet Naval Headquarters in Bahrain.
Every chapter of The Twilight War pulls back the curtain from previously
undisclosed and often underappreciated events that have shaped U.S.-Iranian
relations. This masterfully researched historical account focuses on those
relations since the fall of the shah of Iran and the beginning of the Iranian
Revolution.
The eighteen books in the CNO-PRP provide a wide range of titles that support the CNO’s tenets of “Warfighting First,” “Operate Forward,” and “Be Ready.”
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The five new titles will be shipped automatically to all ships, squadrons, and
major activities during the first quarter of 2014. Pick up a book—and “Read to
Be Ready!”

JOHN E. JACKSON

(Thanks to Commander Dan Dolan, U.S. Navy, for assistance with this article.)
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